Phi Kappa Phi FORUM
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Fall 2003

Globalization

Phi Kappa Phi FORUM

Phi Kappa Phi Forum Mission Statement

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The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the staff of *Phi Kappa Phi Forum* or the Board of Directors of The Honor Society of Phi Kappa Phi.

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Fall 2003

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GLOBALIZATION

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Phi Kappa Phi Forum publishes appropriately written letters to the editor every issue when submitted. Such letters should be 150–300 words in length.

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Columns:

Poetry: "Fish Through Nets" by Pat McCutcheon (20); "Biology" by Tom C. Hunley (25); "Old Dog" by Tom Hansen (37); "Eat" by Paulann Petersen (41); "Pelicans at Dawn" by Van Hartmann (47); "House Moving" by Jeanne Emmons (48).

Book Reviews: Lois Roma-Deeley's *Rules of Hunger*, reviewed by Peter Huggins (42). Dan Brown's *The Da Vinci Code*, reviewed by Annie C. Bond (42). Peter Ginsborg's *Italy and Its Discontents: Family, Civil Society, State (1980–2001)*, reviewed by V. Louise Katainen (43).

A Note from the Editor

James P. Kaetz

IN THIS ISSUE

When my wife's grandfather, Howard Litch, was alive, he served as the founder, curator, and tour guide of the Galena Mining and Historical Museum in Galena, Kansas, where my wife grew up. Galena was once a boomtown, a lead-mining center, with its own opera house. Howard lived his entire life there, and his father was a lead miner. His father was determined that his son not work in the brutal conditions in the mines and encouraged him instead to go to work for a local mechanic. Eventually Howard opened his own garage, which became a town fixture (as did Howard himself), yet he never lost his love for the town's mining heritage. He collected every mining artifact he could get his hands on, to the point that people began to talk about finding a place to put his collection. The idea took hold, the unused town train depot was moved and renovated, and the museum was born.

What does all this have to do with globalization? Well, the town of Galena happens to sit on a stretch of fabled Route 66. Apparently, people both inside and outside of the United States simply cannot get enough of the "Mother Road," and their travels on it take them right through Galena. Many of them stop at the museum. Howard loved to come home and say, "Well, we had some Germans through today" — or Norwegians, or Japanese, or English, or many other nationalities. What Howard was seeing in his own small corner of the world was globalization at work. An American pop-culture artifact, the old television show *Route 66*, had made its way overseas and awakened a need for people to see this quintessential piece of Americana.

The global village, it seems, is just about here. The internet and e-mail have made the world smaller, as have television and films (with the interchange going both ways, though the United States primarily exports to the world), and of course the internationalization of business and manufacturing has made us all tremendously dependent on each other. In this issue, our authors look at some of the good and the bad of globalization — the intended and unintended effects of the "shrinking" of our global home.

Leading off is Amy Chua, who writes of one of the unintended effects: the rise of ethnic hatred and conflicts in those countries where ethnic minorities control the majority of the wealth. She uses her own family's experiences in the Philippines to illustrate a disturbing situation that has been exacerbated by international trade. Tyler Cowen then tackles the question of whether the globalization of culture, in particular the overwhelming of the world with American popular culture, is destroying the native cultures of other regions. Cowen argues that instead of eclipsing local cultures, frequently foreign influences provide both the materials and the market to allow native art and music to develop and to explode onto the international scene.

Next, Alison Brysk examines the sticky issue of globalization and human rights. She points out that globalization has a mixed record when it comes to supporting and encouraging human rights — it is a double-edged sword that can help or hurt, depending on the country and the financial status of the people involved. David Dollar of the World Bank looks at the economic effects of globalization. He also argues that results are mixed, with some poor countries experiencing tremendous gains and others much less, again depending on many factors. The interesting thing is that people in poorer countries have a much more positive view of global economic integration than do those in richer countries.

Next, Robert Schaeffer discusses globalization and technology. Schaeffer cautions us that we must look at some of the hidden costs of new technologies. For example, advances in recycling practices and technologies have depressed world markets in raw materials, which for some countries that depend heavily on the income from exports of such materials can be a severe economic blow. Alan Bairner next examines the question of whether or not globalization is bringing an end to the idea of national teams and sports. He decides that globalization does not mean homogenization, and national and international rivalries remain as fierce today as they ever have been.

Finally, a piece from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention outlines that agency's plans for protecting our nation's population from the threat of worldwide epidemics. Given the recent scares over Mad Cow disease, West Nile virus, and SARS, it is a subject that we all need to know more about.

APPRECIATIONS

My main appreciations for this issue go out to all Phi Kappa Phi members for their gracious attitude about our big goof in the Spring 2003 issue (see page 11 in case you have not yet noticed it). In particular, I wanted to thank our authors in that issue and the Board of Directors of The Honor Society of Phi Kappa Phi for being supportive and understanding. I also wanted to say thanks to one of our practicum students from last spring, Jessica Lytle, for researching and suggesting Alison Brysk as one of our authors.

We hope that your own experiences with globalization are uniformly excellent. Enjoy the issue!

Forum on

Education & Academics

Too Much, Too Soon or Enough is Enough

Andrea Ickes-Dunbar

What's the Matter With _____ Today?

- 0 a) kids
- 0 b) schools
- 0 c) teachers
- 0 d) all of the above

"Isn't it awful? When I was a kid . . . ." Hold it! I object! It is not a fair question. It does not take into account the complex societal changes that have occurred between yesterday and today, the influences that have changed vulnerable youngsters from naive and sheltered children to jaded pseudo-adults, the accelerated and standardized public school curriculum that has created unrealistic expectations of students, the . . . oh, you want a fill-the-blank answer. Okay, here it is: "too much, too soon." Wait, I can explain . . . when I was a kid . . . seriously . . . .

When I juxtapose my own middle school memories with observations of students in my present seventh- and eighth-grade classrooms, I notice some startling contrasts and some surprising parallels. My "findings," of course, cannot be generalized across settings. I am a participant-observer, a surviving exemplar of 1950s upper-middle-class white Berkeley Hills Public School kids, and a survivor of twenty years as a middle school teacher. From my dual vantage point as sexagenarian and veteran teacher, I am prepared to take on the question. Herewith my response.

It seems only yesterday that the girl next door was (gasp!) mysteriously starving herself, that the girl three houses up was (gasp!) kidnapped and murdered, that my friend's mom (gasp!) committed suicide and her dad later (gasp!) married (gasp!) a Mexican (gasp!) divorcée with (gasp!) two daughters by her previous marriage. In the world of my childhood, much was hidden from children. The lives of adults were virtually unknowable and, frankly, of minimal interest.

I never read the newspaper except when required to bring a current-events article to class. Television consisted mainly of Westerns or cartoons, pretty innocuous fare. When I was able to handle the vocabulary level, I occasionally relished the fictional perversions of Edgar Allen Poe. I knew nothing about anorexia, spousal abuse, date rape, or bipolar disorder. I thought talking about suicide with friends was a sign of superior intellect and philosophical angst. I did not know that kids ever actually tried to kill themselves. At school we watched a cautionary film on heroin addiction and came away terrified of this monster that lurked somewhere out there, but nowhere we knew of.

With the exception of occasional shocking revelations, the stability of my young life was absolute. The only time I missed school was when I was sick in bed. Every day when I got home, my mother cheerily inquired, "How was your day?" My response, "Fine." We did not discuss details. My parents pretty much stayed out of my school life. I rarely asked for help. They provided me with every kind of lesson: violin, horseback-riding, swimming, ballroom-dancing. As far as I knew, everyone lived much the same way. Perhaps they did not, but an aura of privacy prevailed; the inner workings of families were not publicized.

Some of my students, even today, exemplify a stable, family-centered upbringing. Many more, of course, have fragmented families, rife with conflict, and they experience multiple moves, poor nutrition, nonexistent schedules, and inconsistent parental discipline.

In marked contrast to my childhood, nothing is withheld from today's children. Depravity and dysfunction are luridly dramatized on television and video. Poe-like characters are ordinary folks in the nightly news, and horror stories are marketed at every reading level. My students gulp "meds." Several talk about mental illness as if it were routine, and one recently remarked that she might soon return to the "looney ben" (sic).

School also has changed significantly since my days as a student. When I was an eighth-grader, writing a school report meant merely summarizing a plot or rephrasing text and copying pictures by hand from a single source, preferably an encyclopedia. I still have several such essays in a box in the garage. I would be mortified to show them to my students, of whom far more is required. Today's seventh-graders are expected to "write narrative, expository, persuasive and descriptive texts of at least 500–700 words, which demonstrate interpretive response to literature, clearly articulated supportive evidence compiled through the formal research process," etc. etc. etc. So states the *Reading/Language Arts Framework for California Public Schools*.

Teaching methods have also changed. When I was a student, all classroom questions were formulaic "display questions," where the answer is already known by the teacher. The teacher was the only person qualified to think, to explicate text, or to have a valid opinion. The student's job was to listen, memorize, and regurgitate. I prided myself on the fluency with which I paraphrased teacher talk. Never was I challenged to interpret text according to my own understanding, to compare one work of literature with another, to have an informed opinion, to write a persuasive essay, or to elucidate the theme

(continued on page 9)

Larry Chambers

No Crystal Ball

Today's "state-of-the-art" investment advice has been built upon a basic flaw — a shortcoming that causes investors to fail over and over again. That flaw is the concept that someone can predict the future. In fact, the entire securities industry thrives on this erroneous concept by focusing on past performance.

This belief system supports the sale of individual investment products and the competition for investable assets by funds. The people who work on Wall Street put together a good rationale for their stock picks, but the stock market is like the game of golf: it will humble anyone.

The stock-market pricing system is a vast information-processing machine that registers the implications of all available information. You may not know the information directly, but you have the implications of it in the set of market prices. When you make an investment decision by looking at stock-market prices, you are essentially saying: That price contains all the information of investors everywhere all over the planet. You do not need to spend too much time questioning the validity of the price; you are using approximately six billion times the information that you, individually, possess.

EFFICIENT MARKETS

The previous paragraph is an oversimplified example of "efficient markets," a phrase coined in 1965 by Eugene Fama, a University of Chicago professor. Fama's efficient-market theory is probably the most misunderstood hypothesis in economics. It asserts that prices are probably wrong, and that they are right only on average. In other words, the amount that a stock is over- or underpriced is purely random.

When markets are efficient, it is because information moves rapidly and prices immediately reflect new information. Efficient also means that the prices reflect the knowledge and expectations of all investors. That way, no person can consistently know more about any individual security than does the market as a whole. The only condition necessary for market efficiency to occur is that nobody systematically profits more than could be expected by chance at the expense of other investors (as long as no one cheats).

Once researchers were able to get their hands on the earliest computers, they confirmed that asset prices did behave in a purely random fashion. They proved beyond a doubt that no one can forecast what is going to happen next.

It is ironic, then, that the most competitive sector of the economy, the financial-service industry, is designed to give advice based on the belief that the very markets they trade in do not work. According to Wall Street's view, stock prices react to information slowly enough to allow some investors, presumably professionals, to take advantage of market inefficiencies. But as good as Wall Street pundits think that they are, given all the available information, they still do not know where or when it is going to be inefficient. No evidence exists of any large institution having anything like a consistent ability to get in when the market is low and get out when the market is high; attempts to switch between stocks and bonds, or between stocks and cash, in anticipation of market moves, have been unsuccessful much more often than they have been successful.

But we still find that *all* traditional Wall Street-investment advice involves forecasting some future event, such as interest rates, the Federal Reserve's action, or whatever is in the media that day. Then, investments are made in anticipation of this action, and the portfolio is actively traded in an attempt to react to the accuracy of the forecast. It is then regularly modified as new information enters the picture. The media have taken advantage of this and have built an industry over this same flaw.

Money managers on Wall Street believe that the stock market is not priced correctly and that they can exploit the mispricing, or by buying the stocks before anyone else finds out then selling them for a profit.

The research departments of these Wall Street firms and media experts then try to guess which way interest rates will go, or which industry or sector of the market will "be in favor" over the next six months to a year. In essence, they all are simply telling the public that their "crystal ball" is better.

How does this misinformation get validated? Because every once in a while, someone like Warren Buffett or Peter Lynch shows up as having done an extraordinary job of picking stocks. Of course, you do not hear about them until after the fact. In the same timeframe, thousands of other investment managers did not come close to beating the market. But, investors are still desperately seeking the next Peter Lynch to guide their decisions — someone else to take responsibility for the guesswork.

Here is the part most investors do not understand: For an active money manager or broker to succeed, the markets must fail to correctly price an individual issue of stock, and that manager or broker must identify the mispricing and act on that information before it is corrected. The problem is, no one can consistently do it!

Look for yourself; examine the top-ten mutual funds for the last year, or five years, or ten years, or look at the top-twenty funds — you will find that the winners do not repeat over time. Someone will be at the top of the list, but they are not there because of any repeatable traits. Yet Wall Street wants people to believe that someone can predict the future.

MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY

Fifty years ago, Harry Markowitz, then a graduate student at the University of Chicago, developed a keen insight that risk (which he defined as volatility) must be the central focus for the whole process of investing. What Markowitz found was an investment world blindly living in a paradox. While it was accepted that human beings, by their nature, are risk-averse, investing had essentially ignored the interrelationship between risk and return.

This became Markowitz's doctoral study and created a concept known as Modern Portfolio Theory, MPT for short. This revolutionary concept, which in 1990 would earn Markowitz the Nobel Prize in Economics, involved a 180-degree change in viewpoint from what was (and still is largely today) considered the way to design and manage a stock-and-bond portfolio.

Ironically, Wall Street still does the opposite. Blinded by arrogance today's investment firms still believe that they can somehow discover the one nugget of value and opportunity that no one else has seemed to be able to find, and then repeat that process over and over again.

Rather than wasting time trying to predict individual actions, Markowitz thought you should concentrate on the entire portfolio's risk or volatility. Markowitz discovered that for every level of risk, some optimal combination of investments will give you the highest rate of return. He created a concept of blending investments together in a manner that lowered the overall volatility of the total portfolio. Even though if evaluated separately, the individual investments within the portfolio each might be considered too "risky" or volatile, Markowitz found that if you blend such investments together, the overall portfolio's risk or volatility may be reduced. This effect was possible if the various investments were up and down at opposite times to one another. The impact upon the total portfolio was a canceling out, or reduction, of the total portfolio's volatility.

Out of this discovery, Markowitz created the concept of an "Efficient Portfolio," which meant blending different investments together specifically for the purpose of controlling the volatility risk of the whole or total portfolio. The overall returns that the whole portfolio experienced could be enhanced, thereby adding value to the portfolio itself.

THREE-FACTOR MODEL

Modern Portfolio Theory was expanded and refined to further explain the relationship between a portfolio's risk measurements and the returns that resulted while exposed to that risk. It has evolved into the latest and newest version that University of Chicago professors Eugene Fama and Ken French call the Three-Factor Model. That model argues that 96 percent of returns in a portfolio can be explained by three factors: exposure to the overall stock market, exposure to company size, and exposure to value. In concert, these factors drive all the variation in stock returns, not superior stock selection or market timing. The only way to get returns above the market is by increasing exposure to a risk that has been identified to deliver extra returns. Extra returns come from the small companies (size effect) and exposure to value companies (the value effect). The growth of those companies is riskier and, therefore, over long periods of time they have higher expected returns.

The difference is that the three factors explain everything in returns, and what cannot be explained is called residual risk, which is risk through concentration of securities, manager risk, stock picking, market timing, or foreign risk.

But even though this knowledge is widely available and indisputable, here is what most investors will do: They will go into a bookstore and pick up *Fortune*, *Money*, and *Forbes* and read over and over that companies which are profitable, healthy, well run, and have great management and great ideas have higher expected returns, and to avoid companies that are poorly run, have stupid ideas, bad products, and low profitability. But think about this from a different angle: When prices are lower it means that the investor is getting a bigger chunk of those companies' future earnings. It's the *cost of capital that determines* stock returns.

The next column will continue to build an understanding of how you can be a successful investor without owning a crystal ball.

Larry Chambers is a freelance financial writer living in Ojai, California. He has authored more than 800 magazine articles and thirty-four business books. Two of his books remain specialty best sellers, and three have found their way into book-of-the-month clubs. One of his books,* The First Time Investor*, was named one of the top five books for "investing on a shoestring" by Chuck Myers, Knight Ridder,* Washington Review*. He welcomes feedback at Lchamb007@aol.com.

FORTHCOMING ISSUES

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PROFESSORS PROFESSING

Forum on Science & Technology

Devlin M. Gualtieri

Proof and Truth in Mathematics

The idea of "proof" is the guiding light of mathematics. No matter how many examples you can give for the reality of your theorem, if you cannot offer a valid proof, then your theorem is merely a conjecture. After confidently mastering elementary algebra, most students are taken aback by the difference between algebra and geometry. Elementary algebra is taught as a tautology. Expressions are set equal to each other, and these equations are manipulated to obtain the desired reduction in complexity, such as finding the value of a variable (equating the variable to a number). Geometry, however, is an exercise in logic. In a geometric proof, each step follows logically from the others, and there is a chain of truth that extends from beginning to end.

Euclidian geometry as truth was an underpinning of mathematics until the nineteenth century, when mathematicians found that it was based on a flawed axiom. That axiom, the "Parallel Postulate," states that if you have a line and a point not on the line, only one line can be drawn through the point parallel to the first line. A trio of mathematicians — Lobachevsky, Bolyai, and Riemann — showed that there exists, in one case, more than one line; or in another, no such line. The truth of Euclidian geometry was either destroyed or transformed into three new truths, depending on your mood. Mathematicians preferred the three truths to no truth, and mathematical life went on.

Bertrand Russell continued the assault on mathematical truth in the twentieth century. Russell is famous for the nearly 2,000-page tome, *Principia Mathematica*, coauthored with Alfred North Whitehead, in which he attempted to reduce all mathematics to a form of logic. Russell used logic in the form of a paradox as his weapon against truth. Russell's Paradox, outlined in a letter to fellow mathematician Gottlob Frege, has an analogy in the statement by Epimenides, a Cretan, that "All Cretans are liars." Russell's mathematical statement of this paradox implied that there could be no truth in mathematics, since mathematical logic was flawed at a basic level.

This logical assault on mathematical truth continued in the work of Kurt Gödel, an esteemed associate of Albert Einstein. Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem, popularized by Douglas R. Hofstadter in his book, *Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid* (Basic Books, New York, 1979), caused quite a stir at its publication. This theorem states that certain statements in mathematics exist in a shadow world in which they are neither true nor false; they are "undecidable." The consequence of this is that there is a fundamental uncertainty in mathematics.

Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem is to mathematics what the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle is to physics. The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, published at about the same time as Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem, states that some things in the physical world cannot, in principle, be known. Many physicists, Einstein included, were not convinced that, in effect, some things Man was not meant to know. Today, the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle is taken as fact, and it is even a useful tool. Likewise, mathematicians have chosen to live with incompleteness. Gregory J. Chaitin of IBM has stated that Gödel's Theorem "has had no lasting impact on the daily lives of mathematicians or on their working habits; no one loses sleep over it any more."

In 1950, Alan Turing, a founding father of computer science, proposed a test of machine intelligence that he called an "imitation game." This game is now called the "Turing Test," and the modern form has a person conversing with a computer program and guessing whether he or she is chatting with a machine or a real person. Turing thought it was necessary for the computer program to occasionally answer some questions wrong, lest its perfection prove it was not human. Mathematicians, of course, are human, and Andrew Hodges of Wadham College, Oxford, UK, remarks in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, "Turing's post-war view was that mathematicians make mistakes, and so do not in fact see the truth infallibly. Once the possibility of mistakes is admitted, Gödel's theorem becomes irrelevant." Turing, apparently, rejected the idea of mathematical truth.

Computer programmers often repeat the slogan, "To err is human, but you need a computer to really screw things up." In light of the fallibility of computer code, it is interesting to see how some mathematicians have integrated computers into mathematics. The first notable example is the "proof" of the "Four-Color Conjecture." The Four-Color Conjecture dates back to 1852, when a mapmaker, Francis Guthrie, found that four colors seemed to suffice to make a map in which no region of any color abuts another of the same color. The mathematician Arthur Cayley published this as a conjecture in 1879, and in that same year Alfred Kempe published a proof that remained in force until 1890, when an error was discovered. In 1976, Kenneth Appel and Wolfgang Haken published a "proof" of the Four-Color Conjecture, pushing it into the domain of the Four-Color Theorem. Their proof caused considerable controversy because they had used a computer to analyze systematically every conceivable map and demonstrate that four colors worked. Appel

and Haken's method can be realized only with a computer because the computational workload is too much for mere humans. Mathematicians, of course, are still searching for a "real proof" of the conjecture, but perhaps not as hard as they were before.

Now that the low-hanging fruits have been picked from the mathematics tree, the remaining conjectures are requiring very long proofs that are prone to error, both in their construction and in the necessary checking by other mathematicians. A mathematician might err in a proof, and other mathematicians might compound that error by not catching a mistake. Fermat's Last Theorem was, until recently, one of the great unproven conjectures. This conjecture was written by Fermat in the margin of a book around 1630, and Fermat claimed to have discovered a proof, but he did not have space to write it in the page margin. In their attempts to "rediscover" Fermat's proof, mathematicians have demonstrated their fallibility. J.J. O'Connor and E.F. Robertson of the University of St. Andrews (Scotland) have reported that a thousand false proofs of this conjecture were published between 1908 and 1912.

In 1993, Andrew Wiles of Princeton University announced another proof of Fermat's Last Theorem, and for a while it held the ring of truth. However, Wiles withdrew the proof at the end of the year when a gap in the logical flow of the proof could not be mended. Finally, in 1995, a corrected proof was produced with the aid of another mathematician, Richard Taylor. No errors have been discovered in this proof in the intervening years, and this gives it considerable, although not absolute, validity.

Mathematics is still prejudiced in favor of pencil-and-paper proof, but it is slowly making some concessions to computers. There is now a journal, *Experimental Mathematics*, published quarterly by A.K. Peters (Natick, Massachusetts) that mediates the fusion of computers and math. To quote from the journal's mission statement, "*Experimental Mathematics* was founded in the belief that theory and experiment feed on each other, and that the mathematical community stands to benefit from a more complete exposure to the experimental process." Does mathematical truth really exist, or will most of mathematics become a tentative consensus of a mathematical reality mediated by computers?

Devlin M. Gualtieri received an undergraduate physics degree and a PhD in solid state science from Syracuse University. He is currently senior principal scientist with Honeywell, Morristown, New Jersey. Dr. Gualtieri has been a member of Phi Kappa Phi for thirty years, and he can be reached at gualtieri@ieee.org.

Forum on the Arts

David Thurmaier

What is "American" Music?

A colleague recently asked me what makes the music of Aaron Copland sound "American." After rattling off obvious biographical facts about Copland that proved his "American-ness," waxing rhapsodic about the "expansive" nature of his music that aurally depicts the vast dimensions of the United States, and acknowledging that Copland must be American because his music has been included in television commercials, I began to ponder more seriously the question of what *defines* "American" music. I have spent most of my professional career promoting awareness of American music and researching one particular Yankee composer intensively, so of course *I* know what American music is. Or do I?

One way to tackle the question of what makes music "American" is to look at music in the United States historically. You may be surprised to discover that relatively little indigenous American classical music existed until the late nineteenth century. Apart from pockets of classical and sacred music composed between the American Revolution and the Civil War, most American music of the early to mid-nineteenth century was of the variety that noted musicologist H. Wiley Hitchcock defines as "vernacular" music. According to Hitchcock, vernacular music is "more plebeian, native, not approached self-consciously but simply grown into as one grows into one's vernacular tongue; music understood and appreciated simply for its utilitarian or entertainment value." Some representative vernacular genres included gospel hymnody, spirituals, popular song, band music, and by the end of the century, ragtime. One example of a celebrated composer who fused vernacular traditions with a more classical aesthetic was Stephen Foster. Foster's songs spanned the gamut from clearly homespun tunes such as "Oh Susanna," to parlor songs in a classical style such as "Beautiful Dreamer."

After the Civil War, which in itself inspired a fascinating and powerful musical repertoire, a push for more academic training in music began. Music departments were spawned at schools such as Harvard, and conservatories were built especially for studying music. But composers faced a particular dilemma — what musical models were teachers going to instruct their students to follow, given that America had very little of its own classical music? The solution for most academics was to look abroad; after all, the Europeans created a magnificent corpus of music and seemed to be on the cutting edge of music composition. As a result of this ideological bent, many teachers and students studied abroad in Germany and France to develop their craft. By and large the music of noteworthy composers such as John Knowles Paine (founder of the music department at Harvard), George Whitefield Chadwick (president of the New England Conservatory of Music) and Horatio Parker (Dean of the School of Music at Yale) sounds European and adheres to the traditions of the great masters. Though Americans wrote this music, most people would question whether it exhibits qualities of "American music."

By the end of the nineteenth century, the impetus to create music that sounded "American" arose partly as a result of a visit by Czech composer Antonin Dvorák. Dvorák came to America in 1892 to teach composition at the National Conservatory of Music in New York. Part of Dvorák's appeal was the perception that his music exhibited "nationalistic" traits; therefore, those hiring Dvorák wished him to promote American music traits as a composition teacher. To assist in this goal, Dvorák became acquainted with Black spirituals through an encounter with a student at the conservatory; the idiosyncratic melodic and rhythmic characteristics of spirituals would make their way into several works by Dvorák, most famously his Ninth Symphony, "From the New World."

Though most American composers of the next century chose sources of inspiration other than spirituals, Dvorák's advocacy of indigenous vernacular music proved to be an influential step toward developing a truly American music. Composers of the twentieth century would borrow from a wealth of traditions such as hymnody, jazz, ragtime, and blues, as well as expand their reaches to music from Asia and Eastern Europe. As was the country itself, American music became a "melting pot" of influences that synthesized into a wholly new brand of musical expression.

All of this historical background leads me back to my initial challenge to identify specific qualities that define American music. I have already suggested one quality: the assimilation of diverse influences into original classical works. Take for example Copland's *Concerto for Piano and Orchestra* written in 1926 after his studies in France. As Copland explained in his book *Our New Music*, his concerto was one of the first to "adopt the jazz idiom," and he wanted to "see what [he] could do with it in a symphonic way." Jazz was in its developmental stages at the time of Copland's concerto, but it was decidedly American in conception and genesis. Later in the century, Copland would write some of the most famous American works that evoke national themes: the ballets *Billy the Kid* and *Rodeo*, the opera *The Tender Land*, and the music for the film based on John Steinbeck's *The Red Pony*. Copland was able to assimilate influences that originate in American history and mythology and bring them into the modern classical era.

Another trait that typifies American classical music is an emphasis on innovation and experimentation. In glancing at American works composed in the early twentieth century, one notices many new performance directives, instruments, and compositional ideas. By mirroring inventions and developments concurrent in technology and science, composers often derived their musical ideas from nontraditional sources. For example, the concept of the "prepared piano" — a piano with various materials such as screws, bolts, paper, and felt inserted between the strings — originated with American composers Henry Cowell and John Cage (whose father was an inventor). Or take the avant-garde composer George Antheil, the self-dubbed "Bad Boy of Music," who wrote an infamous piece in 1924–26 entitled *Ballet mécanique*; the forces required to play the piece first consisted of one Pianola with amplifier, two pianos, three xylophones, electric bells, three airplane propellers made of wood and metal, tam-tam, four bass drums, and a siren. In addition, other composers wrote music based on scales, harmonies, and rhythms that differed greatly from those employed in traditional classical music. What may sound "weird" to many people reflects the search for original techniques and highlights the American spirit of innovation and experimentation.

I can think of other stylistic traits, but I would like to conclude by considering why it is essential to know about American music. We should all care about what makes our music *our* music. Paying closer attention to works written by Americans can reveal insights into the American character and spirit. For example, when one hears Charles Ives's masterpiece *Three Places in New England*, one can attain a brief glimpse into early twentieth-century New England and try to experience what Ives saw and heard at each place. Also, knowing something about American music can assist instructors in making connections among other arts. For instance, an art class studying the paintings of Edward Hopper might examine contemporary music to discover whether American composers reflected Hopper's stark perspective of America through their music. Finally, we owe it to the artists of our own country to devote time and interest toward exploring what they have to communicate; for if we ignore the richness of American music, we deny ourselves the chance to delve deeper into what makes us Americans.

David Thurmaier teaches music theory at Lawrence University and is a PhD candidate in music theory at Indiana University. His primary research focuses on the music of Charles Ives.

Too Much, Too Soon (continued from page 3)

of a piece, all of which are routine expectations for my students.

I knew that I would go to college, or become something my father disparagingly referred to as "a ribbon clerk." At school, I remember taking an interest inventory of forced-choice questions such as "Would you rather be an aviatrix or a paleontologist?" However, my eventual attainment of a teaching credential was more a result of chance than of career planning.

Today's students receive much more social, academic, and career counseling than I did. Social isolates are identified and provided with friendship circles. Angry students are counseled in conflict-management programs. Students' learning styles and disabilities are diagnosed and, if possible, accommodated. Students are routinely guided through the high school transition and are made aware of educational choices and career paths very early on. Whatever my students do or do not become, it will not be for lack of information.

What about the notorious rudeness of kids today? What about their flagrant materialism, their intellectual laziness, their distractibility, their faulty English, and their poor performance on standardized tests? What is the matter with kids today, and whose fault is it?

I contend that many kids, schools, and teachers are suffering from a societal ailment called "too much, too soon." At home, we have created unprecedented stress in young people by granting unsupervised access to overwhelming information. At school, we apply tremendous academic pressure to children and their teachers to implement expectations that are beyond the capabilities and cognitive development of many. Then, we inform students that they are not meeting standards and seem surprised when they act out their frustrations. We seem to lay blame on the victim when we ask: what's the matter with kids, schools, and teachers today? It is not a fair question.

Are today's kids precocious or atrocious? I compare my younger self with my current students and am humbled. I, who never ventured outside my social circle, watch with awe as Torveen organizes culture-club activities for a multiethnic group of her peers. I compare my own youthful aloofness with the extraordinary graciousness of Denice, who thanks me daily as she leaves class. I think of my own English-language birthright and admire the persistence of Javier, who understands just enough English to write his essays, in Spanish. I remember my own adolescent awkwardness and admire the courage of Haley, who battles her own unpopularity by daring to join a folk-dance group. I recall my own intellectual apathy as I observe the initiative of Leigh, who spontaneously decides to read a discarded English textbook from cover to cover "just for fun."

There is nothing the matter with kids, schools, or their teachers that cannot be fixed. But it will take a whole society to protect and nurture kids in homes where they are not traumatized, and in schools where teachers are empowered and inspired to teach developmentally appropriate curriculum. Enough is enough. Let's rephrase the question. What can we do for kids, schools, and teachers today? If we do not, we may leave a tragic legacy, an epitaph that reads: "From too much, too soon came too little, too late."

Andrea Ickes-Dunbar teaches seventh- and eighth-grade English and Spanish to a second generation of students in a multigenerational K–8 California public school. Her passion is languages. In Mexico and Chile, she learned Spanish. In the arctic wilderness, she learned conversational phrases in raven caw and wolf howl.

Calling All Professors!

Here is your opportunity to tell all of our readers about the real world of higher education!

In the fall of 2001, the then-titled *National Forum* published "Teachers Teaching," a special issue featuring the voices of numerous K–12 teachers from across the nation. Those dedicated educators told us their stories, their wishes, and their hopes for their profession. In the upcoming Fall 2004 issue, we want to give our members in higher education the same opportunity, in an issue that we are titling "Professors Professing: Higher Education Speaks Out."

We are looking for 500- to 1500-word submissions, dealing with the most pressing issues in higher education today. We will select from among those submissions as many as possible, either in their entirety or in part, to appear in the issue. Topics that you might address include the following:

- Shared governance
- Academic standards and grade inflation
- Finances in higher education
- The academic job market
- Tenure and tenure review
- Adjunct/temporary faculty
- Academic freedom
- Political correctness — real or apparent?
- The student body
- The place of athletics

Of course you are not limited to only these topics, but please make sure that your topic is broad enough to be of general interest to our diverse audience. For example, a controversy unique to the field of Latin American history would not be appropriate unless you are using it as an example to illustrate a broader academic issue.

Guidelines/Rules for Submission:

- You must be an active Phi Kappa Phi member and employed either full or part-time at a post-secondary institution (university, college, or junior college) to submit a manuscript.
- Deadline for submissions will be August 1, 2004; selections will be made by September 1, 2004.
- Only one submission of 500–1500 words, please; multiple submissions will be returned, unread.
- Submit manuscripts either via regular mail (three clean, double-spaced hard copies and an electronic file on either a floppy disk or CD in WordPerfect or Word) or as an e-mail attachment to kaetzjp@auburn.edu.
- Provide a self-addressed, stamped envelope for notification and/or return of manuscript. Manuscripts will not be returned unless postage is included.
- *Phi Kappa Phi Forum* reserves the right to refuse any manuscript.

We are looking forward to your submissions — remember that deadline of August 1, 2004, but early submissions will be greatly appreciated!



Are Our Faces Red?

I once received a publication that ran a column titled something like "A Proofreading Error as Big as a Barn," featuring amusing photos of errors on street signs, billboards, and so on.

Well, as many of you noticed, we made our own big-as-a-barn error on the cover of the Summer 2003 issue: We misspelled the title of the issue.

We sincerely apologize for this huge error, and we want to thank all of you who wrote or called and were kind and amused rather than irate. We appreciate your thoughts, and we will make every effort to ensure that it never happens again.

Pat Kaetz
Alleged Editor

Stephanie Bond
"If-it-had-been-a-snake-it-would-have-bitten-me"
Associate Editor

Laura Kloberg
"I-could-have-sworn-that-I-typed-it-correctly"
Associate Editor

FREE!

"Architecture" Cover Repair Patch

Instructions: Cut along the dotted line, apply adhesive, then paste on the Summer 2003 cover, being careful to align with the existing graphic.

Start planning now to attend the 2004 Phi Kappa Phi National Triennial Convention in Albuquerque, New Mexico.

Nestled in the Sandia Mountains, Albuquerque is a city rich in history and culture that offers something for everyone. While there, visit Old Town with its 300-year-old adobe buildings, ride the tram to the top of Sandia Peak, and experience the culture and art of the area's Native American population. Our hotel in the heart of Albuquerque is within easy walking distance of many attractions. Come and join us as we conduct the Society's business, report our successes and concerns, and share in the camaraderie with other volunteers dedicated to doing their part for the nation's oldest and most prestigious multidisciplinary college honor society.

The convention will feature election of national officers for the next triennium, chapter-officer training workshops and presentations, exciting speakers, national scholar and artist award presentations, and much more!

Visit the Phi Kappa Phi Web Page at www.phikappaphi.org (under Events) for updates on plans, and watch for future notices in the *Phi Kappa Phi Forum* and *Phi Kappa Phi Focus*.



All chapter delegates will be reimbursed for travel expenses plus a $100 voucher. In addition, the first 50 nondelegates to register for the convention will receive $100.

Photo Credits: Route 66, Luminarias in Old Town, and Albuquerque Skyline, marblestreetstudio.com; Night Cityscape, Ron Behrmann; Sandia Peak Tramway, Jay Blackwood.

Amy Chua

Globalization and Ethnic Hatred

One beautiful, blue morning in 1994, I received a call from my mother in California. In a hushed voice, she told me that my Aunt Leona, my father's twin sister, had been murdered in her home in the Philippines, her throat slit by her chauffeur. My mother broke the news to me in our native Hokkien Chinese dialect. But "murder" she said in English, as if to wall off the act from the family, through language.

The murder of a relative is horrible for anyone, anywhere. My father's grief was impenetrable; to this day, he has not broken his silence on the subject. For the rest of the family, though, there was an added element of disgrace. For the Chinese, luck is a moral attribute, and a lucky person would never be murdered. Like having a birth defect, or marrying a Filipino, being murdered is shameful.

My three younger sisters and I were very fond of Aunt Leona, who was petite and quirky and had never married. Like many wealthy Filipino Chinese, she had all kinds of bank accounts in Honolulu, San Francisco, and Chicago. She visited us in the United States regularly. She and my father — Leona and Leon — were close, as only twins can be. Having no children of her own, she doted on her nieces and showered us with trinkets. As we grew older, the trinkets became treasures. On my tenth birthday, she gave me ten small diamonds, wrapped in toilet paper. My aunt loved diamonds and bought them up by the dozen, concealing them in empty Elizabeth Arden face-moisturizer jars, some right on her bathroom shelf. She liked accumulating things. When we ate at McDonald's™, she stuffed her Gucci™ purse with free ketchups.

According to the police report, my Aunt Leona, "a fifty-eight-year-old single woman," was killed in her living room with "a butcher's knife" at approximately 8:00 P.M. Two of her maids were questioned and confessed that Nilo Abique, my aunt's chauffeur, had planned and executed the murder with their knowledge and assistance. "A few hours before the actual killing, respondent was seen sharpening the knife allegedly used in the crime." After the killing, "respondent joined the two witnesses and told them that their employer was dead. At that time, he was wearing a pair of bloodied white gloves and was still holding a knife, also with traces of blood." But Abique, the report went on to say, had "disappeared," with the warrant for his arrest outstanding. The two maids were released.

After the funeral, I asked one of my uncles whether there had been any further developments in the murder investigation. He replied tersely that the killer had not been found. His wife explained that the Manila police had essentially closed the case.

I could not understand my relatives' almost indifferent attitude. Why were they not more shocked that my aunt had been killed by people who worked for her, lived with her? Why were they not outraged that the maids had been released? When I pressed my uncle, he was brusque. "That's the way things are here," he said. "This is the Philippines — not America."

My uncle was not simply being callous. As it turns out, my aunt's death is part of a common pattern. Hundreds of Chinese in the Philippines are kidnapped every year, almost invariably by ethnic Filipinos. Many victims, often children, are brutally murdered, even after ransom is paid. Other Chinese, like my aunt, are killed without a kidnapping, usually in connection with a robbery. Nor is it unusual that my aunt's killer was never apprehended. The policemen in the Philippines, all poor ethnic Filipinos themselves, are notoriously unmotivated in these cases. Asked by a Western journalist why it is so frequently the Chinese who are targeted, one grinning Filipino policeman explained, "they have more money."

My family is part of the Philippines' tiny but entrepreneurial, economically powerful Chinese minority. Just 1 percent of the population, Chinese Filipinos control as much as 60 percent of the private economy, including the country's four major airlines and almost all of its banks, hotels, shopping malls, and conglomerates. My own relatives in Manila, who run a plastics conglomerate, are only

"third-tier" Chinese tycoons. Still, they own swaths of prime real estate and several vacation homes. They also have safe-deposit boxes full of gold bars, each the size of a Snickers bar, but strangely heavy. I myself have such a bar: My Aunt Leona sent it to me as a law-school graduation present.

Since my aunt's murder, one childhood memory keeps haunting me. I was eight, staying at my family's splendid hacienda-style house in Manila. It was before dawn, still dark when I went to the kitchen for a drink. But I must have gone down an extra flight of stairs, because I literally stumbled onto six male bodies.

I had found the male servants' quarters. My family's house-boys, gardeners, and chauffeurs — I sometimes imagine that Nilo Abique was among them — were sleeping on mats on a dirt floor. The place stank of sweat and urine. I was horrified.

Later that day, I mentioned the incident to my Aunt Leona, who laughed affectionately and explained that the servants — there were perhaps twenty living on the premises, all ethnic Filipino — were fortunate to be working for our family. If not for their positions, they would be living among rats and open sewers, without even a roof over their heads. A Filipino maid then walked in; she had a bowl of food for my aunt's Pekingese. The Filipinos, my aunt continued — in Chinese, but plainly not caring if the maid understood — were lazy and unintelligent and did not really want to do much else. If they did not like working for us, they were free to leave any time. After all, they were employees, not slaves.

Nearly two-thirds of the Philippines' 80 million ethnic Filipinos live on less than two dollars a day. Forty percent spend their entire lives in temporary shelters. Seventy percent of all rural Filipinos own no land. Almost a third have no access to sanitation.

But that's not the worst of it. Poverty alone never is. Poverty by itself does not make people kill. To poverty must be added indignity, hopelessness, and grievance.

In the Philippines, millions of Filipinos work for Chinese; almost no Chinese work for Filipinos. The Chinese dominate industry and commerce at every level of society. Global markets intensify this dominance: When foreign investors do business in the Philippines, they deal almost exclusively with Chinese. Apart from a handful of corrupt politicians and a few aristocratic Spanish mestizo families, all of the Philippines' billionaires are Chinese. By contrast, all menial jobs in the Philippines are filled by Filipinos. All peasants, domestic servants, and squatters are Filipinos. In Manila, thousands of ethnic Filipinos used to live on or around the Payatas garbage dump, a twelve-block-wide mountain of fermenting refuse known as The Promised Land. By scavenging through rotting food and dead animal carcasses, squatters eked out a living. In July 2000, as a result of accumulating methane gas, the garbage mountain imploded and collapsed, smothering more than a hundred people, many young children.

Americans, while not an ethnic minority, have come to be perceived as a kind of global market-dominant minority, wielding outrageously disproportionate economic power relative to our numbers. Just 4 percent of the world's population, we are seen everywhere as the principal engine and principal beneficiary of global capitalism. We are also seen as "almighty," "exploitative," and "able to control the world," whether through our military power or through the IMF-implemented austerity measures we have heartlessly forced on developing populations.

When I asked an uncle about the Payatas explosion, he was annoyed. "Why does everyone want to talk about that? It's the worst thing for foreign investment." I wasn't surprised. My relatives live literally walled off from the Filipino masses, in a posh, all-Chinese residential enclave, on streets named Harvard, Yale, and Princeton. The entry points are guarded by armed, private-security forces.

Each time I think of Nilo Abique — he was nearly six feet and my aunt only four-feet-eleven — I find myself welling up with a hatred and revulsion so intense that it is actually consoling. But over time, I have also had glimpses of how the Chinese must look to the vast majority of Filipinos, to someone like Abique: as exploiters, as foreign intruders, their wealth inexplicable, their superiority intolerable. I will never forget the entry in the police report for Abique's "motive for murder": not robbery, despite

the jewels and money the chauffeur was said to have taken, but just one word — "Revenge."

MARKETS, DEMOCRACY, AND ETHNIC HATRED

A connection exists between my aunt's killing and the waves of global violence and mass murder that we read about with mounting frequency. It lies in the relationship — and increasingly the explosive collision — among the three most powerful forces operating in the world today: markets, democracy, and ethnic hatred.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, a common economic and political consensus emerged, not only in the West but to a considerable extent around the world. Markets and democracy, working hand in hand, would transform the world into a community of modernized, peace-loving nations.

In the process, ethnic hatred, religious zealotry, and other "backward" aspects of underdevelopment would be swept away. The sobering lesson of the last twenty years, however, is that the global spread of free-market democracy — at least in its current, raw for-export form — has been a principal aggravating cause of ethnic violence throughout the non-Western world.

The reason has to do with a phenomenon — pervasive outside the West, yet rarely acknowledged, indeed often viewed as taboo — that turns free-market democracy into an engine of ethnic conflagration. The phenomenon is that of *market-dominant minorities*: ethnic minorities who — for widely varying reasons ranging from entrepreneurism to a history of apartheid or colonial oppression — can be expected under market conditions to economically dominate the "indigenous" majorities around them, at least in the near to midterm future.

Examples of market-dominant minorities include the Chinese, not just in the Philippines, but throughout Southeast Asia. Most recently, in Burma, ethnic Chinese have literally taken over the economies of Mandalay and Rangoon. Whites are a market-dominant minority in South Africa and Zimbabwe — and, in a more complicated sense, in Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and much of Latin America. Indians are a market-dominant minority in East Africa, as are Lebanese in West Africa and Jews in post-Communist Russia. Ibo are a market-dominant minority in Nigeria, as were Croats in the former Yugoslavia and Tutsi in pre-genocide Rwanda.

In countries with a market-dominant minority, markets and democracy will tend to favor not just different people, or different classes, but different ethnic groups. Markets magnify the often astounding wealth of the market-dominant minority, while democracy increases the political power of the impoverished indigenous majority. In such circumstances, where the rich are not just rich — but belong to a resented, "outsider" ethnic group — the pursuit of free-market democracy often becomes an engine of catastrophic ethnonationalism, pitting a poor "indigenous" majority, easily aroused and manipulated by opportunistic politicians, against a hated ethnic minority.

Consider Indonesia. Free-market policies in the 1980s and 1990s led to a situation in which the country's 3-percent Chinese minority controlled 70 percent of the country's private economy. The introduction of democracy in 1998 — hailed with euphoria in the United States — produced a violent backlash against both the Chinese and markets. Some 5,000 shops and homes of ethnic Chinese were burned and looted, 2,000 people died, and 150 Chinese women were gang-raped. Free and fair elections in the midst of all this gave rise to ethnic scapegoating by demagogic politicians, along with calls for confiscation of Chinese assets and for a "People's Economy" that would return Indonesia's wealth to the *pribumi* majority, the country's "true owners." The wealthiest Chinese left the country, along with $40 to $100 billion of Chinese-controlled capital, plunging the country into an economic crisis from which it still has not recovered. Today, unknown to most Americans, the Indonesian government sits on roughly $58 billion worth of stagnating, nationalized industrial assets, almost all formerly owned by ethnic-Chinese tycoons.

Indonesia is part of a much larger global problem: The unequal fruits of globalization pit a poor, frustrated majority against a rich "outsider" minority. Add democracy, and the result is often retaliation, violence, and even mass slaughter. Even as America celebrated the global spread of democracy in the 1990s, the world's new political slogans told of more ominous developments: "Kazakhstan for Kazakhs," "Serbia for Serbs," "Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans," "Eritreans out of Ethiopia," "Hutu Power," "Kenya for Kenyans," "Whites out of Bolivia," "Jews out of Russia." Whenever free-market democracy is pursued in the presence of a market-dominant minority, the result is not peace and prosperity but tremendous instability and some form of backlash. September 11, 2001, brought this same dynamic home to the United States.

Americans, while not an ethnic minority, have come to be perceived as a kind of global market-dominant minority, wielding outrageously disproportionate economic power relative to our numbers. Just 4 percent of the world's population, we are seen everywhere as the principal engine and principal

beneficiary of global capitalism. We are also seen as "almighty," "exploitative," and "able to control the world," whether through our military power or through the IMF-implemented austerity measures we have heartlessly forced on developing populations. In part as a result, the United States has become the object of the same kind of mass popular, demagogue-fueled resentment that afflicts so many other market-dominant minorities around the world.

BALANCING THE FREE MARKET AND POLITICAL REALITIES

In my view, free-market-generated growth and democratic processes offer the best long-term hope for developing countries. But how can Western nations promote capitalism and democracy in the developing world without encouraging conflagration and bloodshed? The answer is that they must stop promoting both unrestrained laissez-faire capitalism (a form of markets that the West itself has repudiated) and unrestrained, overnight majority rule (a form of democracy that the West also has repudiated). Instead of encouraging a caricature of free-market democracy, Western nations should follow their own successful model and support the gradual introduction of democratic reforms, tailored to local circumstances. (Meaningful democratization requires much more than simply shipping out ballot boxes for elections — which of course brought people such as Slobodan Milosevic and Hugo Chavez to power.) They should also cultivate stabilizing institutions and programs such as social safety nets, tax-and-transfer programs, aggressive education campaigns, antitrust laws, philanthropy, constitutionalism, and property protections. Most crucially, the Western nations must find ways to give the poor majorities of the world an ownership stake in their countries' corporations and capital markets.

In the United States, a solid majority of Americans, even members of the lower-middle classes, own shares in major U.S. companies, often through pension funds, and thus have a stake in the U.S. market economy. This is not the case in the developing world, where corporations are typically owned by single families belonging to an outsider market-dominant minority. Blacks in South Africa, for example, control only 2 percent of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange's total capitalization (as of June 2002), even though they make up 77 percent of the population. Similarly, the indigenous majorities (or near-majorities) of Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Guatemala have virtually no stake in their countries' corporate sectors.

Continued global democratization seems inevitable. In this climate, international businesses, Western investors, and market-dominant minorities themselves should heed the lessons from Jakarta. It is an act of enlightened self-interest to launch highly visible local corporate-responsibility initiatives and innovative profit-sharing programs. Consider these models: In East Africa, powerful families of Indian descent include Africans in top management positions and provide education, training, and wealth-sharing schemes for their African employees. In Russia, where anti-Semitism is rampant, the Jewish billionaire Roman Abramovich was recently elected governor of Chukotka after spending tens of millions of dollars of his personal fortune to airlift food, medicine, computers, and textbooks into the poverty-stricken region. In Central America, a few Western companies have started contributing to local-infrastructure development and offering stock options to local employees.

In these ways, foreign investors and market-dominant minorities can give local populations a stake in their local economy and businesses. This direction is perhaps the best way to defuse tensions that, history tells us, can sabotage both markets and democracy, the very structures businesses need to thrive.

A final clarification. My arguments are not about blame, but about unintended consequences. My own view, for example, is that the results of democratization in Indonesia have been disastrous. But if forced to place the blame somewhere, I would point to thirty years of plundering autocracy and crony capitalism by Suharto. Similarly, in Iraq, overnight elections might well bring undesirable results — for example, a fundamentalist regime that is intensely anti-American, antiforeign investment, and illiberal. But that is not *democracy's* fault. On the contrary, if anything, the blame rests with the cruelly repressive regime of Saddam Hussein. Nevertheless, this does not take away from the reality that given the conditions that actually exist now in many postcolonial countries — conditions created by history, colonialism, divide-and-conquer policies, corruption, autocracy — the combination of laissez-faire capitalism and unrestrained majority rule may well have catastrophic consequences.

Amy Chua is professor of law at Yale University and author of the *New York Times* bestseller *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability* (Doubleday, 2003).

Tyler Cowen

Does Globalization Kill Ethos and Diversity?



Basketball, Nike™, McDonald's™, and Madonna are now available in most parts of the world, no matter how poor or remote. It is therefore no surprise that critics, such as Benjamin Barber and John Gray, fear for the future of world culture. They charge that the world is becoming one big shopping mall, causing non-Western cultures (and perhaps Western culture as well) to falter in their artistic creativity.

The notion of *ethos* describes the special feel or flavor of a culture. We can think of ethos as a background set of assumptions for viewing the world. The combination of ethos and technique gives a creative era its particular "feel," or its stylistic and emotional core. In short, the fear is that the world will end up with a single ethos, and an unattractive one at that.

I wish to offer a more optimistic perspective on global culture. My vision of globalized culture looks to Hong Kong cinema, the novels of García Márquez, the Cuban music of Buena Vista Social Club, the successes of Australian Aboriginal art, and the amazing proliferation of ethnic dining. Culture lovers have never had more quality choices than today, and artists have never had more opportunities to reach audiences. Insofar as we have a "global shopping mall," it delivers many diverse styles to eager fans around the world. To see why I hold these optimistic views, let us step back and examine how trade influences ethos.

FRAGILITY AND THE PROBLEMS OF ETHOS

An ethos can be weakened or destroyed by external influences. Artists can lose their creativity if they learn too much about other approaches. Contemporary musician Beck, an eclectic purveyor of rock, country, and blues, makes the point succinctly: "You can't write a pure country song any more. You can't write a pure Appalachian ballad. Because we live in a world where we've all heard speed-metal, we've all heard drum-and-bass, we've all heard old-school hip-hop. Even if you're not influenced by it, or you're not using elements of it, they're in your mind."

Some degree of *isolation* can inject self-confidence and a sense of magic into an art. Many creators view their endeavors as imbued with great religious and mythic significance, and as having central importance for the unfolding of history. In reality, they may be just another craftsperson in the eyes of most observers, but their creativity will be greater if this knowledge is not rubbed in their faces. Art and creative power, to some extent, rest on illusion and delusion, most of all in the minds of artists.

That being said, ethos relies on trade as much as on isolation. It is no accident that Classical civilization developed in the Mediterranean, where cultures used sea transport to trade with each other and learn from each other. Trade relations spread the spirit of learning throughout Europe during late

medieval times, starting in northern France, the Low Countries, and Italy. The mobility of scholars, painters, manuscripts, and scientific ideas gave birth to the Renaissance and its artistic glories. The development of the United States, another formative event in Western history and cultural history, owes its existence to trade and resource mobility.

It is impossible to look at culture without noticing the importance of trade. For instance, Jamaican music did not take off until African-American rhythm and blues music was imported. Jamaican migrant sugar workers were exposed to R&B during their trips to the American South in the late 1940s, and they brought back a taste for the music. In the 1950s, Jamaican listeners picked up rhythm and blues broadcasts from New Orleans and Miami radio. Louis Jordan, Fats Domino, and Chuck Berry were especially popular in Jamaica. (Jamaicans tended to prefer loping, less hurried rhythms, rather than the Delta Blues of Howlin' Wolf and Muddy Waters; this continues to be reflected in reggae music.) The Jamaican ska tunes of the early 1960s, the first breakthrough for Jamaican music, reveal strong influences from doo-wop, swing, crooners, and the softer forms of rhythm and blues. Sam Cooke and Nat King Cole remain beloved in Jamaica to this day. The early ska style then blossomed into reggae, dancehall, and other musical forms, commonly selling to wealthier American and British customers.

In this scenario, a burst of creative flowering precedes the decline of a culture and an ethos. Even when two (or more) cultures do not prove compatible in the long run, they may produce remarkable short-run gains from trade. Alternatively, it may be said that cultural booms contain the seeds of their own destruction.

The culture of the Hawaiian islands, rather than withering immediately with foreign contact, blossomed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The combination of Pacific, American, Japanese, and Chinese influences created a fertile creative environment. In music, Hawaiian performers have been seminal influences behind the development of country-and-western, pedal-steel guitar, blues, jazz, and fingerpicking guitar styles, as well as modern "lounge" music. In each case the Hawaiians innovated within established Western forms, or relied partly on Western inspiration. The Hawaiian steel guitar, for instance, was actually invented by a Czech immigrant living in California. Hawaii also produced many superb handwoven quilts in the latter part of the nineteenth century and in the early part of the twentieth. Like Hawaiian music, these works were synthetic products of American, Asian, and Polynesian styles.

THE MINERVA MODEL

Cross-cultural contact often mobilizes the fruitfulness of an ethos before disrupting or destroying it. We see a common pattern. The initial meeting of cultures produces a creative explosion, as individuals trade materials, technologies, and ideas. Often the materially wealthier culture provides financial support for the creations of the poorer culture, while the native ethos remains largely intact. For a while we have the best of both worlds from a cultural point of view. Over time, however, the larger or wealthier culture upsets the balance of forces that ruled in the smaller or poorer culture. The poorer culture begins to direct its outputs towards the tastes of the richer culture. Communication with the outside world makes the prevailing ethos less distinct. The smaller culture "forgets" how to make the high-quality goods it once specialized in, and we observe cultural decline.

I refer to this as the Minerva model. "Minerva" refers to Hegel's statement that "The owl of Minerva flies only at dusk," by which he meant that philosophic understanding comes in civilizations that have already reached their peak. I reinterpret the metaphor to refer to cultural brilliance instead, which in this context occurs just when a particular culture is starting its decline. In this scenario, a burst of creative flowering precedes the decline of a culture and an ethos. Even when two (or more) cultures do not prove compatible in the long run, they may produce remarkable short-run gains from trade. Alternatively, it may be said that cultural booms contain the seeds of their own destruction.

The Minerva model applies best when gains from trade are based on a cultural imbalance. For instance, American Indian arts and crafts flourished until shortly before their (temporary) collapse early in the twentieth century. The most accomplished arts of the Plains Indians used crayons, pencils, clothes, metals, bright paint pigments, papers, dyed-wool yarns, mirrors, bells, brass tacks, and glass beads, all drawn from European culture. The woodsplint-basketry technique of many Indian tribes appears to have been European in origin, probably Swedish. The *kachina* dolls of the Hopi flowered in the nine-

teenth century, when the Hopi tribe came into contact with Spanish and Mexican folk art and sought to meet touristic demands for dolls. Indian totem poles became common in the middle of the nineteenth century, only when the northwestern fur trade brought new wealth to Indian communities. The settlers also brought the metal knife, a prerequisite for effective large-scale carving.

To some extent trade "cashes in" the potential creativity embedded in a culture. By accepting the eventual decline of the culture, we also are mobilizing its creative forces to unprecedented levels, at least for a while.

The modern world may be cashing in cultures too quickly, or too many at once, but we should not measure failure by the number of declining cultures. The absence of observed cultural decline might reflect a world that attained less diversity in the first place and reached lower and fewer peaks. In similar fashion, a large number of declining artistic genres might be a symptom of cultural wealth and vitality, rather than a harbinger of complete and absolute decay. Cultures are always changing. The question is not what declines, but rather what arises to take its place.

Almost all of today's disappearing cultures evolved out of earlier processes of remixing and cashing in of cultures. The spread of the Chinese across southeast Asia, the extension of the Roman empire, or the European folk migrations in the Dark Ages, whatever their benefits, all wrought great havoc on the cultures of their time. In reality today's so-called "indigenous" cultures are regroupings, yesterday's remixed versions of previous cultural expansions. Cross-cultural contact cashes in some cultures while others germinate, waiting for subsequent cultural exchanges to bring out their virtues, while simultaneously heralding later declines.

Trade will bring very small communities into the global economy, but it will not wipe out diversity. India, Mexico, and Brazil provide models of how large societies can maintain distinct and diverse identities in light of extensive foreign contact. Globalization tends to encourage large, internally diverse polities, rather than small unique ones.

East Indian culture exhibits a recurring historical pattern of being swamped by some outside culture, digesting that culture after a period of adjustment, and returning with synthetic innovations of a very high quality. The Aryan invaders brought Sanskrit and the gods of the Vedas. The Hellenic influence came to India at the time of Alexander, heavily influencing Gandharan sculpture. Later India had extensive seaborne trade with the Roman Empire. The Islamic influence transformed Indian arts and architecture from the thirteenth century onwards. The Persian influence was especially important in the earlier years of the Mughal empire, stretching from the sixteenth century to the rule of Queen Victoria (1526–1857). The first two hundred years of this period often are considered the peak of Indian culture. The Taj Mahal at Agra comes from Persian sources and influence. The Persian influence was dominant in the decorative arts as well, but again India responded by absorbing and transforming foreign ideas. The British and Western influence in India has been no exception to this pattern. India is now a world leader in cinema, the novel, and popular music, all genres that owe considerable debts to Western contact.

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Mexico offers a remarkable variety of cuisines, arts and crafts, and musics. This diversity has proven resilient to foreign influences and indeed has been culturally synthetic from the beginning. Mexican regional diversity owes much of its existence to the railroad and to the economic growth of Mexico, which funded an explosion of culture, starting in the early part of the twentieth century. Even in the folk arts, the number of artisans in Mexico is now at an all-time high. Many of the best of these artists take special care to cultivate sales to tourists and wealthy North Americans.

NICHE ETHOS

Finally, the Minerva scenario changes ethos rather than destroying it. We have fewer distinct languages and religions than in times past, but we have a greater number of diverse niche ethoses.

Modernity has brought us the "programmer culture" of Silicon Valley, teenage rave culture of the late 1980s and 1990s, and literally millions of fandoms, to give a few examples. The science-fiction revolution of the mid-twentieth century would not have been possible without national and international networks for publishing and distribution. Few science-fiction books and periodicals could have supported themselves by selling to purely local audiences. This niche ethos has in turn spawned creative achievement in literature, cinema, and computer games.

The resulting cultural communities are typically independent of geography, as their ethoses are transmitted through means other than spatial proximity. We can speak of the liberation of ethos from geography, rather than the destruction of ethos. Most recently, the Internet has liberated culture from geography to an unprecedented degree.

The more that national and international communications replace geographic and regionally defined culture, the greater the impetus for the proliferation of new (albeit narrower) ethoses. Homogenization implies a pool of customers who receive common information from common outside sources, whether it be newspapers, television, or the Internet. Once these individuals have been brought into a common pool with well-developed means of communication, they sort themselves into more finely grained and more diverse groups. Entrepreneurs create new groups by marketing, and new groups evolve by mobility and sorting. Many kinds of internal diversification occur only when a society becomes larger and in some regards more homogeneous. Counterintuitively, modern diversity is homogenizing trends to some degree.

In sum, the world's cultures are changing, and they are changing fast. But we live in an era of cultural plenty and quality. The benefits of trade are not only limited to greater material wealth, but they also bring us greater creative joy.

Tyler Cowen is the author of *Creative Destruction: How Globalization is Changing the World's Cultures* (Princeton University Press, 2002), and he writes for marginalrevolution.com and volokh.com, two blogs.

FISH THROUGH NETS

for Cheryl

I'd know your lambs-wool slippers anywhere:
slope of worn right heel,
the sole's sheen rubbed by footsteps.
Your fingertips, smudged with watercolor, brush my wrist's blue veins.
Once, in a cinder-block house with a privy, those same fingers
placed a single pansy in a blue bottle,
arranged ringed stones on window sills,
showed me something that slipped past words like fish through nets,
darting silver,
that drew me like lodestone
down stretches of highway deep in evergreen shadow,
through splotches of moon-washed asphalt
where you lean close
as my fingers furrow your dark hair, threaded with meteors.

PAT McCUTCHEON

Pat McCutcheon makes her home with her partner in far northern California. At the local community college, she teaches composition, literature, and creative writing. Her chapbook, *Recovering Perfectionist*, was published in 1996, and her poems have recently appeared in *Confluence*, *Cumberland Poetry Review*, *Evansville Review*, *Nightsun*, *Owen Wister Review*, *Pearl*, *Sanscrit*, and *The MacGuffin*.

Alison Brysk

Globalization and Human Rights: It's a Small World after All

The odds are that it has touched you. Perhaps your immigrant family or neighbors came to this country seeking refuge from repression — or perhaps the shirt on your back was stitched by a virtual slave. It has certainly touched your wallet: your business, your pension fund, and your tax dollars may be bankrolling dictatorship or investing in freedom. And human rights have probably touched your conscience, when you read about mass graves with your morning coffee, answer an e-mail petition for women threatened with mutilation, or write a check for the latest victims of the latest war. Tens of thousands of Americans are risking their own lives in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Liberia, and Iraq, in part because we now believe (rightly or wrongly) that the atrocities of despotic regimes make our own world more dangerous. It's a small world after all — and often a very brutal and disturbing one.

The recognition of human rights and the weaving of a web of globalization are probably the most important political developments of our lifetimes. Like water carving a canyon, the slow, quiet power of human-rights pressures and aspirations helped bring down the Soviet empire, transform long-suffering Latin America, and construct unprecedented international institutions: the United Nations system. Meanwhile, the world is also more connected by trade, more susceptible to neighbors' weapons and distant wars, more bound together by the very vanishing air that we breathe — and the microbes it carries across borders. Globalization in all of these forms affects human-rights conditions for better and for worse, and at the same time, the spread of human-rights ideals and institutions affects the shape of international integration. Understanding these connections is the key to building a small world worth living in.

THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Most lasting political change is driven by powerful ideas (good or bad), and the current era of globalization is no exception. These ideas inspire leaders, shape institutions, drive nations, and create communities — locally and globally. Ideas, in turn, evolve as they are adopted by new populations, tested in practice, and used to advance and resist the interests of the powerful.

Globalization and human rights both have roots in the powerful ideas of liberalism, which originated during the Enlightenment and evolved notably following the Second World War. The fundamental tenets of liberalism include the dignity of the individual, the desirability of freedom, the superiority of reason over belief, and the possibility of progress through exchange. By the end of the Cold War, most international interactions — from negotiations to lower tariffs to appeals against torture — shared the common elements of this world-view. But by the end of the twentieth century, the relationship between globalization and human rights had become more complicated — and at times, even contradictory.

Human rights are universal principles affirming the inalienable dignity and equality of persons. The principle of human rights limits legitimate forms of coercion and deprivation that may be used in the exercise of authority, usually but not always by

governments (Brysk forthcoming). The "first generation" of rights inscribed in international treaties and institutions protects the individual's life, liberty, and bodily integrity from persecution and discrimination. A "second generation" of social and economic rights was introduced to international debate by developing countries and is gaining increasing recognition. For example, new trade agreements granting poor countries free access to patented pharmaceuticals seem to grant the legal basis for the "right to health" claimed by African AIDS patients. Finally, new challenges such as environmental devastation and new movements such as indigenous peoples' campaigns raise questions of a "third generation" of collective and cultural rights, which may be necessary to counter fundamental threats to survival and self-determination not captured by individual civil liberties. Human rights promise the first half of the liberal vision — freedom and the development of human potential through principle and law — but each of these kinds of rights is sometimes threatened by globalization's promise of progress through exchange.

Both promoters and protesters of globalization often equate globalization with trade; their debate centers on whether it means more Starbucks™ or more sweatshops. But globalization is actually an interconnected process of institutional, demographic, and cultural connection — not just economics. The desire for more Starbucks depends on cultural flows such as Hollywood images, and the customer base depends on social changes such as middle-class, high-tech incomes. Similarly, more sweatshops also produce more migration, more transnational boycotts and organizations, and even more international law.

Although previous waves of globalization have occurred, the current era is distinguished by the strength and *combination* of four elements: connection, cosmopolitanism, communication, and commodification.

- *Connection* means greater traffic in bodies, goods, services, and information across borders.
- *Cosmopolitanism* describes the growth of multiple centers of power and influence above, below, and across national governments: international organizations, grassroots groups, and transnational bodies from Microsoft to Greenpeace.
- *Communication* is an increase in technological capacity that strengthens transnational networks of all kinds (from multinational corporations to nongovernmental organizations [NGOs] to terrorists) and diffuses ideas and values more quickly and broadly.
- *Commodification* is the expansion of world markets, and the extension of market-like behavior across more states and social realms. Increases in global capital flows, privatization of formerly state-owned enterprises, and increasing employment of children are all examples of commodification (Brysk 2002).

These disparate aspects of globalization help to explain why it is a double-edged sword for human rights (Brysk 2000b). Connection brings human-rights monitors to Chiapas, but it also brings sex tourists to Thailand. Cosmopolitanism creates a UN Human Rights Commission and countless NGOs to condemn China's abuse of political dissidents and religious minorities; yet commodification makes China the United States's second-leading trade partner.

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Although contradictory, these patterns are not random — research can map some factors that enhance or diminish globalization's impact on rights. First of all, we can distinguish the *form of globalization*. In general, interstate forms of international connection, such as conflict and migration, are threatening to human rights. But commodification and markets have a more mixed effect, sometimes providing employment and mobility but often fostering economic exploitation — which also may generate coercion and violence by businesses, smugglers, and corrupt governments. Overall, human rights are strengthened by the growth of cosmopolitan connections and global civil society, from international courts to transnational social movements. However, important exceptions to these trends exist (Brysk 2000a).

Second, we must consider *which kinds of rights* are being affected. Civil rights are often enhanced by the connection, communication, and cosmopolitanism of globalization; the whole world is watching, and it will block your trade if you torture well-known political prisoners. But economic rights are often undermined by commodification and other forms of connection. Under pressure to service foreign debts, governments cut basic entitlements or ignore labor rights to attract foreign investors (Brysk 2000). The third generation of environmental and cultural rights is more episodic and usually depends on particular campaigns. Indigenous peoples are able to modify international dam projects that imperil their land, livelihoods, and cultures in Brazil, but not in China (Brysk 2002).

Finally, globalization ironically increases the importance of the degree and direction of *national governance*. The same forces of commodification that subject Latin Americans to economic displacement, political chaos, and renewed repression are much less troublesome for a European, whose more developed government can buffer the shocks, negotiate effectively for citizens' interests in international institutions, and exercise social control without coercion. A Mexican peasant may lose her traditional land rights and government credits to a trade agreement concluded without her consent — then be beaten by the police when she protests. But a French farmer facing the same challenge has more leverage on his own government, basic welfare rights if things go wrong, reliable access to a range of speech and assembly rights to defend his interests, and appeal to the European Union for economic and civil-rights protection (and more subsidies). Further down the scale of national governance, the worst victims of globalization are people without *any* state protection: noncitizens, refugees, internally displaced persons, and women relegated to control of the "private authority" of family, community, or religion (Brysk and Shafir 2004).

By combining these factors of the form of globalization, the type of rights affected, and the citizenship of the recipient, we can more accurately gauge the probable impact of globalization on rights. This more accurate picture should enable us to move beyond sterile debates on whether globalization is a good thing, without falling into a piecemeal case-by-case analysis. But the real question is, given a globalizing world and evolving threats to human dignity and survival, what can we do to change it?

THE HUMAN-RIGHTS RESPONSE

Millions of human-rights activists around the world, and visionary leaders, have crafted a new way of doing politics to bring principle into practice. It begins by using global communications to capture the hearts and minds of global publics, who will pressure governments from the grassroots. Human-rights campaigns provide information on global suffering, affecting images that promote identification with victims and the formation of solidarity networks, and explanations that trace international connections. Advocates of human dignity must also construct cosmopolitan institutions at multiple levels, including global, regional, and sectoral organizations — from the International Criminal Court to the Organization of American States Human Rights Commission to the World Medical Association. And human-rights organizations actively promote the rule of national and international law. These strategies of mobilization and global governance can pressure governments "from above and below" to change repressive practices or better protect overlooked vulnerable citizens (Brysk 1993). But when the threat to human rights comes from global or private actors, human-rights proponents increasingly turn to an additional set of tactics. New forms of standard-setting, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child, highlight new populations, construct new rights, inspire willing governments, and embarrass laggards. To enforce these standards on global and private actors, activists participate in global civic initiatives that bypass governments — such as codes of conduct for multinational corporations (Brysk forthcoming).

In the least-developed corners of the globe, pariah states and cultural relativists resist universal standards and international law — even as they seek global trade and security support. Furthermore, the crimes against humanity wrought by terrorist networks are more common and overall more costly in "failed" or weak states that lack both national and global governance.

Most of the leading threats to human rights today reflect insufficient global governance. In the least-developed corners of the globe, pariah states and cultural relativists resist universal standards and international law — even as they seek global trade and security support. Furthermore, the crimes against humanity wrought by terrorist networks are

more common and overall more costly in "failed" or weak states that lack both national and global governance. Terrorism flourishes in societies experiencing an unhealthy and unsustainable imbalance in these aspects of globalization.

At the other end of the spectrum, the Bush administration has sought to substitute American hegemony for global participation in a way that has damaged international human-rights treaties, programs, and institutions. For example, misguided U.S. objections and ultimate withdrawal from the International Criminal Court — which incorporated ample safeguards against political prosecutions — have complicated a goal that the United States claims to share: bringing war criminals and genocidal dictators to justice. Compounding this folly, U.S. policymakers have manipulated aid and trade agreements to impose special clauses exempting U.S. personnel from international legal accountability on states that had agreed to participate. U.S. rejection of international law also has diminished dominant power respect for human rights in the conduct of military interventions, the treatment of noncitizen immigrants, prisoners, and terrorism suspects, and even for the everyday civil liberties of U.S. citizens.

In a different way, the unbalanced commodification and global-governance gap of neoliberal policies and pressures has generated impoverishment, destabilizing discontent, and decaying democracy in Latin America and parts of Africa and Asia. Powerful ideas have begun to receive policy feedback — showing that economic neoliberalism may contradict its namesake philosophy of liberalism, threatening human rights as it expands property rights. While the overall trend remains discouraging, human-rights resistance has already inspired some changes, such as debt relief. Continuing pressure may be building towards a chastened vision of a global safety net and rights consciousness for cosmopolitan economic institutions (both the World Bank and IMF now have human rights-related programs).

Human rights in the new millennium face a kind of "run on the bank," with expanding principles chasing too little authority. As with most global problems, the connection, communication, and resources exist to solve the problem — what is lacking is political will. Cosmopolitan institutions and rules can be strengthened at three levels. To strengthen global capacity, the United States must stop being the "deadbeat dad" of the UN and return to the family of nations. To bridge the gaps of chronically failing abusive governments, leading powers and regional organizations must build a systematic and humane system for multilateral humanitarian intervention — a kind of "governance of last resort." And the increasing influence of private actors — such as business or religious organizations — over the rights and conditions of millions requires a stronger set of global civic initiatives and monitoring, based in nonpartisan groups and affected sectors leveraging appropriate incentives such as investment (Brysk forthcoming).

In an era of globalization, defending human rights means more than the ongoing, still-necessary work of condemning distant dictators. It means tracing global connections, acknowledging global responsibilities, and rethinking national interest. In a small world, the rights you save may someday be your own.

Alison Brysk is professor of political science and international studies at the University of California, Irvine. She has published two books, two edited volumes, and numerous scholarly articles on human rights, Latin American politics, social movements, and globalization.

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BIOLOGY

means “study of life,”
if you look at its roots,
but Ron Rice, my lab partner in tenth grade,
just wanted to look at
his pot stash under the microscope.

He said he could see
the THC, but all I saw
were red strands roping
around hard green buds
crystals shining like dimes
on a sunlit tennis court.

People liked to call Ron “Rat.”
He had a rat-tail in his hair
like the guys in Duran Duran.
He had a turned up nose that twitched
whenever he had an itch, and if
you put him under a microscope,

you’d have seen that
he would steal your jacket,
pawn it to buy coke,
and then help you look for it.
Our senior year, Ron OD’d and died
— suicide —

and everyone forgot
that they’d ever called him “Rat.”
They eulogized him and cried.
Man, if you were to look
at one of those tears
under a microscope,

you’d see something human
dog-paddling and gasping its last,
and you’d see something inhuman
holding it down, drowning it.

TOM C. HUNLEY

Tom C. Hunley is in his last year of PhD studies in English (creative writing dissertation) at Florida State University, where he holds the Edward H. and Marie C. Kingsbury Creative Writing Fellowship. His poetry has been published in *Cimarron Review*, *Exquisite Corpse*, *5 AM*, and *Southern Poetry Review*. He was recently nominated for a Pushcart Prize.

David Dollar

Globalization and Poor Nations: Opportunities and Risks



A recent worldwide poll found that attitudes toward global-economic integration are generally positive. What might surprise many people is that developing countries have more enthusiasm for foreign trade and investment than do rich ones. This attitude is not so surprising once one recognizes that the fast-growing economies in the world in this era of globalization are developing countries that are aggressively integrating with the world economy. While this integration brings benefits, it also requires complementary institutions and policies to enhance the gains and cushion some of the risks of greater openness. Also, many poor countries are simply not involved in globalization, and their marginalization is a serious problem for the world. Where poverty and unemployment are growing are precisely the locations that are not integrating. Rich countries could do substantially more in terms of foreign aid and market access to help these lagging regions to integrate.

VIEWS OF GLOBAL-ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

The Pew Center for the People and the Press recently released a global-attitudes survey that provides an interesting perspective on different views of globalization in poor countries and rich ones. The Pew Center surveyed 38,000 people in forty-four nations, with excellent coverage of the developing world in all regions. In general, the worldwide view of growing economic integration is positive. But what is striking in the survey is that views of globalization are distinctly more positive in low-income countries than in rich ones.

While most people worldwide express the view that growing global trade and business ties are good for their country, only 28 percent of people in the United States and Western Europe think that such integration is "very good." In Vietnam and Uganda, in contrast, the percentages who think that integration is very good are 56 percent and 64 percent, respectively. While these countries stand out as particularly proglobalization, developing Asia (37 percent) and Sub-Saharan Africa (56 percent) are far more likely to find integration "very good," than are respondents from rich countries. Conversely, a significant minority (27 percent of households) in rich countries thinks that "globalization has a bad effect on my country," compared with negligible numbers of households with this negative view in developing Asia (9 percent) or Sub-Saharan Africa (10 percent).

Developing nations also have a more positive view of the institutions of globalization. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 75 percent of households think that multinational corporations have a positive influence on their country, compared with only 54 percent in rich countries. Views of the effect of the World Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank, and International Monetary Fund

(IMF) are nearly as positive in Africa (72 percent finding these to have a positive effect on their country). On the other hand, only 28 percent of respondents in Africa think that antiglobalization protestors have a positive effect on their country. Views of the protestors are more positive in the United States and Western Europe (35 percent positive).

ATTITUDES SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE

The results of the Pew attitudes survey make sense once one combines them with the objective findings on globalization coming from World Bank and other research. In general, the developing countries that have increased their participation in trade and attracted foreign investment have seen accelerated growth and poverty reduction. Uganda and Vietnam are two of the best examples, so it is not surprising that households there have a very positive view of this integration. Vietnam liberalized foreign trade and investment as part of a larger reform program and quickly shifted from being a rice importer to being one of the top three rice-exporting nations. With the help of foreign investment, it also dramatically increased its exports of footwear, garments, and other labor-intensive manufactures. Spurred by the faster growth, Vietnam cut poverty in half in a decade.

More generally, globalizing developing countries are growing significantly faster than the rich countries. In our paper, "Trade, Growth, and Poverty," my colleague Aart Kraay and I define the top one-third of developing countries in terms of trade integration as the "more globalized" countries. This group has seen an acceleration of its per-capita growth rate, reaching a population-weighted average of 5 percent per annum in the 1990s. By contrast, rich countries grew at 2 percent and the rest of the developing world at –1 percent. Because the globalizing group includes some large countries such as Bangladesh, China, India, Brazil, and Mexico, it has a total of 3 billion people.

A common claim of the antiglobalization movement is that integration is leading to growing inequality within countries so that the poor do not benefit from the growth. But this is not generally true. Certainly in some countries inequality has risen, such as in China and the United States, but there is no worldwide trend. Most important, in the developing countries that are growing well as a result of integration and other reforms, rapid growth translates into rapid poverty reduction. The total number of extreme poor (living on less than $1 per day measured at purchasing-power parity) increased throughout history up to about 1980. Since 1980, the number of poor has declined by 200 million, while at the same time world population increased by 1.8 billion over the period. The progress is heartening, though the remaining number of extreme poor (around 1.1 billion) represents one of the great challenges of the new millennium. Rich countries and poor countries together have established a set of "Millennium Development Goals" that include reducing the extreme-poverty rate in the developing world by one-half between 1990 and 2015. As of 2000, the world was slightly ahead of schedule for meeting this target. Much of that progress has been achieved in countries such as Bangladesh, China, India, and Vietnam, which have obviously benefited from globalization.

INTEGRATION REQUIRES GOOD GOVERNANCE

While the Pew survey reveals broadly positive views of globalization in the developing world, the survey also shows common anxieties around the world concerning the availability of good jobs, job insecurity, old-age support, and other quality-of-life issues. Interestingly, people tend not to blame globalization for lack of progress in these areas, but rather to focus on weaknesses in governance in their own countries. World Bank research shows that openness to trade alone is not going to have much impact if that openness is not complemented by other factors — especially sound macroeconomic policies, a healthy investment climate, and effective provision of basic services, especially for the poor.

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The highly visible financial crises in Argentina, Russia, Thailand, and other countries are a powerful reminder that economic integration brings risks as well as opportunities. While each crisis is somewhat

different, they provide two important lessons for managing globalization. One lesson concerns the importance of good macroeconomic management (especially fiscal management) because most of the crises are related at least in part to fiscal mismanagement. But a second lesson of equal importance is that opening the capital account to easy flows of money from abroad is probably the last step in integration that a developing nation wants to take. The countries that have done very well — China is an example — have opened up to trade and direct investment by multinational firms, while taking a prudent approach to flows of portfolio capital. The latter are notoriously volatile and difficult to manage for developing countries.

Growing evidence suggests that differences in investment climate can explain much of the variation in performance in the developing world and that reform of the investment climate is thus a front-burner priority in many locations. By investment climate, I mean the micro-environment in which firms operate: the environment of regulation, infrastructure, and financial services. A major new initiative at the World Bank is to help client countries carry out large, systematic surveys of firms to measure the investment climate, relate it to investment and productivity at the firm level, and identify priority areas for reform.

Investment-climate surveys have been completed recently in Bangladesh, China, India, and Pakistan. The surveys cover large samples of firms in tradable sectors such as garments, textiles, electronics, pharmaceuticals, and the like. The "typical firm" in the sample employs around seventy-five workers. For such firms, weaknesses in governance and infrastructure services are among the main problems that hold back productivity and growth. For example, reliability of the power supply is a big issue in all of the South Asian countries. In our China sample, firms estimate losing 2 percent of sales to power outages, compared with 3.3 percent in Bangladesh and 5.4 percent in Pakistan.

On many of these regulatory and infrastructure issues, China looks quite good compared with other developing countries. For example, one indicator is how long it takes a firm to get its last shipment of materials through customs. Firms in garments and electronics that are trying to compete on the world market typically import some materials regularly, and efficiency of customs is quite important. The typical firm in the China sample got its most recent shipment of imported materials through customs in seven days, compared with eleven days in India, twelve days in Bangladesh, and seventeen days in Pakistan. Because of such delays, firms have to hold higher inventories and are less reliable suppliers on the international market. Another good investment-climate indicator is how many days it takes to get a fixed telephone line. The wait varies from sixteen days in China, to forty-two in Pakistan, to a whopping one hundred and thirty days in Bangladesh. Locations with better investment climates are the ones that are benefiting powerfully from globalization, with large-scale job creation and rapid reduction of poverty.

Labor-intensive manufactures are the other important area where protection remains fairly high in rich countries, especially the continuing import quotas for textiles and garments. What the Pew attitude survey reveals clearly is that populations in the developing world have bought into the model of comparative advantage and an integrated global economy, but when they act on this model they often face unfair trade barriers in the rich countries that make up the bulk of the world market.

A third important area of complementary policies concerns health and education. Integration creates opportunities for many people in the developing world, but clearly basic education and health are prerequisites for taking advantage of the opportunities.

RICH COUNTRIES COULD MAKE INTEGRATION EASIER

Rich countries could take important actions to make integration easier for poor countries. While developed countries are relatively open to foreign trade, where they maintain strong protection is exactly in the product lines that are important to developing countries. Perhaps the worst protectionism in the rich world concerns agriculture: for example Japan has a rice tariff of 700 percent that effectively shuts out exports from Thailand and other producers. The European Union subsidizes its producers — directly through the budget and indirectly through high tariff walls that jack up prices to consumers — at a cost of some $100 billion annually, which depresses world-market prices in sugar, dairy,

and wheat while keeping prices high at home. The United States spends $50 billion annually on farmers. Cotton subsidies of $3.7 billion to U.S. farmers depress world-cotton prices and crowd out poor but otherwise efficient farmers in West Africa. These subsidies are three times the amount that the U.S. gives in foreign aid to Africa.

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The other area where rich countries could make a difference is with foreign aid. The volume of assistance has stagnated during the past decade, while rich countries grew well. As a result, foreign aid as a share of rich countries' GDP has fallen in half, to the lowest level since aid was instituted at the end of World War II. In the section above I noted some of the important areas in which developing countries have to "do their homework" — investment climate and health and education. Intelligent policies are critical, but money is an important input as well. We have ample evidence that the combination of policy reform and generous foreign assistance provides the best hope for growth and poverty reduction in the developing world.

In summary, globalization can be a powerful support to poverty reduction in the developing world, but to realize this potential requires actions at the national and international levels. Developing countries need to improve their investment climates and provide for effective delivery of health and education. The recent global-attitudes survey reveals that this agenda has broad popular support in developing countries. Rich countries also could do a lot to help, by providing fairer access of developing countries to their markets and by increasing their development aid. There is some support for this agenda in rich countries, but these countries' commitment to an integrated global economy and society continues to have serious detractors.

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Views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent official views of the World Bank or its member countries.



Robert K. Schaeffer

Globalization and Technology

Technology plays an important role in contemporary globalization. Most observers argue that technology is a force for integration, making the world a smaller, better place. Technology, it is said, brings "good things to life." This is true, but only in part. New technology also plays a role that few people consider. It may contribute to integration, but it also may result in economic and political disintegration, a process that distances people living in different parts of the world. A brief review of some recent developments illustrates the diverse social consequences of contemporary technology.

Consider the technological developments associated with the communications revolution. Fiber-optic cable and wireless technologies have transformed telecommunications in recent years. By most accounts, these technologies have made it easier and less expensive for people to talk with family, friends, and business associates, and to do so while on the move, from great distances. Many have argued that they have contributed to what Marshall McLuhan called the "global village." But these technologies have had other, less obvious consequences. The introduction of new communications technologies contributed to the substitution of these technologies for old ones and resulted in the dematerialization of the raw materials used in their manufacture. And this trend in turn has resulted in falling prices and a whole series of economic and social problems for the producers of raw materials in the periphery, that is poor countries across Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and South Asia.

EXAMPLES OF SUBSTITUTION AND DEMATERIALIZATION

For more than a century, communication technology relied on copper cable to carry the electric impulses generated by telegraph and telephone machines. Then in the 1970s, scientists at Corning Glass began developing glass fiber that could transmit laser light efficiently enough to make wave guides, what we now call fiber-optic cables, that could carry telephone, television, and computer transmissions. More recently, in the 1980s and 1990s, microwave cell-phone and satellite technologies made it possible to communicate without wires made of either copper or fiber-glass. Fiber-optic and wireless technologies contributed to the process of technological substitution, replacing old, copper-wire-based systems with new glass and microwave mediums.

Not surprisingly, the advent of new communications technologies reduced the demand for copper, a mineral mined in countries such as Chile and Zambia. At about the same time, during the 1970s and 1980s, environmental advocates and business leaders began worrying about the use of nonrenewable resources such as copper and oil and adopted recycling technologies as a strategy to preserve and prolong the use of natural resources. Although recycling is a relatively unheralded technology, nowhere near as sexy or as interesting as cell phones, it is extremely important. By 1985, businesses and consumers in the United States obtained half of the cop-

per that they needed from recycled scrap. Of course, as industry began to recycle copper from wire cable and the pipes used in plumbing, it needed less copper from mines overseas, a process of dematerialization. Think of recycling, conservation, and the elimination of waste as technologies that dematerialize, vaporize, or eliminate the need for mined copper and other metals. In Japan, for instance, businesses "mine" metals by recycling discarded cell phones. From a lode of 16,000 cell phones, recyclers can extract 255 pounds of copper, 205 pounds of steel, 83 pounds of aluminum, 2.6 pounds of silver, .4 pounds of gold, and .02 pounds of palladium.

Communications technologies may be the most prominent new inventions, but other important technologies also have resulted in substitution and dematerialization. During the 1970s and early 1980s, successive oil embargoes and skyrocketing oil prices stimulated the development of myriad new technologies that created alternatives to oil or reduced the need for oil in some uses. Technologies that used alternative fuels — wind, sun, and water, but also natural gas, coal, and uranium — were introduced in some industries, for some uses, as alternatives to oil. Today, governments and industries in the wealthy core (countries in Western Europe and North America, plus Japan and Australia) are exploring ways to develop hydrogen as a substitute for oil in transportation, which is its primary use.

While technologies designed to create substitutes for oil were useful, more important were technologies that dematerialized oil, by making it possible to do more with less. Automobile manufacturers built more fuel-efficient engines and cars, architects redesigned homes and offices to heat and cool with less energy, homeowners put fiberglass blankets in their attics to conserve energy, and engineers developed new lighting and refrigeration systems to reduce energy consumption. In the United States, refrigerators alone consume one-sixth of the electricity used by consumers, much of it generated by oil-burning power plants. But between 1987 and 1997, new technology had reduced energy consumption in new refrigerators by 75 percent. Taken together, new technologies helped dematerialize oil. Between 1973 and 1985, U.S. demand for energy fell 20 percent. Of course it did not last. As oil prices fell in the late 1980s, the introduction of new technologies slowed and consumers abandoned fuel-efficient cars and embraced new, inefficient, oil-dependent technologies called minivans, pickups, and SUVs.

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One last example will serve to illustrate the process of technological substitution and dematerialization. In the 1960s, scientists in Japan and the United States developed two important food technologies: 1) enzymes that produced fructose sugar from the starch in corn, resulting in High Fructose Corn Sweetener (HFCS), and 2) artificial chemicals that mimicked the taste of sugar, aspartame the chief one among them. These technologies enabled the food industry to replace cane and beet sugars for many uses, particularly in beverages and candies. (Hard candies still need cane sugar to set or harden properly.) The major cola makers had long used cane sugar to produce their products. But their decision in the early 1980s to use HFCS in their beverages was a turning point, leading to widespread substitution of HFCS for cane sugar. By 1985, the consumption of HFCS equaled the consumption of cane and beet sugar for the first time ever, and it has since continued to grow. Likewise, dietary sugars have replaced natural sugars in many beverages and chewing gums. In this case, consumers have played an important role in the substitution process, either because they grew worried about the weight-gain associated with drinking high-calorie, sugar-laden sodas or because they were concerned about the cavities associated with chewing sugared gums.

While technologies have encouraged a massive substitution process, they have not resulted in a significant dematerialization of cane and beet sugars. But health-conscious consumers have embraced new technologies that promote the substitution and dematerialization of other foods. Increasingly consumers have switched to foods using technologies based on temperate oil seeds (canola, cottonseed, flaxseed), which are low in cholesterol and saturated fats, and abandoned technologies based on yummy tropical oils (coconut and palm oil), which are high in cholesterol and saturated fats.

No one doubts that new technologies have provided real and substantial benefits: mobile and inexpensive phone systems; fuel efficiency and energy conservation; cheap and, in some cases, healthier

food products. It is easy to imagine, then, that because these new technologies benefit businesses and consumers in the core, they must also benefit others. But this is not necessarily the case. To appreciate why this difference might be so, it is important to consider the economic and social consequences of technologies that allow widespread substitution and dematerialization.

In general, new technologies have weakened or reduced the global demand for many minerals, raw materials, and agricultural products. As demand for these goods has fallen, either as a result of substitution or dematerialization or both, prices have fallen. Since the 1980s, worldwide commodity prices for raw materials have fallen by more than half. This is the biggest decline since the Great Depression of the 1930s.

EFFECTS ON COUNTRIES IN THE PERIPHERY

Of course, falling prices are a problem for producers in any country, but they are a particular problem when these revenues are a country's only source of income. Zambia does not produce and export anything of value besides copper. The Dominican Republic and the Philippines rely almost exclusively on sugar cane and tropical oils to earn money overseas. Oil is the only export of value for Nigeria and Saudi Arabia. So when world demand for raw materials weakens and prices fall, these countries face a series of problems.

First, the industries that mine, pump, or grow raw materials shrink or go out of business. Firms that have higher costs — ones that have to mine or drill deeper or use more fertilizer to coax a crop out of infertile soils — go bankrupt first. But others follow if falling prices reduce profitability. Employment in these industries shrinks and wages decline as businesses go bankrupt or try to reduce one of the few costs (labor) that can be cut. Once you know that 50 million people worldwide work in the cane and sugar-beet industry, the impact of HFCS technology becomes apparent. Nearly all of them are vulnerable to the substitution and dematerialization process. In Brazil, the world's largest sugar producer, employment in the industry fell by half in the 1990s. The Philippines experienced a comparable decline. And in the Caribbean, where sugar cane was first introduced in the 1500s, job loss has been so severe that one prime minister argued that he could foresee a "situation that could lead to the destruction of the sugar industry in most developing nations."

Falling prices and the decline of raw-materials industries also contributed to a second set of related problems. Countries sell goods abroad not because they enjoy it, but because they use the money that they earn from sales of copper, oil, or sugar to purchase goods which they cannot make themselves. So when export earnings decline, they have to reduce their purchases of foreign goods, some of them — food, medicine, machinery, or oil — essential to their health and well-being. They might try to borrow money from international banks and lending agencies to purchase goods that they need, but their ability to repay their debts depends on their capacity to sell the stuff that they can export. The problem is that the value of their exports has steadily fallen in recent years. Under these conditions, it is difficult for them to borrow money or repay debt.

Following the advice of economists such as Raul Prebisch, many governments in the periphery tried in the 1950s and 1960s to practice a kind of substitution of their own, building and then protecting domestic industries so that they could replace goods manufactured in foreign countries with products made by domestic firms. But "import-substitution industrialization," as it was then called, was swept away by the great debt crisis of the 1980s and by new free-trade agreements in the 1990s.

Of course, governments in the periphery depend on tax revenue from export industries — severance taxes, taxes on business income and wages — to fund public services. So when important industries decline, government tax revenues fall. Therefore, in a pinch, governments lay off public-sector workers — teachers, policemen, and health workers — and reduce spending on schools, roads, and hospitals.

Across the low-income periphery, people have been deeply affected by changes associated with the introduction of new technology and falling commodity prices. (Commodity prices have fallen for other reasons, too — rising supplies of some goods, fluctuating exchange rates — but those reasons are beyond the scope of this article.) Although the pace of recent change has accelerated as a result of contemporary globalization, these developments are not entirely new. Some economists and government

officials have long worried about the prospect of declining prices for the goods that poor countries export.

ATTEMPTS AT SOLUTIONS

Following the advice of economists such as Raul Prebisch, many governments in the periphery tried in the 1950s and 1960s to practice a kind of substitution of their own, building and then protecting domestic industries so that they could replace goods manufactured in foreign countries with products made by domestic firms. But "import-substitution industrialization," as it was then called, was swept away by the great debt crisis of the 1980s and by new free-trade agreements in the 1990s. So as an alternative, economists and government officials in many poor countries have tried to replace declining raw-materials industries with new service industries, particularly tourism.

In the Caribbean, for instance, hotels and resorts now stand where sugar cane once grew. Unfortunately, the tourist industry will not be able to make good the losses experienced by the decline of raw-materials industries in many countries for two reasons. First, tourists from the wealthy core prefer to vacation in the core, not the periphery. The top-five tourist destinations worldwide are France, the United States, Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom. And since September 11, tourists have demonstrated an increasing preference for these countries (if they travel at all) over destinations in the periphery, which are now regarded as unsafe as a result of terrorism or crime, or unhealthy as a result of infectious diseases such as AIDS and SARS.

A second reason why economic development based on tourism will not be the panacea that many government officials imagine is that most of the money spent by tourists in the periphery is captured by high-tech service industries — airlines, hotels, and cruise ships — based in the core. For example, 97 percent of all tourists flying to the Bahamas arrive on American or British airlines, 90 percent stay in American or European hotel chains, and most of the food and drink that they consume during their visit is imported. Tourists spend a very small percentage of their vacation money on local goods or services, which is particularly true when they travel on cruise ships or stay in all-inclusive resorts, which prevents their dollars or deutsche marks from leaking out into local economies.

In short, the problem is that the changes associated with new technologies developed in the core have had adverse consequences for people in the periphery. Moreover, the economic alternatives available to people in the periphery are relatively unpromising. Producers and consumers in the core need less of the stuff — copper, oil, sugar — that peripheral producers make. As a consequence, technological change has not resulted in integration but instead in a disintegration of long-standing economic ties between rich and poor countries. Some observers of contemporary globalization worry that if the wealthy countries do not need what former colonies make, their interest in the economic and political fortunes of people in the periphery will diminish, a process that may lead to declining investment and aid. And without new investment or aid, the economic, political, and social conditions in the periphery will deteriorate.

This perspective on contemporary globalization differs from that of many scholars who argue that global change — particularly technological innovation — has a singular, positive, universal social meaning. Instead, I take the view that global change has diverse social meanings. Here's an analogy. Picture a weather satellite view of North America and the Pacific. Then scroll it forward. As a low-pressure system from the Pacific sweeps west across the continent, it has very different meteorological consequences for people living along its path. It brings fog to people on the coast, rain to people in the interior, snow to people in the mountains, and drought to people in the high desert beyond. So it is with economic, political, cultural, technological, and environmental changes that sweep across the contemporary global landscape. Some people benefit from change, as farmers do from rain, while others are disadvantaged by it, such as people living in flood plains. The storm of change associated with new technology wreaks different kinds of havoc around the world.

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Alan Bairner

Globalization and Sport: The Nation Strikes Back



Saif Saeed Shaheen's victory in the 3,000-meter steeplechase at the recent World Championships in Paris was but the latest piece of evidence of what some commentators believe to be a process that will inevitably lead to the total transformation of international sport. Here was an athlete, born in Kenya and formerly known as Stephen Cherono, winning a gold medal for Qatar, a small but rich state with no previous tradition in distance running, which for all intents and purposes had simply bought the services of its new sporting star. The global-sports economy, it seemed, had hammered yet another nail in the coffin of authentic national rivalry.

Many people believe that nowhere is the triumph of globalization more apparent than in the world of sport. All manner of evidence is produced in support of this claim. Frequent reference is made to the movement of athletes from one country to another, and the significance of global-sporting events is cited. The role of the media in selling certain sports to new audiences is mentioned. So too is the manufacture and subsequent marketing of sports merchandise that connects, albeit in a highly unequal relationship, small villages in India and elsewhere in the developing world with the rich suburbs of North America, Australia, and Europe. As a consequence of these and other related phenomena, it is argued that a global-sports arena has emerged. In itself, the claim is irrefutable. Scarcely any part of the world can escape the influence of a global-sports economy that touches the lives of billions of people whether as active participants, consumers, or exploited laborers. Less convincing, however, are the additional conclusions that are drawn from the essentially simplistic assertion that the world of sport reflects certain important global trends.

Many of those who are most supportive of the idea of a global-sporting universe proceed from indisputable factual observations to much grander and more controversial claims. The first of these claims is the belief that the process that is being described is new. The second contends that, as in other spheres of human activity, the consequence of globalization's impact on sport is increased homogenization. The latter is portrayed as having particularly significant implications for cultural diversity centered on local, regional, and national differences. Let us consider these extended claims.

IS GLOBALIZATION OF SPORTS NEW?

One can argue that ever since sports emerged in their modern forms during the nineteenth century, a globalization project has been in place. One only has to consider the ways in which many sports were diffused from Britain to the various corners of the British Empire to appreciate the extent of global interconnectedness at a time when the concept of globalization had not even been created. Major global-sporting spectacles such as the modern Olympics and soccer's World Cup also predated the emergence of the idea of globalization. Furthermore, in terms of the notion of a global-sports economy, it should be remembered that athletes were moving from one country to another long before their actions were thought of in terms of global-sports migration. Saif Saeed Shaheen is by no means the first sportsman to represent more than one nation, nor is he the first to be prompted to make his move by material circumstances. For the most part, the migration of sporting talent has its roots in the economic and political circumstances of particular nations. In the final analysis, Hungarian footballers who moved to western Europe in 1956 did so for the same reason as other Hungarians. Much of the labor migration that has occurred during the so-called global era is explicable in precisely the same terms. Although the two cannot be wholly disaggregated, local conditions rather than the invisible hand of global capitalism make people want to move, and it has always been thus.

For the most part, the migration of sporting talent has its roots in the economic and political circumstances of particular nations. In the final analysis, Hungarian footballers who moved to western Europe in 1956 did so for the same reason as other Hungarians. Much of the labor migration that has occurred during the so-called global era is explicable in precisely the same terms. Although the two cannot be wholly disaggregated, local conditions rather than the invisible hand of global capitalism make people want to move, and it has always been thus.

It should be added too that the idea that the manufacture and marketing of sports goods is a novel phenomenon is also open to question. Since the nineteenth century, sports equipment that has been used in the developed world has frequently been manufactured using raw materials from poor countries in Africa and Asia. One significant difference is that while once the manufacturing itself was carried out in Europe and the United States, nowadays it is much more likely to be conducted in the developing world so that multinational companies can take advantage of low labor costs. But that is a trend within capitalism as such; it is not a clear sign that the sports economy is now more globalized than it was 150 years ago. Indeed, one quickly comes to realize that since its inception modern sport has been internationalized.

GLOBAL SPORTS AND HOMOGENIZATION

However, it would be highly erroneous to assume that internationalization has meant homogenization. In fact, the appropriateness of the concept of internationalization in this context immediately casts doubt on claims that global processes affecting sport have created cultural homogeneity. For example, turning our attention first to major sporting spectacles, the fact is that, despite their global reach, events such as the Olympic Games are international rather than transnational. They involve competition between national teams. The sprinter who finishes fourth at the U.S. Olympic trials cannot simply turn up and compete in the games, even if he or she also happens to be the fourth fastest runner in the world at that particular time. Competitors can only attend as part of national squads. Furthermore, the exploits of talented individuals are celebrated with the waving of national flags, the playing of national anthems, and a medal table that quantifies the achievements of national

teams. The age of the global-sporting individual has not yet arrived as far as the International Olympic Committee is concerned. Similarly, Real Madrid cannot enter soccer's World Cup even though the club has assembled a squad of players that is equal to, if not better than, the best that any single nation can put on the field. Arguably, soccer's European Champions' League has assumed a significance at least as great as that of the World Cup, primarily because wealthy clubs are in a better position than national selectors to assemble multitalented squads. But even in competitions of this sort, the contest within the contest is fought out between national soccer leagues. Thus, rumors of a proposed European league remain greatly exaggerated. That is not to say, of course, that the idea of European leagues within the context of sport is wholly frivolous, as the example of American football reveals.

A professional American football league is currently in operation in Europe with teams based in a number of major cities. On the basis of such developments, one assumes, advocates of the homogenization thesis are often tempted to embellish their claims with talk of a process of Americanization. Not only does globalization lead to cultural homogeneity, but also the content of the culture, sporting or otherwise, that has resulted is essentially American — or so the argument goes. In fact, American sports per se have had remarkably little effect on the rest of the world despite the economic, military, and political preeminence of the United States, particularly since the collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire. One reason for this is that, at least in terms of those who play sports or who actually attend events, sporting space is finite. Just as soccer has found it difficult to penetrate the psyche of the true American sports fan, so North American sports have found little room for maneuver in Europe and elsewhere, despite the best financial efforts of bodies such as the National Football League. In some parts of the world, such as Japan and certain Caribbean islands, where the sporting space was not already overcrowded, American sports have been successfully diffused. But most Europeans who like baseball have acquired the taste while living temporarily or more probably for an extended period of time in the United States. On the other hand, most Swedes who love hockey do so not because of their exposure to the National Hockey League but because of the sport's not inconsiderable history in their own country.

All of that said, it is necessary to repeat that there does indeed exist a global-sporting economy (in which the United States is a major player) that operates hand-in-hand with transnational media. This relationship has a massive impact on the ways in which people consume sport. Most Europeans may have rejected American sports, but they cannot deny that the way in which they now watch their own sports is hugely influenced by what happens on the other side of the Atlantic. Squad numbers, sophisticated scoreboards, and even the dreaded cheerleaders are not European inventions, but they are now undeniably part and parcel of European sporting events. Developments such as these illustrate the extent to which the global and the local interact. That is not the same as saying, however, that the global is successfully replacing the local.

Not only does globalization lead to cultural homogeneity, but also the content of the culture, sporting or otherwise, that has resulted is essentially American — or so the argument goes. In fact, American sports per se have had remarkably little effect on the rest of the world despite the economic, military, and political preeminence of the United States, particularly since the collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire. One reason for this is that, at least in terms of those who play sports or who actually attend events, sporting space is finite.

Arguably, as people seek ways of dealing with a world in which events in one place have obvious (and at times fatal) repercussions for people living elsewhere, a retreat into the protective shell of the local has increasing appeal. This impulse has clear implications for the capacity of sport to resist homogenization, despite the emergence of a global sporting economy. Gaelic games in Ireland provide a perfect example. If the doomsday scenarios put forward by advocates of the globalization/homogenization thesis are credible, there is simply no future for Gaelic football and hurling or indeed for myriad other native ludic activities that are practiced throughout the world. It would be foolhardy to say categorically that their future is wholly secure.

For the time being, however, the Gaelic-games movement seems to be more vibrant than ever. Its success is due in part to the ability of its governing body, the Gaelic Athletic Association, to harness

aspects of the global-sporting economy for its own purposes. Satellite television makes a global audience possible, whereas once major games were relayed only within Ireland courtesy of the national broadcasting company. Replica shirt sales have rocketed. Massive sponsorship deals have been arranged. All of this interest is proof that native games need not be entirely backward looking. On the other hand, part of their success is owed to the persistence of local rivalries — between Cork and Kerry or simply between parish teams — and national resistance — doing something, in this instance, that the British do not do. This is a world away from a homogeneous sporting culture in which there is little room for national traditions, far less for regional and local rivalries. Needless to say, many of those fervent devotees of Gaelic games also buy into more mainstream elements of the global-sporting economy — by supporting Manchester United, for example, and purchasing the requisite merchandise. For the time being, though, an attachment to the local and the familiar retains great appeal in a world in which global events and the less familiar can often invoke fear.

Returning to this year's world championships in track and field, Saif Saeed Shaheen's victory was undeniably impressive. The poignant image thereafter, however, was not of him draped in the national flag of Qatar but that of the forlorn silver medallist, Ezekiel Kemboi, holding the Kenyan flag. Here was a competitor who had done all that he could for himself and for his proud sporting nation. It would be foolish to ignore the extent to which representing one's nation remains a cherished ambition for countless young people throughout the world. Kemboi will be back. Kenyan athletics also will be back, no matter how many mercenaries can be recruited by other countries. As regards nations in general, despite the huge influence of the global-sports economy, they have not gone away — as yet — and it is unlikely that they will do so in the foreseeable future. Globalization, or at least the various processes that are categorized under that heading, has offered a challenge to the close ties that link sport with the nation. The game is not over yet, and its outcome is by no means inevitable.

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OLD DOG

Old Dog goes to sleep tired
And wakes up tired from sleep.
He opens his eyes before sunrise.
The dark stares into the dark.
Ears cock forward to catch those first
Faint footfalls of light.

He blinks rheum out of his eyes
And hears that familiar wheeze,
Slowly stretching and limping,
Waiting to get back his legs.
Then he plods out of the yard.
Down to the dew-wet pasture.

Nose and eyes and pizzle-stick:
Not what they should be. Or were.
All of them dribble stuff.
None of them dream any more.
But poking along through the morning,
Old Dog has his day.

TOM HANSEN

Tom Hansen's poems and essays appear in recent issues of *Artlife*, *Cottonwood*, *The Explicator*, *Mangrove*, *The Midwest Quarterly*, *Potpourri*, and *Weber Studies*.

Protecting the Nation's Health in an Era of Globalization: An Introduction

Bob Baldwin, Assoc. Dir., Office of Global Health administers a polio immunization to a Pakistani child in rural Pakistan. Photo credit: CDC/Office of Global Health

It is not possible to adequately protect the health of our nation without addressing infectious-disease problems that occur elsewhere in the world. In an age of expanding air travel and international trade, infectious microbes are transported across borders every day, carried by infected people, animals, and insects, and contained within commercial shipments of contaminated food. "Old" diseases such as malaria, measles, and foodborne illnesses are endemic in many parts of the globe, and new diseases such as acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS, caused by the human immunodeficiency virus [HIV]) — as well as new forms of old diseases such as multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (TB) — can emerge in one region and spread throughout the world.

Moreover, unforeseen disease problems continue to appear. Recent examples include vancomycin-resistant infections of Staphylococcus aureus in the United States and Japan, avian influenza in Hong Kong, a new disease called Nipah virus encephalitis in Malaysia, and outbreaks of dengue fever in Texas and West Nile encephalitis in New York [and even more recently, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, or SARS — Editor]. Increased CDC engagement in efforts to improve global disease-surveillance and outbreak response will help us detect new or unusual diseases of any kind and respond to health emergencies of any kind — including both naturally occurring and intentionally caused outbreaks.

Left unchecked, today's emerging diseases can become the endemic diseases of tomorrow. This is what happened with HIV/AIDS, which spread from a remote part of Africa to all other continents twenty years ago and is now entrenched all over the world, necessitating a major international control effort. Because United States and international health are inextricably linked, the fulfillment of CDC's domestic mission — to protect the health of the U.S. population — requires global awareness and strategic thinking.

U.S. INVESTMENT IN GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH

The United States must participate more fully in combating infectious-disease threats around the world. These efforts will yield multiple benefits:

- **Protecting the health of U.S. citizens at home and abroad.** Controlling disease outbreaks as well as dangerous endemic diseases wherever they occur prevents those diseases from spreading internationally, saving lives and dollars. U.S. citizens cannot be adequately protected from diseases such as measles, HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis if our public-health efforts are restricted to persons residing within our borders.
- **Furthering U.S. humanitarian efforts.** The potential for saving human lives by preventing infectious diseases overseas is tremendous. Every year, an estimated three million infant and child deaths are prevented by vaccination and other preventive health measures. Many families and communities, including refugees and displaced people, also benefit from international investigations that lead to prompt control of outbreaks.
- **Providing diplomatic and economic benefits.** Because health is an area of concern for all nations, international projects that address infec-

tious-disease issues can open avenues of communication and ease tensions between the United States and other nations. Improvements in global health will also enhance the U.S. economy and contribute to global prosperity. Reductions in disease burden will promote economic growth in nations that represent growing markets for U.S. products. Investments in global health will also reduce U.S. healthcare costs by decreasing the number of cases of imported diseases and by eradicating diseases currently included in childhood-vaccination programs.

- **Enhancing security.** Slowed economic growth fueled by poor health and disease can impede democratic development and political transitions in poor and former-communist nations, contributing to military conflicts and humanitarian emergencies. The HIV/AIDS pandemic is already destabilizing poorer nations, damaging their economic, social, political, military, and educational infrastructures, and creating vast numbers of orphans. The recent intentional releases of biologic agents in the United States also have intensified international concerns about bioterrorism. Because of the ease and frequency of modern travel, an intentionally caused outbreak that begins anywhere in the world can quickly become an international problem. A contagious bioterrorism agent such as smallpox can spread rapidly from person to person and from country to country. A noncontagious agent such as anthrax can be spread by unexpected methods, including international mail. The United States must be prepared to work with other nations to prevent illness and deaths caused by acts of bioterrorism.

Although the United States participates in health projects in many parts of the world, much more can be done, at relatively low cost, with political will, national leadership, and a clearly articulated global strategy.

CDC'S ROLE IN PROMOTING GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH

CDC, which is dedicated to the prevention and control of disease and the promotion of health, works by invitation in many different jurisdictions, including U.S. states and cities and other nations. Throughout its history, CDC has provided international leadership in public health, serving as a technical consultant to the World Health Organization (WHO) and ministries of health on projects that address infectious-disease problems related to endemic diseases, wars, famines, or other disasters. Many of these projects have been funded and coordinated by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). CDC has also supported research and public-health education on diseases of regional or international importance, provided resources and leadership for the smallpox-eradication effort, and established long-term collaborative research partnerships with several developing nations. While considerable effort has been devoted to these international activities, CDC's primary focus has remained on domestic health.

In recent years, however, CDC's overseas role has expanded rapidly. Global-polio eradication and HIV/AIDS-control programs have led to substantial investments of CDC personnel and financial resources, as have a succession of complex international emergencies. Between 1990 and 2000, CDC provided outbreak assistance on an ad-hoc basis to nations in Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America to help investigate outbreaks of unknown, highly dangerous, and highly infectious diseases, and also provided diagnostic support for hundreds of local investigations around the globe.

Although there are no formal structures and designated resources for international-outbreak response, U.S. citizens — as well as foreign governments — have come to rely on the CDC to provide outbreak assistance and public-health information whenever a new or reemerging disease threat is detected anywhere on the globe. Outbreak assistance by CDC would also be required if an intentionally caused outbreak occurred at home or abroad.

CDC's growing presence overseas presents new opportunities and new challenges. CDC's ongoing efforts to strengthen U.S. domestic public-health infrastructure are critical to the success of these international collaborations.

SIX PRIORITY AREAS

The CDC has defined global infectious-disease priorities in six areas, selected in consultation with global public-health partners. In looking toward the future, CDC envisions increased activity and progress in each area.

1. International-Outbreak Assistance

An underlying principle of the global strategy is the recognition that international-outbreak assistance is an integral function of CDC. Supporting this function will require augmenting, updating, and strengthening CDC's diagnostic facilities, as well as its capacity for epidemiologic investigation overseas. In the future, CDC must also be prepared, as a matter of routine, to offer follow-up assistance after each acute-emergency response. Such follow-up will assist

host-country ministries of health to maintain control of new pathogens when an outbreak is over.

2. A Global Approach to Disease Surveillance

In the years ahead, regional surveillance networks should expand, interact, and evolve into a global "network of networks" that provides early warning of emerging health threats and increased capacity to monitor the effectiveness of public-health control measures. CDC will help stimulate this process by providing technical assistance, evaluating regional progress, and working with many partners to strengthen the networks' telecommunications capacities and encourage the use of common software tools and harmonized standards for disease reporting.

3. Applied Research on Diseases of Global Importance

A research program on diseases that are of global importance, including some that are uncommon in the United States, is a valuable resource, both for humanitarian reasons and because of the dangers represented by some imported diseases. CDC's laboratorians, epidemiologists, and behavioral scientists will maintain an active research program to develop tools to detect, diagnose, predict, and eliminate diseases of global or regional importance. When a new disease threat is reported anywhere in the world, CDC's laboratorians and field investigators will be available to help answer questions about disease transmission, treatment, control, and prevention.

4. Application of Proven Public-Health Tools

Often a long delay occurs between the development of a new public-health tool and its widespread use. CDC will intensify efforts to couple applied research with research on ways to promote the use of newly developed tools for disease control ("implementation research"). CDC will help identify the most effective tools and actively encourage their international use, applying expertise and resources in laboratory research, public-health policy, program management, and health communications to overcome scientific, financial, and cultural barriers.

5. Global Initiatives for Disease Control

CDC will make sustained contributions to global initiatives to reduce the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in young people by 25 percent and reduce deaths from tuberculosis and malaria by 50 percent by 2010. CDC will also work with the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization to reduce infant mortality through enhanced delivery and use of new and underused vaccines against respiratory illnesses and other childhood diseases. CDC and its partners also will consult on future international priorities for disease-control, elimination, and eradication efforts — as well as on monitoring for antimicrobial resistance and planning for pandemic influenza — and help evaluate progress through the collection and analysis of disease-surveillance data.

6. Public-Health Training and Capacity Building

CDC will encourage and support the establishment of International Emerging Infections Programs (IEIPs) in developing countries — centers of excellence that integrate disease surveillance, applied research, prevention, and control activities. The IEIP sites will partner with Field Epidemiology Training Programs (FETPs) and other institutions to strengthen national public-health capacity and provide hands-on training in public health. Over time, they may help to strengthen capacity in neighboring countries as well as within the host country.

Implementation of specific objectives in these six areas will help realize CDC's vision of a world in which U.S. citizens and people throughout the world are better protected from infectious diseases.

PARTNERSHIPS AND IMPLEMENTATION

CDC's global infectious-disease strategy was prepared by the National Center for Infectious Diseases, in collaboration with other CDC centers and offices, including the Office of Global Health, the National Center for HIV, STD, and TB Prevention, the National Immunization Program, the Epidemiology Program Office, and the Public Health Practice Program Office. Many global-health organizations and agencies provided consultation and assistance during its development.

The strategy will be implemented incrementally over five years, as funds become available; the program began with the highest priorities for 2001–2002. As CDC carries out this strategy, it will coordinate with foreign governments, international organizations (including WHO, the Joint United Nations Programme on AIDS, and the United Nations Children's Fund), other U.S. agencies (including USAID, the National Institutes of Health, the Food and Drug Administration, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the National Aeronautics and Space Agency), professional societies, research institutions, and schools of public health, medicine, nursing, and veterinary science. CDC also will participate in international coalitions that support disease-eradication efforts and other regional and global-health initiatives. These coalitions may include

national and local nongovernmental organizations, community-based and faith-based organizations, and communities of color. Other implementation partners will include pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, nongovernmental organizations that address health problems, and development agencies, development banks, foundations, and other organizations that aim to reduce poverty by reducing the incidence of endemic diseases.

This article has been adapted from the Executive Summary of the CDC document *Protecting the Nation's Health in an Era of Globalization: CDC's Global Infectious Disease Strategy* (2002), prepared by Scott F. Dowell, MD, PhD, and Alexandra M. Leavitt, PhD. Reprinted with the permission of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The entire document is available on the CDC's web site at www.cdc.gov/globalidplan/.

EAT

Between our two eternities of darkness,
what's to be done? Pick up the table knife
from the table's cloth and peel
an apple's skin from its wet flesh.

Your knife is not made for such work.
Its blade, not sharp to begin with,
is clumsy from all the butter it's spread,
the forcing of meat from bone.

And yet. With practice —
not even art, but simple-minded rote —
skin can be parted from its body
in one spiral of derring-do.

Given light, the slap of air,
flesh will yellow, rust,
scurry to brown.
Grow its own darkness.

PAULANN PETERSEN

Paulann Petersen's work has appeared in *Poetry*, *The New Republic*, *Prairie Schooner*, *Willow Springs*, and the Internet's *Poetry Daily*. A collection of her poems, *The Wild Awake*, was published by Confluence Press in September 2002. A volume of her poems about Turkey, *Blood-Silk*, is forthcoming from Quiet Lion Press. She serves on the board of Friends of William Stafford, organizing the January Stafford Birthday Events.

Book Reviews

LOIS ROMA-DEELEY. *Rules of Hunger.* Scottsdale, AZ: Star Cloud Press. Release date: March 2004. $12.95.

In reading Lois Roma-Deeley's first book of poems, *Rules of Hunger*, I am struck by the careful precision of her observations. Here is one from "The Given": "Plums should be cold,/in a glass bowl and offered to children." Another from "Storytelling": "I'm in the airport watching the clouds/roll onto a tarmac sky." And one from "Crossing the Desert": "At three in the afternoon, the sky in July/over Gila Bend is a holocaust of light." Roma-Deeley marshals these observations in the service of a threshold experience: that moment when you put your hand on the door and then, taking the risk, you push through into the unknown. The poems in *Rules of Hunger* take us through, and we go willingly.

Arranged in three parts, *Rules of Hunger* presents the threshold experience in the first poem, "North of Babylon," when the speaker sees "an argument/of opening doors" and continues in "The Given" with an invitation "to stop at the doorway of our past/and step into our home." Other doors appear, sometimes disastrously as in "Inside the Rush of Plastic Pink Wings" or ominously as in "Compulsions (& Obsessions)" and "Storytelling." Doors mean a passing through, even a passing over as in "Piece Work," sections of which figure in all three parts of the book. In addition, these doors lead to movement, whether in a "big finned/Lincoln" ("The Apostle of Wax and Shine") or by train: "A train rolls by,/flatbed cars moving toward Phoenix" ("Crossing the Desert"). The movement is westward — Kansas City, St. Louis, Phoenix — in "Severe Traffic," as one poem is aptly called.

This movement often serves, as it historically has in the United States, to leave the past behind, to light out, as Huck said, for the territory: "The past is more like/this poor excuse for a train, rattling on/between two fixed points — a bead and a charm — /like some bastard with his eyes staring into mine" ("Gestures"). But the poet wisely knows that the past is not so easily shed or dead: "Sometimes, in the steam/of artichokes, I see a round/dining room table with cane back/chairs and these people are shouting:/*We're not very dead*" ("Too Many Ghosts"). And they are not, for, as Roma-Deeley reminds us in a quotation from Auden, "Art is our chief means of breaking bread with the dead."

Equally important, Roma-Deeley breaks bread with the living: "One day you go to college, take a class/and there's a woman sitting in the front row;/she refuses to turn around, to speak a word./And then it's 20 years and then it's just me/and you and this page which can't seem to say *we/know this is not the end of the story*" ("(Just For Today) I'm Stealing Your Story"). The poet knows it never is the end as she notes beautifully in "The Very Thing," my favorite poem in *Rules of Hunger*: "like the spaces/in late night conversations/I fill in what I don't know/with wanting." For this poet also knows that if she lets the bus "keep on driving" she will not miss a thing; she has everything she needs.

Peter Huggins teaches in the English Department at Auburn University. His poems have appeared in more than 100 journals, magazines, and anthologies. He has been a Tennessee Williams Scholar at the Sewanee Writers' Conference and has won the Dickinson Review Prize for Poetry. Two poems from his collection *Hard Facts* were nominated for a Pushcart Prize. His most recent collection of poems is *Blue Angels*, River City Publishing; *In the Company of Owls*, a novel for middle readers, is forthcoming from New South Books.

DAN BROWN. *The Da Vinci Code.* New York: Doubleday, 2003. 454 pages. $24.95.



When I initially learned that a book, a novel, had been written using some of Christianity's more, shall we say, esoteric subject matter, I was more than a little wary of the accuracy of the book. But I was refreshingly surprised by Dan Brown's fourth venture into the realm of fiction.

While I was not familiar with his previous works, the hubbub that his fourth was causing warranted reading *The Da Vinci Code* for myself. I had not yet met the work's main character, Robert Langdon, an Oxford-trained Harvard professor of symbology, but as I began reading I was drawn into a tightly woven tale of murder, mystery, and puzzles as quickly as Langdon was.

The novel begins with the gruesome murder of the Louvre's curator, Jacques Sauniere, and with the even more bizarre clues that the victim leaves in the museum's most famous wing. It is these cryptic clues that lead to Langdon's

involvement, as well as that of Sophie Neveu, a police cryptologist.

Before delving deeper into the twisted plot of this work of fiction, I must mention that much of the symbolism and details relates to the existence of a certain secret group known as the Priory of Sion. Those who have even a passing knowledge of the organization's history must have recognized the importance of the names that Brown devised for his characters.

Jacques Sauniere was actually a real person who played a pivotal role in the events in which the Priory has been involved since the end of the nineteenth century, and indeed continues to be involved in to this day. The "real" Sauniere was a priest in the south of France who made an interesting discovery when remodeling his church. What exactly was discovered remains unclear, but it is rumored to involve the Merovingian dynasty and the quest for the Holy Grail. I realize this sounds a bit far-fetched, but bear with me. A little background on this subject brings a whole new dimension to this book.

The name Sophie pays tribute to the knowledge that is bestowed upon the heroine at the end of the book. But more on that later.

While the Priory of Sion does exist and may have connections with the Knights Templar and the Freemasons, what this organization is sworn to protect is the knowledge that there are among us, in this day and age, descendants of Christ scattered throughout the world. What is interesting is the idea that Jesus was not a celibate rabbi, as is the image portrayed in the New Testament, but that he was also a man who had fathered children of his own. As you can see, that belief, if it is not just a belief but a distinct possibility, would rock the very foundation of Christianity as it exists today.

Back to the book itself, Brown demonstrates not only knowledge of art, art history, and architecture but also a talent at weaving it all together into such an intricate tapestry that it becomes difficult to determine what is his imagination at work and what is actually a mini-lesson in history.

In the bizarre scene that Sauniere leaves for the authorities to find at the Louvre, Langdon is labeled the prime suspect of the murder of the elderly curator, as the gentleman made a point to ensure that Langdon would be involved with Neveu, so that as a team the two of them would be able to decipher the clues properly.

As the pair begins to unravel bits and pieces of the mystery, the number of pieces of the elaborate jigsaw puzzle seems to expand exponentially. Once one piece is uncovered and its true meaning is discovered, the action truly begins.

The race against time leads the couple from the murder scene at the Louvre to a Swiss Bank on the outskirts of Paris. The information gleaned there from a bank official then leads Langdon and Neveu on a mad dash to an expert on the Sion and in Holy Grail lore, who conveniently resides in a chateau not far from Paris. When this character enters the game, once again a puzzle piece is found. The path then leads the now-trio to London.

It is here that Brown again showcases his knowledge of this subject matter when the next crucial piece of information is revealed. At an out-of-the-way church, Langdon and Neveu discover another treasure that Sauniere and the Priory have left for them. The story then leads them to still another landmark of importance, and the truth of the Holy Grail is finally revealed.

Brown's in-depth study of the body of literature and research that has come out in the last twenty years is extensive, and for the most part accurate. His style is certainly unique, and as this is only his fourth book, I look forward to his next venture onto the literary scene. If you read and enjoyed his work, I would be remiss to mention that of his other works I have since read, I have found them as interesting, as accurate, and as enjoyable as *The Da Vinci Code*.

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PAUL GINSBORG. *Italy and Its Discontents: Family, Civil Society, State (1980–2001)*. New York and Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. 521 pp. $35.00.

This is a book for Italophiles. But it is not one for those Italophiles who wish to perpetuate an idealized vision of "il bel paese" consisting only, for example, of a glowing Tuscan sun setting over silvery olive groves and gracefully terraced vineyards, or of cheerful gondoliers effortlessly plying their tourist-filled boats through silent and misty canals. Rather, this is a book for those whose passion for Italy is tempered by a concern for recent acute problems that the Republic has faced.



Updating his well-received *History of Contemporary Italy*, Paul Ginsborg sets as his task in this volume the examination of the momentous changes in the Italian political and cultural landscape during the last two decades of the twentieth century. This period, the author tells us, has witnessed a "socio-economic transformation" (ix) equally as significant as that of the first two decades of the Italian Republic (1948–68).

To recount within the space restraints of this review the dizzying political events of the period under study is impossible, so a few general comments regarding political trends will have to suffice.

Ginsborg characterizes the political system of the 1980s as "not only blocked but deeply degenerate" (179). This decade was characterized by deep political shifts, such as the creation of the *pentapartito*, an unstable five-party alliance; the collapse of the Italian Communist Party and the birth of its substitutes, the majoritarian Democratic Party of the Left and the minoritarian *Rifondazione Comunista*; and the birth of the conservative Northern League. But during this decade the political gains for the nation were only shallow at best; the "failure to introduce significant electoral or institutional reform" (173) is one such example. The major political players of this decade include Socialist Bettino Craxi, Communists Enrico Berlinguer and Achille Occhetto, and Christian Democrats Ciriaco De Mita and Giulio Andreotti.

The 1990s proved to be equally tense, both politically and culturally. Mincing no words, Ginsborg writes: "Italy witnessed a profound and dramatic crisis, which not only liquidated the old political elites and parties, but brought them into ignominious disrepute" (249). "Earthquake elections" (255) came in 1992, the unexpected results of which destroyed traditionally strong parties (the Socialist Party and the Christian Democrats) and annointed new ones (Northern League and The Network). Between 1992 and 2001, the Italian nation lived through court proceedings against political corruption, the continuing decline in the influence of the Catholic Church over the faithful, a crisis of debt in the Bank of Italy, deep scepticism on the part of European neighbors regarding the strength of the Italian economy, a secessionist threat in the North, and a "desperate fight against Mafia" (250) in the South. Political scandals, which abounded during both decades, ran the gamut from the uncovering of evidence that pointed to the membership of many politically important persons in a secret Masonic Lodge called Propaganda 2, whose name says it all, to the discovery of a "hidden armed network" (171) called the *Gladio*, which had ties to, among others, the CIA. Needless to say, this ongoing instability evoked profound despair and disgust in the citizens.

The cast of political characters in this decade comprised some familiar faces, namely, those of Andreotti, Craxi, and Occhetto, as well as many newcomers, including Christian Democrats Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, Francesco Cossiga, and Romano Prodi; Socialist Giuliano Amato; magistrate-turned-politician Antonio De Pietro; the Northern League's Umberto Bossi; the neo-fascist Gianfranco Fini; the Margherita's Francesco Rutelli; and the Olive Tree coalition's Massimo D'Alema (along with Prodi). But the most powerful newcomer to emerge in the 90s is the Forza Italia leader, Silvio Berlusconi. Currently Italy's Prime Minister, Berlusconi is also in virtually total control of Italy's media and is under accusation in no fewer than ten trials. Just before the 2001 elections, *The Economist*, followed by *Le Monde* and *El Mundo*, led the charge in publishing a severe indictment of Berlusconi: "His election as prime minister would…perpetuate, not change, Italy's bad old ways" (319).

As important and as fascinating as the politics of the period are, they constitute only one of the foci of Ginsborg's study. Equally as crucial to a nuanced comprehension of Italian complexities of this period is an understanding of the nation's cultural and societal underpinnings — its abiding institutions and values. Therefore, in addition to exploring Italy's complex political affairs between 1980 and 2001, Ginsborg analyzes what he considers to be the nation's structural weaknesses, its inherent and evolving strengths, and, importantly, the interplay among these elements and the world of politics.

Among Italy's societal liabilities Ginsborg numbers the ongoing economic depression of the South. For example, while the unemployment rate among Italian youth in 1995 was a startling 33.3 percent (x), it was still higher in the Mezzogiorno (67). (These statistics are, however, skewed, due to Italy's extensive black-market labor force.) The powerful presence of criminal elements in the South has further compromised Italy's political structure and demoralized its citizens. The assassination of judges, politicians, and private citizens who were attempting in various ways to resist the Mafia shocked not only Italians but also people around the world. Ginsborg is also convinced that pervasive structural weaknesses in the nation's political edifice and in its public administration have undermined the state's ability to advance legislative and judicial agendas in a timely manner and to cope with growing and increasingly complex social demands. Three examples serve to illustrate these weaknesses. First, by 1980 only 727 family-health clinics existed in the nation, and 72 percent of these were in the Center-North (228). Second, the average length of time it took to resolve a civil suit in Italy was 1,207 days, not counting possible appeal time (230). Third, despite the obvious importance of tourism to the Italian economy, service in this sector dramatically fell behind demand; for instance, between 1956 and 1997, the area of Pompeii accessible to tourists has declined from 36 to 12 percent, increased tourist interest notwithstanding (11).

Two underlying conditions that in Ginsborg's opinion undermine the Republic's ability to reform its political and administrative structures are widespread nepotism and endemic *clientelismo*, that is, the use of personal connections to make "public resources serve private ends" (100). Both nepotism and *clientelismo* have led to widespread corruption on many levels and have severely hampered the average citizen's ability to participate in the democratic process. In terms of political corruption and judicial stalemate, the nadir was reached in the early 1990s, when the judiciary uncovered a systemic kickback scheme involving many politicians (on both the right and the left) and entrepreneurs engaged in lucrative public-works programs. The subsequent *Tangentopoli* (Bribesville) trials continued for some years, yielding, however, only 460 convictions out of a stunning 2,970 cases, and finally grinding to a halt under political pressure and in the face of general "*Tangentopoli* fatigue" (my phrase) on the part of the citizenry.

While Ginsborg finds much to criticize in Italy's socio-political landscape, he also emphasizes the positive effects of significant social and political forces that have fostered the growth of active democracy in the Republic. Among the strengths that Ginsborg sees in the current cultural-political landscape is the impressive increase during the Republican period (in other words, since 1948) in the nation's wealth and in the standard of living of the Italian people. Regional differences notwithstanding, Italy has become "a place of unimagined opulence" (30) compared with pre-WWII conditions. An increased awareness of the value of "intellectual capital" (253) has resulted in Italians' taking advantage of growing opportunities for education. Between 1981/82 and 1996/97, for instance, the number of university students in Italy increased from 1,001,570 to 1,595,642 (351). As a result of the feminist movement and legislation promoting both female and male emancipation from centuries-long traditions, positive changes have come about in the status of individuals, families, and women in Italy. Two very important conditions on the plus side of the cultural-political ledger include the rising political awareness and influence of the "critical" middle class, and the growth of a "civil society," which Ginsborg identifies "neither with the state nor with the family, but constitut[ing] a sphere of human association intimately connected to, and influencing both" (95). Other important positive features are the development of post-materialism and associationism (in areas including environmentalism), the relative autonomy of the judicial branch of government, and the beneficial effects of membership in the European Community.

As the subtitle of the book suggests, Ginsborg devotes particular attention to the study of the intersection of political culture and family, the latter a particularly important and powerful element in Italian society and culture. But while many have studied the history of the family in Italy, Ginsborg here attempts to integrate the special importance that the family occupies in Italy's past and present with the history of the nation in this time period. Indeed, the author's principal aim is "to look constantly at the connections between individuals, families, society and the state, to treat the relationships between different levels of human aggregation as the complex mechanisms around which the history of a nation is constructed" (xiii). Methodologically, therefore, Ginsborg aims to write history "from the bottom upwards." (xiv).

This book is highly recommended for the specialist and the general reader alike. Thoroughly researched and erudite, it is nevertheless written in an easygoing style that belies the portentousness of the complicated events under study. Similes (for example, "consumers were attracted like flies to the vast spaces and special offers of the super- and hypermarkets" [13]) and metaphors ("The cold breath of downward mobility touched the necks of the same middle class which had been transported upwards, in considerable style, in the late 1980s" [32]) animate the text, thus rescuing it from the dryness of many social-science texts. The author meticulously documents the multitude of details that serve to support his arguments; the endnotes, drawn from not only scholarly and theoretical but also from journalistic and other sources, run to nearly one hundred pages, while the extensive bibliography comprises more than one thousand items. A rich Statistical Appendix contains forty-six charts. Table 8, for example, shows that in 1989 more than half of *married* (my emphasis) children (50.3 percent) still resided in the same municipality as their mother, and that only 13.2 percent lived more than fifty kilometers away from her.

One small criticism: the author is not consistent in his explanation of acronyms. When an acronym first appears, the unabbreviated phrase almost always follows in parentheses (for example, UNDP = United Nations Development Program [29]). But sometimes it does not, and this can be confusing, especially when the acronym is that of, say, a less well-known Italian governmental agency or one of the numerous new political parties or coalitions that have appeared on the Italian scene in the last two and a half decades.

Ginsborg, an Englishman transplanted to Florence where he is professor of Contemporary European History, is clearly concerned about the future of Italy. The observations that he makes and the solutions that he proposes are worthy of serious consideration by Italians and non-Italians alike. Is Ginsborg hopeful or despairing of Italy's future? While he believes that it is still too soon to give a definitive answer to this question, Ginsborg is convinced that Italians possess the necessary tools to reconstruct the damaged or weakened parts of their political edifice. In his view, the redress of Italy's many pressing "discontents" lies in a two-way symbiotic interaction: on the one hand, the government must be sensitive and responsive to civil society; on the other hand, civil society itself must continue to participate energetically in the broader political process (324).

V. Louise Katainen, professor emerita of Italian, continues to teach part-time in the Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures of Auburn University.

Letters to the Editor



ARCHITECURE? ARCHITECTURE

My daughter, a high school student, greatly desires to study architecture in college. In fact, just yesterday, we were building her interest by visiting Frank Lloyd Wright's Pope-Leighey House in Mount Vernon, Virginia. Today, I was pleasantly surprised to receive the Summer 2003 *Phi Kappa Phi Forum*, which provides a solid foundation for this subject. Its design and layout are commendable with one exception. Let me level with you — some credibility flew out the window with the misspelled single-word title dwelling on the cover.

All tongue-in-cheek aside, you've constructed a wonderful issue that will be serve to inspire future architects.

Michael O'Keefe
Springfield, Virginia

If you are going to screw up, do it big and on the cover.

How about a sticker that says, "LeCorbusier put plaques next to the imperfections left by workers in his buildings pointing out the necessary human component that is part of all good work."

Bruce Lindsey
Auburn, Alabama

I was really dismayed at seeing your Summer 2003 *Phi Kappa Phi Forum* with the cover title of "Architecure."

I suppose your cover is just another victim of how computer mistakes can easily happen. Unfortunately, though, a misspelling that blatant on the cover seems inexcusable. Perhaps the topic of a future *Forum* issue should be the need for careful proofreading and the pitfalls of computer use. Those are the things we continually stress in freshman English classes.

Jerry Daniels
Platteville, Wisconsin

CULTURAL STUDIES

This article ["*Forum* on the Arts," "Architecture," Summer 2003] is attempting to justify and explain the emerging field of cultural studies. This article was both appalling and contradictory. The author is attempting to clarify the relevance of this field of study to the Academy as a whole, but in doing so ridicules the Academy. First, the statement "As in postmodernist thinking, cultural studies maintains that there are no absolute truths, but that there is a myriad of perspectives, all worthy of examination." How can the Academy take seriously a field that declares as a truth that no truth exists? The statement that there is no truth is a statement of truth and is internally self-contradictory. No wonder alumni and legislators are increasingly becoming critical of institutions of higher learning. Second, if it is true that "cultural norms are only norms for that culture," then no criticism whatsoever of any culture can be uttered. If a culture believes Jews are sub-human creatures and decides to exterminate them, well "It is a cultural norm" of that society and cannot be criticized, at least if the culturalist remains consistent. How absurd! As long as cultural studies teaches such nonsense, it is likely to continue the struggle for academic recognition. I pray it never gets recognized, only exposed.

Jim Baber
Bellflower, California

BALANCE AND CONTEXT: MAINTAINING MEDIA ETHICS

I found Professor Deni Elliott's article timely and germane to today's near-universal media blackout of progressive politics in America ["Balance and Context: Maintaining Media Ethics," "Professional Ethics," Spring 2003]. The myth of the liberal media is just that — a myth.

My last two sentences ring true to anyone who recently participated in the "preemptive" peace movement, to prevent preemptive war based on untruths regarding the imminent threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Just as George Bush did, the corporate media that backed this war consistently marginalized the progressive peace protest. Their coverage lacked precisely what Professor Elliott said the ethical press needs – balance and context.

When arguing before the UN, the American people, the world, and Congress, WMDs were Bush's main *casus belli*. Those of us in the peace movement knew that there were no weapons of mass destruction. We knew Iraq was a poor Third-World country brought to its knees by two wars in the last twenty years and by thirteen years of economic sanctions. If that wasn't enough proof, Hans Blix and the UN inspectors kept coming up empty. So once Bush, on the aircraft carrier *Abraham Lincoln*, dramatically called an end to the hostilities, not finding any weapons of mass destruction was no surprise to most of us.

Furthermore, John Thomasson's criticism of Professor Elliott's article [Letters to the Editor, "Architecture," Summer 2003] made no sense to me. We all know that the popular vote does not count in American presidential elections, but would Thomasson prefer that the media just didn't mention that Bush lost the popular count in the 2000 election by some 545,000 votes?

To anyone unconvinced that the corporate media has a dominant right-wing spin, compare the coverage that Bill Clinton received regarding his personal affair — the impact of that affair was mostly personal — with the coverage that George Bush received regarding the missing weapons of mass destruction. Then look me in the face and tell me it is a liberal press.

In the meantime, because of their lack of balance and context, I have unilaterally demoted our previously Fourth Estate to a sub-zero caste!

Roger Goldblatt, MSW
Kansas City, Missouri

PELICANS AT DAWN

A strand of pelicans glides along the surf,
fifteen, eighteen, maybe twenty black pearls
strung across the morning sky,
growing quickly into chunks
of slate sliding over slate,
stones flung low against the dawn,
leaden, large, improbable,
refusing to drop, rocking
from side to side, lifting, lilting,
riding the draft that glances off the swell;
between their dark plumage
and the murmuring sea
a thin crease of morning light,
like a door left slightly ajar.

They whisper to me
in their silent flight
that all that was lost
during the previous night
might find its way back
through that slender space.
Then one of them veers, hooked
it would seem, by a line from the deep,
plummets, then surfaces, glistening and sleek,
something dying clamped in its beak.

VAN HARTMANN

Van Hartmann received his bachelor's degree in history from Stanford University and his doctorate in literature from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He teaches English at Manhattanville College in Purchase, New York.

HOUSE MOVING

The trucks lurch with their burdens down the asphalt,
which groans and slowly depresses underneath,
and the street will never be the same. Four houses
without foundation advance on flatbeds
and seem to gain momentum like boulders
rolled away from the mouths of tombs,
or babies c-sectioned from their mother's wombs.

Behind them, the aging neighbors grumble,
abandoned along with the buried toys
of children now grown up and the skeletons
of pets in backyard graves. The maples
whose thick limbs are trimmed to clear the passage
were planted when the sawn lumber was sweet
and full of sap, and the nails still shiny with pounding.

These houses have long pasts, like my own
concrete porch where I stand, feeling stationary.
Do their histories labor by on those flatbeds —
ghosts in wedding veils, christening gowns,
carpenters' aprons, academic regalia?
Or do they stay behind, pale shades lounging
on the maple branches or flattening themselves
against the poured walls of exposed basements?

Surely these are only shells of lives.
Yet my house seems to stiffen as they go by,
and to deepen its silence, as if its roots went down
into the ground, as if they went down
all the way to the center of the earth.
The porch tightens its hold underneath me.
And all along the street the old joists grow tense
with indignation and a great will to permanence.

JEANNE EMMONS

Jeanne Emmons teaches English and Writing at Briar Cliff University and is poetry editor of *The Briar Cliff Review*. Her collection of poetry, *Rootbound* (New Rivers Press, 1998), won the Minnesota Voices Project Competition and was subsequently named for a Pippistrelle Best of the Small Press Award. Her second book of poetry, *Baseball Nights and DDT*, is forthcoming from Pecan Grove Press. Her poetry and fiction have appeared in *Prairie Schooner*, *Confrontation*, *New Orleans Review*, *American Scholar*, *Cream City Review*, and other journals.

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