The Global Terrorist Threat
Jeffrey D. Simon

Terrorism, the Mass Media, and the Events of 9-11
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Reporting Terror: CNN Journalists Reflect
Michele Mitchell, Kate Snow, Maria Hinojosa, Kris Osborn

Excerpts from Holy War Inc.
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The Green Cross Project: A Model for Providing Emergency Mental-Health Aid after September 11
Charles R. Figley and Kathleen Regan Figley
The Honor Society of Phi Kappa Phi was founded in 1897 and became a national organization through the efforts of the presidents of three state universities. Its primary objective has been from the first the recognition and encouragement of superior scholarship in all fields of study. Good character is an essential supporting attribute for those elected to membership. The motto of the Society is φιλοσοφία krateit ὥσπον, which is freely translated as “Let the love of learning rule humanity.”

Phi Kappa Phi encourages and recognizes academic excellence through several national programs. Its flagship National Fellowship Program, founded in 1970, now awards more than $460,000 each year to student members for the first year of graduate study. In addition, the Society funds Study Abroad Support Grants and Internship Support Grants, awarded to deserving undergraduates, as well as Promotion of Excellence Grants awarded to faculty projects that research and promote academic excellence. For more information about how to contribute to the Phi Kappa Phi Foundation and support these programs, please write Perry A. Snyder, PhD, Executive Director, The Honor Society of Phi Kappa Phi, Box 16000, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70893 or go to the Phi Kappa Phi web page at www.phikappaphi.org.

The purpose of the Phi Kappa Phi Forum is to enhance the image of The Honor Society of Phi Kappa Phi and promote the pursuit of academic excellence in all fields through a quality, intellectually stimulating publication for its membership.
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James P. Kaetz

IN THIS ISSUE

This issue was conceived on September 12, 2001 — the day after the hideous attack on the United States by al Qaeda terrorists. At that time, no one of course had any way of knowing what consequences would follow from the events of that terrible day. Since we began inviting authors for the issue, the U.S. actions in Afghanistan have resulted in the overthrow of the Taliban regime and the scattering of the al Qaeda groups, and the world has seen what happens to a society when it is taken over by fundamentalist zealots who twist a noble religion to their own narrow ends. But what we also have seen, possibly more vividly than ever before, is that a large part of the world’s population views us as the bad guys, not the good guys — a sobering reality to come up against, to say the least.

The articles in this issue, which probably could be more accurately titled “Reflections on and Aspects of Terrorism” (too awkward a title to put on the cover), deal with a variety of issues related to the September 11 attacks. Jeffrey Simon opens the issue with an overview of the types of terrorist organizations — their differing motivations and ideologies — and the trends that we might expect in the future. The challenge for those combating these organizations and individuals is to stay one step ahead of them — not an easy task given their dedication, as well as the increasing availability of sophisticated technologies to aid their causes.

Brigitte Nacos then takes a close look at the way the media covered the attacks and subsequent events. Most Americans were glued to either television or radio in the days that followed, and devoured the contents of newspapers and news magazines, looking for insights into what happened and why. Though the media did an excellent job in many ways, ironically the extensive media coverage handed the terrorists the publicity that they craved. How to balance the public’s need to know with the very real negatives such coverage sometimes brings has been an ongoing dilemma for the press.

Continuing with the role of the media, several CNN and CNN Headline News reporters and anchors share with us their experiences and challenges in dealing with terrorism and its aftermath. Newspeople are of course professionals with a job to do, but no one could possibly be unaffected by the destruction and its aftermath. Then, we have an excerpt from Peter Bergen’s recent book, Holy War, Inc. Bergen, an award-winning journalist now working as CNN’s terrorism expert, had written this book and had finished it in August of last year — then had to revise it after September. The excerpts we have chosen include a chilling interview with Osama bin Laden from 1997 and a discussion of bin Laden’s motivations and the motivations of other recent terrorist actions.

Next, Howard Zinn voices a very different view of our actions in Afghanistan, a view probably diametrically opposed to the opinions of the vast majority of Americans. While by no means condoning the acts of the terrorists, Zinn strongly disagrees with the methods we are employing to remedy the problem. His is a controversial and strongly worded view, one sure to elicit some equally strong reactions from our readers.

Jurgen Brauer then looks at the economics of terror — how the attacks affected the U.S. economy (his surprising conclusion: not much at all), and the motivations of the terrorists. Brauer presents nine points that help to explain why terrorists choose the actions that they do, and then five policy options to consider in the battle against terrorism. Finally, Charles Figley and Kathleen Regan Figley look at how one organization tries to help those who survived the tragedy of September 11 to cope and move on with their lives. They outline a model of how the Green Cross Project mobilized to respond to a request for help from a union group, some of whose members were killed in the attacks, and many of whom witnessed the events.

APPRECIATIONS

We owe thanks to several people who helped out on this issue. First, thanks go to Edna Johnson, Vice President of CNN Public Relations and a Phi Kappa Phi member, and to Lauren Hammann of CNN for their immense help in pulling the CNN piece together, as well as in securing the excerpt from Peter Bergen’s book. Thanks also go to Robert Niegowski of Simon and Schuster for his assistance with the necessary permissions for the Bergen excerpt.

Enjoy the issue!
Demonizing the United States

Some intellectuals and academics have urged Americans to think hard about why so many in the world hate us. So I have been thinking, and I have come with a reason that they are not going to like.

Could it be that some people hate us because academics and intellectuals have encouraged them to do so?

For forty years, many “progressive” academics have vilified and defamed the United States (as well as Western civilization). I am not talking about reasoned criticism of America’s policies, practices, and institutions, but about wholesale condemnation of the United States as a source of evil throughout the world.

The bill of indictment should be familiar by now: America is imperialistic, racist, sexist, homophbic, oppressive, materialistic, and vulgar — a global scourge. Some American academics have even suggested that the world would have been better off if the United States had never been founded.

The demonization of this country has been an enterprise of the academic Left for decades. Stalin popularized the notion that the United States is “fascist,” and this slander was repeated so often that it became credal in academic circles. In 1971 the president of Howard University publicly declared that the United States “conquered Hitler, but we have come to embrace Hitlerism.” In 1984 a professor found five parallels between popular support for Reagan and that for Hitler. In 1989, Canadian academics listed Reagan (29 percent) as more reprehensible than Hitler (10 percent), Stalin (8.5 percent), Idi Amin (3 percent), or Pol Pot (2 percent), the most blood-soaked butchers of the twentieth century! The “fascist” slander lives on. Protesting the “War against Terrorism,” a student at Berkeley posed proudly with her drawing of the President as “Adolf Bush.”

A writer for the Left-wing magazine The Nation had to admit recently that many Leftists “really do hate their country. These Leftists find nothing to admire in its magnificent Constitution; its fitful history of struggle toward greater freedom for women, minorities, and other historically oppressed groups; and its values, however imperfectly or hypocritically manifested in everyday life.” For a wealth of examples of anti-American slander, consult Arnold Beichman’s Anti-American Myths: Their Causes and Consequences (1972) or Paul Hollander’s Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad 1965-1990 (1992).

Decades of hate-speech have taken their toll. For a country to survive, its citizens must believe that the country deserves to survive, that it is, overall, a decent country whose existence benefits even those who live outside its borders. This conviction is at risk on our campuses, where self-declared “subversive” professors and increasingly their students not only deprecate the very existence of their country but also applaud the evils that befall it.

A professor at the University of New Mexico boasted that “anybody who would blow up the Pentagon would get my vote.” A Wake Forest student wrote that “we are kidding ourselves in thinking we have been ‘wronged.’” A student at the University of Colorado argued that “we had it coming.” Another at the University of Chicago hoped that the American people would not support their country but instead think about “why the world hates us, what we are truly guilty of, and how we need to change.” A student at Duke opined that “the sight of the flag burning would be preferable to its display.” A campus speaker at the University of North Carolina demanded that the United States apologize to “the tortured and impoverished and all the millions of other victims of American imperialism.”

Such maunderings provoked professor Michael Béruèbé, a Leftist himself, to observe that much of what he was hearing on campus was “coming uncomfortably close to justifying the indiscriminate slaughter of innocents.” Jonathan Alter, another Leftist professor, said, “The line between explaining terrorism and rationalizing it has been repeatedly breached by a shallow left stuck in a deep anti-American rut.” That rut is also dangerous.

According to Professor John Gray (Oxford), this incessant bashing of America has provided the world with a veritable “model of anti-Americanism.” Our home-grown adversarial intellectuals and academics have encouraged the whole world to defame and hate the United States. Paul Hollander believes that Third-World peoples are especially receptive to anti-American hatred because it provides them with a convenient alibi for the shameful failures of their own governments and cultures.

By dehumanizing and demonizing its object, defamation, whether of a person, a minority, or a nation, paves the way for violence. If ideas have consequences, there is no way to avoid the possibility that anti-American hate speech could have helped prepare the way for mass murder. As Daniel Pipes (“The Western Mind of Radical Islam”) and Bernard Lewis (“The Roots of Muslim Rage”) have shown, a number of terrorist leaders were educated in the West, where they (continued on page 5)
Age Discrimination and Layoffs of Highly Compensated Workers

The inevitable graying of the work force as the baby-boom generation ages is a demographic factor with profound implications for society in general, and business in particular. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the first baby boomers will begin to turn sixty-five in 2011, and by 2030, one in five people will be over sixty-five. Baby boomers are better educated, healthier, and more apt to continue working longer than their parents’ generation. Additionally, the current economic downturn has depleted the retirement savings of many older workers, thus delaying their prospects for retirement. The latter fact, coupled with the increase in the retirement age for full Social Security benefits, underscores the trends for older workers to remain employed long past traditional retirement ages. Having so many older workers active in the work force is a new phenomenon that poses many challenges for employers, particularly in terms of our nation’s age discrimination in employment laws.

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits discrimination in employment matters on the basis of age for most employees who are forty years of age or older. Thus, for example, employers cannot refuse to hire, demote, fire, or otherwise discriminate against employees expressly because of their age. The ADEA is administered by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In 1992, some 19,573 charges of age discrimination were filed with the EEOC, amounting to 27 percent of that agency’s total charges. By 1999, the number of charges filed declined to 14,141 or approximately 18 percent of total charges. In 2000, charges rose to 16,008 or 20 percent of the total. Ostensibly, the decline in age-discrimination charges filed with the EEOC throughout the 1990s was attributable to the booming economy and low unemployment rates. More recently as the economy has faltered, corporate layoffs have escalated, and age-discrimination charges have begun to rise.

LAYING OFF WORKERS FOR ECONOMIC REASONS

The split in the federal circuit courts over the issue of disparate-impact claims under the ADEA is particularly relevant given the current economic climate. As corporations fight to survive, reducing costs becomes a primary focus. Labor costs are generally targeted and frequently result in layoffs. More senior (which often, but not always, implies older) workers typically earn higher salaries than less-senior workers. The question then arises: Can an employer lay off more-senior employees because they are highly compensated and therefore more costly (in other words, for economic reasons) without violating the ADEA? In turn, can older workers bring an age-discrimination suit under the disparate-impact theory showing that a facially neutral business practice of laying off the most highly compensated employees falls more harshly, and thus has an adverse impact, on older employees as a group? Does, in fact, a company policy of laying off highly compensated workers constitute illegal age discrimination?

Federal courts have long recognized the legal right of employees aged forty or over to bring a lawsuit against their employers under a disparate-treatment theory of age discrimination. Essentially under the disparate-treatment theory, employees must prove that their employers intentionally discriminated against them personally on the basis of age. On the other hand, however, federal circuit courts are currently split over the issue of whether older employees can bring a suit for age discrimination under a disparate-impact theory. Under the latter approach, age discrimination is demonstrated on a group basis. Using statistics, plaintiffs establish that a business policy or practice that appears facially neutral in the treatment of all employees in actuality falls more harshly, or in legal terms has an adverse impact, on older employees as a group. Thus, for example, a company policy of not hiring any software developer whose salary with his or her previous employer was more than $30,000 may appear neutral on the face of it. However, such a policy may fall more harshly on older workers as a group because it could effectively eliminate a majority of software developers over age forty whose years of experience have earned them high salaries. On April 1, 2002, the Supreme Court dismissed the case Adams vs. Florida Power Corporation, which would have addressed the use of disparate-impact theories in age-discrimination cases.

DISPARATE-TREATMENT AND DISPARATE-IMPACT THEORIES

Federal courts have long recognized the legal right of employees aged forty or over to bring a lawsuit against their employers under a disparate-treatment theory of age discrimination. Essentially under the disparate-treatment theory, employees must prove that their employers intentionally discriminated against them personally on the basis of age. On the other hand, however, federal circuit courts are currently split over the issue of whether older employees can bring a suit for age discrimination under a disparate-impact theory. Under the latter approach, age discrimination is demonstrated on a group basis. Using statistics, plaintiffs establish that a business policy or practice that appears facially neutral in the treatment of all employees in actuality falls more harshly, or in legal terms has an adverse impact, on older employees as a group. Thus, for example, a company policy of not hiring any software developer whose salary with his or her previous employer was more than $30,000 may appear neutral on the face of it. However, such a policy may fall more harshly on older workers as a group because it could effectively eliminate a majority of software developers over age forty whose years of experience have earned them high salaries. On April 1, 2002, the Supreme Court dismissed the case Adams vs. Florida Power Corporation, which would have addressed the use of disparate-impact theories in age-discrimination cases.
which the statutory language specifically allows for disparate-impact claims. Thus a split has occurred in the circuits over whether or not disparate-impact claims are actionable under the ADEA. Currently, some federal circuit courts do not allow disparate-impact claims. These circuits contend that the statutory language of the ADEA is directed at prohibiting discrimination against individual employees because of their age and that Congress never intended to protect older workers as a group. Other federal circuits have upheld disparate-impact claims under the ADEA, contending that Congress did intend to protect older workers as a group and pointing out that the language of the ADEA closely parallels that of Title VII. In addition to the statutory-language issue, the Supreme Court itself has caused much of the confusion. In an earlier decision, Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, the Supreme Court explicitly left open the question of whether a disparate-impact theory is available under the ADEA.

As a result of the split in the circuits, older workers laid off for economic reasons may or may not be able to bring a claim of age discrimination, depending upon the circuit in which they are located. In circuits not allowing disparate-impact claims, the court will disallow such a suit on the basis that the ADEA protects individuals only and that employers are free to make economic decisions despite their adverse impact on older employees. In circuits permitting disparate-impact claims, the employee may prevail. In such circuits, courts contend that Congressional intent was to protect older workers as a group and that frequently there is a high correlation between salary and age. Corporate policies of laying off workers for economic reasons can result in a disproportionate number of older workers being let go and could therefore constitute illegal age discrimination.

Absent congressional action to amend the statutory language of ADEA, the Supreme Court will ultimately have to resolve the split in the circuit courts. For employers, at stake are the freedom and flexibility to respond to the demands of an increasingly competitive business environment. For employees, at stake are job preservation and economic security in a working environment that is not always hospitable to older employees.

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(continued from page 3)

learned to blend anti-Americanism, Marxism, and Islamic fundamentalism into what Waller R. Newell has called a “Postmodern Jihad.” Just two days before the September 11 attack, a popular imam from the San Francisco Bay area warned that the United States “is facing a very terrible fate. And the reason for that is that this country stands condemned.” “Condemned,” repeatedly and outrageously, for forty years by thousands of its intellectuals and academics.

When Jerry Falwell uttered his “insensitive and ill-timed” remarks (his characterization) about the causes of the September 11th attack, one academic called him an “enemy within, an enemy who is ugly, destructive, and subversive toward everything we allegedly believe in.” If he is, then so too are the anti-American bigots on the Left, who are more dangerous because they have greater power to sanction and incite anti-American animosity in others, both here and abroad. Again, I am not talking about the reasoned criticism of American policy or culture, but about sweeping defamations that exhibit little if any regard for proportion and degree, historical change, clear and consistent terminology, numerical data, and comparative analysis.

As Leonard Cassuto (Fordham University) reminds us, “words are the most powerful weapons we have, and we need to use them thoughtfully.”


Literacy Initiative Work Group Needs Input

As part of its commitment to academic excellence, the Phi Kappa Phi Board of Directors has formed a work group to explore literacy as a national service initiative. Such a program would give all members the opportunity to contribute to the betterment of their communities.

The work group invites ideas and recommendations regarding literacy programs, affiliations, and work group membership. If you or your chapter is actively engaged in the cause of literacy, let us know. Please direct comments, suggestions, and questions to Dr. Pat Kaetz, editor, Phi Kappa Phi Forum, at kaetzjp@auburn.edu.

At present, the work group consists of Pat Kaetz, National President-Elect Paul Ferlazzo, National Vice President Donna Schubert, Regent Nancy Blattner, Director of Fellowships Marya Free, and Traci Navarre, Communications Director. All members of the work group may be contacted through the Phi Kappa Phi web site: www.phikappaphi.org.
Americans generally believe that technology poses a significant threat to the world’s natural environment, but they also have an abiding faith in the power of technology to solve environmental problems. In the Pacific Northwest this paradox reveals itself in the vast network of dams that impound the region’s major rivers, including the Columbia, Snake, Willamette, and Rogue. The dams, numbering in the hundreds, were built during a fifty-year period by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, public utility districts, and private corporations. Since the mid-1930s, the dams have yielded considerable economic and social benefits, principally hydroelectric power, flood control, navigation, irrigation, municipal water supply, and recreation.

Unfortunately, the dams also have had a substantial, irreversible effect on the ecology of the rivers that they impound. The paradox arises when the public believes that these effects can somehow be remedied by applying a technical fix. But the dams are firmly in place, their imposing presence permanently blocking the rivers’ free flow and, consequently, altering the rivers’ natural physical, chemical, and biological features. Thus, earnest attempts at technical remediation — short of breaching the dams, which has been seriously considered — have proven to be largely ineffective, if not more detrimental than the original impacts.

Perhaps the most publicized and disturbing ecological effect — one largely attributed to dams — has been the rapid decline of the rivers’ highly valued anadromous fish populations (fish that return to the freshwater rivers from the sea to breed), consisting chiefly of Pacific salmon and steelhead trout. The life history of these fish is complex, with each phase of biological development precisely timed. As adults, the fish migrate far upstream from the Pacific Ocean to spawn in streambed gravel, or redds. There the eggs hatch, releasing larvae that eventually emerge from the redds as fry. Once in the open stream, the fry begin their long journey to the ocean, where they will spend several years maturing to adults.

When the dams were first proposed, scientists and others expressed grave concerns about the fate of anadromous fish. They feared that spawning areas would be inundated or rendered inaccessible upstream of the impoundments, and that fry would be decimated (“sliced and diced”) as they passed through power-generating turbines en route to the ocean. In response, the Corps of Engineers and other dam-building proponents assured the public that technical means were available not only to protect the fish, but also to enhance their productivity. These techniques included fish hatcheries, fish ladders allowing fish to bypass dams, fish collection facilities, and other engineering approaches. Unconvinced, the fish advocates predicted that these would only become “monuments to a departed race.”

By 1990, it was evident that these early predictions were ominously on track. In the Columbia River, for example, the annual number of upstream migrants had declined by nearly 85 percent during the preceding sixty years, dropping from more than 16 million adult fish per year during the 1930s to around 2.5 million adults in 1990. Regrettably, this downward trend continues today despite billions of dollars spent on efforts to rescue the fish from extinction. In his recent book Salmon Without Rivers: A History of the Pacific Salmon Crisis (1999, Island Press), James Lichatowich sadly reports that salmon populations are now extinct in nearly half of the rivers where they once spawned, and that populations in about half of the remaining rivers are at risk of becoming extinct.

In 1962, following severe flooding in Oregon and California seven years earlier, the U.S. Congress authorized the Army Corps of Engineers to construct three large dams on the Rogue River in southwest Oregon. The Rogue originates near Crater Lake National Park along the crest of the Cascade Mountain Range. From its origin, the river flows westerly for a distance of 215 miles before discharging into the Pacific Ocean near the town of Gold Spring 2002

Douglas W. Larson
impact statement for the project. The Engineers had completed preliminary populations. Rogue’s salmon and steelhead trout dams posed serious threats to the artists and various conservation and fish-planned and constructed, other scien-
to the detriment of fish.

fry migrating downstream would be expressed three major concerns: (1) the effects of dams on anadromous fish and (3) the natural temperature regime source in the mountain under Crater Beach. The river is so highly regarded that it was among the original twelve in the United States protected under the federal Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968. (The wild and scenic designation applies only to the river’s lower reach, however, which covers a dis-
tance of eighty-four miles and flows through the Wild Rogue Wilderness Area.)

The Rogue River is world-renowned for its runs of Pacific salmon and steelhead trout. Between 1929 and 1933, commercial fishermen caught an average of 305,000 adult chinook salmon and about 9,000 coho salmon in the Rogue River annually, attesting to the river’s high productivity. The author Zane Grey, who often fished from his cabin on the river, aptly described the Rogue in his 1948 book Rogue River Feud (Harper and Row Publishers): “Deep and dark green, swift and clear, icy cold and as pure as the snows from which it sprang, the river had its source in the mountain under Crater Lake. It was a river at its birth; and it glided away through the Oregon forest, with hurrying momentum, as if eager to begin the long leap down through the Siskiyous. The giant firs shaded it; the deer drank from it; the little black-backed trout rose greedily to floating flies.”

In 1938, Dr. Henry Baldwin Ward, a consulting scientist for the Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries, warned about the potential effects of dams on anadromous fish runs in the Rogue River. Ward expressed three major concerns: (1) the dams would interfere with the upstream migration of adult fish; (2) fry migrating downstream would be drawn into turbines and destroyed; and (3) the natural temperature regime of the river would be altered, possibly to the detriment of fish.

Years later, as the dams were being planned and constructed, other scientists and various conservation and fishery groups continued to argue that the dams posed serious threats to the Rogue’s salmon and steelhead trout populations.

Nevertheless, construction of the first dam, called Lost Creek, got underway in 1973 after the Corps of Engineers had completed preliminary studies and filed an environmental-impact statement for the project. The dam, located 160 miles upstream of the river’s mouth and completed in 1976, is 3,600 feet long and 345 feet high. Unlike most dams on the Columbia River, which are equipped with fish ladders, Lost Creek Dam lacked fish-passage facilities. Consequently, the four hundred streams (total length: 770 miles) that were once used for spawning in the 675 square-mile watershed above the dam were no longer accessible. As mig-
ration for these losses, the Corps of Engineers built fish-collection facilities and a hatchery near the dam. Thousands of adult migrants are now collected below the dam each year and diverted to the hatchery for artificial propagation. After the eggs are incubated and hatched in trays, young fish are reared to a specific size and then released into the river for their migration to the sea. The yearly number of adult salmon and trout migrating upstream varies considerably: Nearly 135,000 migrants were recorded in 1987, but only 31,000 were recorded in 1984. Not all of these made it to the hatchery. The number of hatchery-reared fish released annually into the river is several times higher, amounting to 1.5 million for spring chinook salmon alone.

Additionally, the Corps of Engineers made other commitments to ensure river protection and to make up for irreversible fish-habitat losses owing to the dam’s obstructive presence. One such commitment was to install a reservoir intake tower at the dam with multi-level ports for selective withdrawal capability. The tower, costing more than $20 million, is a 256-foot-tall, free-standing structure, with water-intake ports at four widely spaced elevations, and a thirteen-foot-diameter conduit — facetiously called the “elephant trunk” — extending nearly four-hundred feet into the reservoir to draw near-bottom water (see photo on page 6).

The purpose of the tower was to selectively withdraw water from the reservoir to provide thermally optimal water for enhanced production of anadromous fish downstream. The capacity to control downstream river temperatures, for the purpose of improving habitat and thereby sustaining larger fish populations, is a function authorized by the U.S. Congress. Fish-enhancement benefits based on temperature control could contribute significantly to the total benefits claimed for the project. Whenever the total benefits are believed to be greater than construction costs, Congress usually approves the Corps’ recommendation to build the project. But if costs exceed benefits, then the project is not funded and is eventually deauthorized. Thus, in keeping with its longstanding tradition as the nation’s largest dam-builder, the Corps of Engineers vigorously promoted the temperature-control concept to achieve a favorable benefit-to-cost ratio for Lost Creek Dam.

Interestingly, federal and state fishery agencies bought the concept — that optimal river temperatures can actually be maintained below the dam through manipulation of reservoir releases — and approved the dam. Fishery biologists speculated, for example, that low-temperature reservoir releases would cool the river during summer and thereby reduce mortality of adult chinook salmon.

But subsequent studies found that reservoir release strategies are capable of optimizing temperatures only within a distance of about thirty to forty miles below the dam (Larson, 1984). Some reservoir releases may be of sufficient quantity and temperature to induce cooling or heating of the river beyond that distance, but not to the extent to which biologically optimal temperatures are achieved and sustained. Thus, during the summer and fall, both immigrating and emigrating salmon and trout must negotiate roughly 125 miles of thermally uncontrolled waters.

Additionally, reservoir regulation does not necessarily improve salmon habitat below the dam. Researchers from the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife reported that abnormally warm water released during the fall and early winter months can accelerate emergence of juvenile spring chinook salmon, thus subjecting them to unfavorable conditions such as high flows and scarce food during winter months and reducing their survivability. Warmer wintertime releases also caused premature emergence of steelhead fry, which exposed them to the disadvantages of high flows, low food availability, and increased predation by emigrating adult salmon and trout.

(continued on page 9)
I fell in with the snakes and the poison ranks of strangers. Please send me more yellow birds for the dim interior.

— Mark Linkous

Eight years ago . . .

I remember reading a poem in which the character of Death, after a hiatus, returned, at their request, to his people. Without him (I seem to recall Death as a blond-haired boy), their lives lacked momentum, and the People had nothing to do but follow stray dogs and stare at grass. When he came back to work, the happiness of the People rose up “like a net to catch the delicate and plummeting bodies” of birds, which were the first visible creatures to go. (Microscopic things and bugs, and maybe even frogs had already started dying again, but nobody noticed.) It is a vivid and wonderful poem, and I apologize to you and to Stephen Dobyns for lancing it with plot summary, always the unwieldy weapon.

Two notions of this poem have lingered with me for almost a decade — that a bird might die in midflight, like we might in midstride, or midsummer or midsandwich. (I suppose, if I had ever given thought to it, I might have imagined the birds feeling ill and landing like retired golfers near a soft patch of moss. Or perhaps toppling gingerly out of a dogwood tree. Once, on a Florida sidewalk, I found a dead bird so brilliant in its chartreuse, it seemed unthinkable and maybe even unjust that its vitality had flown off without it.) And secondly, that birds are indicators of fragility — not of their own, of course; if you have ever seen a rush of chimney swifts storm their dwelling at dusk like so much smoke in reverse, you will know that they are not faint-hearted creatures — not indicators of their own fragility, but of ours.

Eight months ago . . .

Although I wasn’t thinking about this then, after the Eleventh (remember when eleven felt like one of the lucky numbers?) I drew birds — pastel colored, cartoon birds, but delicate and lifeless. Superheroes in full uniform would be carefully lifting little yellow wings to look for lesions. I have no particular interest in morbidity; I just knew that if I could draw what I was afraid of seeing, I could give it some manageable size and shape, and then I could name it and hold it and put it to the side of my desk in order to move on to other things. Without this activity, there was only an enormous Unnamed Sinking Feeling and an edgy pit of sleeplessness.

Eight days ago . . .

Last week I was in a bookstore a few blocks from my house. A disheveled and slightly drunken man shoved his arm in the partially opened door, and emerging from his tightly clenched and cruddy fist was the yellow head of a bird. He had just “caught” this apparently feral parakeet on the sidewalk, after it had been crashing frantically into walls, and was asking five dollars for it. The bird did not stop biting the fleshy inside of the man’s index finger the entire time we stood there. The storeowner gave
THE DOOR OPENS SLIGHTLY

It is just a crack
but through it I see
a table set
with a coffee cup
and a man
with his hand
beside hers
as she stirs his coffee
then kisses him softly
as if his lips
are sacred texts
and I watch him read her
like braille
and the wind blows
and the door closes
and I stand
in the breeze
like space
between trees.

BOBBI LURIE

Bobbi Lurie has worked as a therapist, printmaker, art reviewer, and essayist. Her poems have been published or are forthcoming in *American Poetry Review, Sou’wester, Rattapallax, Rio Grande Review, The Orange Willow Review, Thin Air, Gulf Stream, Illuminations, Licking River Review, Passager, Wellspring, The Bridge, ELM, Spillway*, and numerous anthologies. Her autobiographical essay, “4 O’Clock,” was recently nominated for the Pushcart Prize.

(continued from page 7)

Researchers also discovered that the summertime release of thermally suboptimal water slowed the growth of juvenile salmon, while warm-water releases during early summer accelerated the upstream migration of adult spring chinook salmon. This influx could overburden the hatchery, as it did in June 1979, making it necessary to release colder water and thereby delay migration. Moreover, sudden changes in the rate at which water was being released activated premature downstream migration by juvenile fish. Peak reservoir releases made during spring and summer had at least two adverse effects on juveniles migrating downstream: (1) migration was accelerated, causing juveniles to crowd in the lower Rogue River where temperatures were unfavorably high, and (2) juveniles emigrated prematurely to the sea where their chances of survival were greatly reduced.

As studies have clearly demonstrated, the claim that temperature control can meet the thermal requirements of a complex fishery was an oversimplification and one that appears to have been unjustified. Indeed, the proponents of temperature control overestimated the capacity of dams to achieve the objective of maintaining optimal or even marginally desirable temperatures throughout the river’s below-dam reaches. Furthermore, project benefits allocated to that portion of fisheries enhancement based on temperature control were overstated in preimpoundment benefit-cost economic analyses. In recent years, however, the Corps of Engineers has stated publicly that temperature control is only “theoretically possible,” and that more studies are needed to demonstrate its workability and fish-enhancement potential. Meanwhile, as the salmon and steelhead struggle to survive in impounded rivers, the dams loom increasingly larger as “monuments to a departed race.”

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TERRIFYING INNOVATION

Yet as shocking as these attacks were, they should not have been surprising. Terrorists continually think up new and more devastating ways to perpetrate their violence. They escalate their violence when they perceive that the public and governments have become desensitized to the “normal” flow of terrorism. By perpetrating a violent act that causes more casualties than previous ones, terrorists are guaranteed widespread publicity for their cause and reaction from various parties. Terrorists also view new types of attacks as ways to penetrate existing security measures. Furthermore, because there had been suicide attacks on the ground in Lebanon in the 1980s and a suicide attack at sea in Yemen in 2000, it was just a matter of time before terrorists used suicide attacks from the air. That it occurred in the United States shattered any remaining illusions that America could avoid on its own soil such terrorist attacks as had plagued many other nations.

Security was raised to unprecedented levels both in the United States and elsewhere after the events of September 11. The economic effect of the attacks was staggering, with losses estimated in the hundreds of billions of dollars. Reflecting the anger of the country, President George W. Bush called the attacks “acts of war” and vowed to defeat terrorism wherever it existed in the world. Accordingly, the U.S. launched a military response in Afghanistan that resulted in the collapse of the ruling Taliban regime that had protected the primary suspects in the attacks, Osama bin Laden and his terrorist group, al Qaeda (“The Base”). Hundreds of Taliban and al Qaeda members were killed or captured in the military operation, although the fate of bin Laden remained uncertain as of early 2002.

While viewing terrorism as a “war” can be appealing to government leaders, policymakers, the media, and the public — it implies that with the right mix of policies and actions a nation can “win” the war — the reality is that terrorism can never be completely “defeated.” The roots of the violence are diverse, with terrorists found in a wide range of political, religious, and ethnic-nationalist groups. Terrorism can even be just one person with one bomb and one cause. Furthermore, the advantage in any “war” on terrorism unfortunately lies with the terrorists because they need to commit only one spectacular act to reverse all perceptions of counter-terrorist progress.

DISPARATE GROUPS

The disparate nature of terrorism can be seen in the variety of groups active throughout the world and the different causes that propel them into
violence. Al Qaeda, for example, is representative of the emergence of the religious-inspired terrorist groups that have become the predominant form of terrorism in recent years. One of the key differences between religious-inspired terrorists and politically motivated ones is that the religious-inspired terrorists have fewer constraints in their minds about killing large numbers of people. All nonbelievers are viewed as the enemy, and the religious terrorists are less concerned than political terrorists about a possible backlash from their supporters if they kill large numbers of innocent people. The goal of the religious terrorist is transformation of all society to their religious beliefs, and they believe that killing infidels or nonbelievers will result in their being rewarded in the afterlife. Bin Laden and al Qaeda’s goal was to drive U.S. and Western influences out of the Middle East and help bring to power radical Islamic regimes around the world. In February 1998, bin Laden and allied groups under the name “World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders” issued a fatwa, which is a Muslim religious order, stating that it was the religious duty of all Muslims to wage war on U.S. citizens, military and civilian, anywhere in the world.

Other religious terrorist groups include Hizballah, a radical Shia Islamic group in Lebanon that has committed numerous anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli attacks; HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement) and the Palestine Islamic Jihad, both of which use terrorism in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israel in order to undermine Middle East peace negotiations and to establish an Islamic Palestinian state; the Abu Sayyaf Group, which is a radical Islamic separatist group operating in the southern Philippines; Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group), which is based in Egypt and seeks the overthrow of the Egyptian government; and the Armed Islamic Group, which is based in Algeria and seeks to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state.

Ethnic-nationalist conflicts provide another source for terrorism. Although there can be a religious component to the violence, it is usually secondary to the political goals of the conflict. In Sri Lanka, for example, the Tamil separatist group Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which is comprised of minority Hindu Tamils, has combined guerrilla insurgency with terrorist attacks in its battle against the ruling Buddhist Sinhalese majority. The goal of LTTE is to establish an independent Tamil state, not a religious state. Similarly, the Irish Republican Army’s campaign of violence was aimed at driving the British out of Northern Ireland and creating a united Ireland, not a Catholic state. There are also several Palestinian terrorist groups, including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Abu Nidal Organization, whose goal is to establish an independent, but not an Islamic, Palestinian state.

Although religious terrorism and ethnic-nationalist terrorism have become the major forms of terrorism in recent years, numerous political and ideologically motivated terrorist groups are still active around the world. The political and ideological terrorists do not fight for any religion, territory, or homeland, but rather for a “cause” that could range from Marxist-Leninist revolutionary goals to Neo-Nazi and white supremacist objectives. One of the most mysterious and long-lasting political terrorist groups has been the Greek leftist Revolutionary Organization 17 November, also known as N-17. Formed in 1975 and named for the November 1973 student uprising against the Greek military regime, N-17 is believed to have fewer than twenty members, none of whom have ever been arrested. They have attacked U.S., British, Greek, Turkish, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and European Union targets over the years. Demonstrating the truism that “the more things change, the more they stay the same,” just as N-17 posed a threat in the 1970s, so too do they pose a threat in the first decade of the twenty-first century. One of the major concerns for security planners for the 2004 Summer Olympic...
Games in Athens is the prospect of terrorist attacks by N-17.

In the United States, right-wing antigovernment extremists have posed a serious threat in recent years. Before September 11, the worst terrorist attack on U.S. soil was the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City that killed 168 people. The perpetrators of that attack, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, both had ties to the right-wing American militia movement. McVeigh was executed for his crime while Nichols is serving a life sentence in a federal penitentiary. Political terrorist groups can also be motivated by a single issue, such as the environment, animal rights, abortion, and other issues. The Earth Liberation Front (ELF), the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), and anti-abortion militants, for example, have committed terrorist acts in the United States. ELF and ALF have avoided causing deaths or injuries in their attacks on mink farms, fur retailers, research laboratories, and other targets. The anti-abortion terrorists, however, have been responsible for several deaths of abortion-clinic doctors and staff. A single-issue or “special-interest” terrorist group can arise at any time in reaction to a specific government or corporate policy or action.

Added to the mix of different types of terrorists are the “lone operators” who pose a unique problem for law enforcement and intelligence officials. Because they work alone, there are no communications between members of a group to intercept, nor are there any terrorist-group members to arrest and reveal further information about planned operations. In one sense, the lone operator epitomizes the unique nature of terrorism, namely, the ability of a single individual to commit a violent act — or threaten to do so — and cause fear and anxiety throughout a nation. Theodore Kaczynski, who was known as the Unabomer, was a lone operator who committed sixteen bombings during a seventeen-year period beginning in 1978. Three people were killed and twenty-three others injured in the attacks, which included several package bombs being sent to the victims. The Unabomber’s attacks led to changes in the way packages are sent through the U.S. postal service and generated fear among the public.

The lone-operator type of terrorist has also been among the most innovative in terms of terrorist tactics, sometimes introducing new forms of violence that the more established terrorist groups eventually emulate. For example, the first midair plane bombing in the United States occurred in 1955 and was the work of a lone operator, and the first hijackings in the United States in the early 1960s were also the work of lone operators. One reason why lone operators are so creative and innovative in their terrorist tactics is that there are no group-decisionmaking processes to deal with and no constituency to be concerned with in terms of a possible negative backlash to an incident. The lone operator is free to think up any type of violent scenario and then act upon it. The wave of anthrax letters that were sent to members of the media, Congress, and other targets after the September 11 attacks were suspected to be the work of a lone operator living in the United States.

**FUTURE TRENDS**

The emergence of “smarter” and more creative terrorists is a trend that will continue in coming years. Advances in technology, weaponry, and other fields are there for everyone to take advantage of, including the terrorists. Furthermore, information on weapons — including weapons of mass destruction — targets, tactics, and resources necessary for a terrorist operation are readily available on the Internet. The challenge for counterterrorist officials will be to try to stay one step ahead of the terrorists. Perhaps the best description of the difficult task governments face in dealing with terrorism was made by the Irish Republican Army. After a failed attempt to assassinate British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1984, the IRA issued the following chilling statement: “Today we were unlucky, but remember, we only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always.”

Unfortunately, governments and the public cannot always expect to be lucky in the battle against terrorism. That fact was painfully demonstrated on September 11. We are living in an age in which small groups and even criminals or mentally unstable individuals can perpetrate horrendous terrorist acts. Yet it is important to remember that while we will not be able to prevent every single incident from occurring or take away every potential bomb or other weapon from the terrorists, we at least can take away the reaction that they seek, which is panic, fear, and disruption in our lives.

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As millions of Americans watched the terror of 9-11 live on television or the Internet, most were already familiar with the shocking images: the inferno in a skyscraper, the terrorists attacking a towering high-rise, the total destruction of a federal building in Washington, the nuclear winter cityscapes in America, Manhattan under siege after a terrorist attack. In search of box-office hits, Hollywood had already produced for many years a steady stream of disaster movies and thrillers, often based on best-selling novels, which used just such images.

In a popular culture inundated with images of violence, the horror of the quadruple hijack coup was as real as in the movie, but it was surreal in life. Novelist John Updike, who witnessed the calamity from a tenth-floor apartment in Brooklyn, felt that “as on television, this was not quite real, it could be fixed; the technocracy the towers symbolized would find a way to put out the fire and reverse the damage.”

The greatest irony was that the very terrorists who loathe America’s pop culture as decadent and poisonous to their own beliefs and ways of life turned Hollywood-like horror fantasies into real-life hell. In that respect they outperformed Hollywood, the very symbol of their hate for American-led western entertainment. After visiting the World Trade Center disaster site for the first time, New York’s Governor George Pataki said: “It’s just incomprehensible to see what it was like down there. You know, I remember seeing one of these Cold War movies and after the nuclear attacks with the Hollywood portrayal of a nuclear winter. It looked worse than that in downtown Manhattan, and it wasn’t some grade “B” movie. It was life. It was real.”

Brigitte Nacos

TERRORISM, THE MASS MEDIA, AND THE EVENTS OF 9-11
TERRORISTS AND PUBLICITY

From the terrorists’ point of view, the attack on America was a perfectly choreographed production aimed at American and international audiences. In the past, terrorism has often been compared to the theater. While the theater metaphor remains instructive, it has given way to that of terrorism as television spectacular, as breaking news that is watched by record audiences and transcends by far the boundaries of theatrical events.

From the perspective of those who produced this unprecedented terrorism-as-breaking-news horror show, this action was as successful as it can get. Whether it is the relatively inconsequential arson by an amateurish environmental group or mass destruction by a network of professional terrorists, the perpetrators’ media-related goals are the same: attention, recognition, and perhaps even a degree of respectability and legitimacy in their various target publics.

It has been argued that contemporary religious terrorists, unlike secular terrorists, such as the Marxists of the Red Brigade/Red Army variety or the nationalists of the Palestinian Liberation Front brand during the last decades of the Cold War, want nothing more than to lash out at the enemy and express their rage. But while these sentiments may well figure into the complex motives of group leaders and their followers, their deeds are planned and executed with the mass media and their effects on the masses and government decision-makers in mind.

To be sure, publicity via the mass media is not an end in itself. Most terrorists have very specific short-term and/or long-term goals. It is not hard to figure the short-term and long-term objectives of those who planned the suicide missions against the United States. Even without the benefit of a credible claim of responsibility, the mass media, decision-makers, and the public in the United States and abroad have discussed the most likely motives for the unprecedented deeds. In the short term, the architects and perpetrators wanted to demonstrate the weakness of the world’s only remaining superpower vis-à-vis determined terrorists, frighten the American public, and fuel perhaps a weakening of civil liberties and in the process foment domestic unrest. No doubt, the long-term schemes targeted U.S. foreign policy, especially the American influence and presence in the Middle East and other regions with large Muslim populations.

Whatever else their immediate and ultimate goals were, those who planned the attacks were well aware, as are most perpetrators of political violence, that the mass-communications media were central to furthering their publicity goals and even their political and religious objectives. Without the frightening images and the shocking stories, the impact on the United States and the rest of the world would not have been so immediate and intense as it was.

In the past, media critics have documented and questioned the mass media’s insatiable appetite for violence. There was no need to count broadcast minutes and measure column inches to establish the proportion of the total news that dealt with “Black Tuesday” and its aftermath. For the first five days after the terror attack, the television and radio networks covered the disaster around the clock without the otherwise obligatory commercial breaks. There simply was no other news. Most sports and entertainment channels switched to crisis news, many of them carrying the coverage of one of the networks, some suspending their broadcasts that suddenly seemed irrelevant.

If not the perpetrators themselves, the architects of their terror enterprise surely anticipated the immediate media impact: blanket coverage not only in the United States but in most other parts of the world as well. Opinion polls revealed that literally all Americans followed the initial news of the terrorist attacks (99 percent or 100 percent according to surveys) by watching and listening to television and radio. This initial universal interest in terrorism news did not weaken quickly. Political leaders as well followed the terror news and subsequent crisis reporting. There is no doubt at all, then, that the terrorists behind the attack on America got the attention of all Americans, the general public and leaders alike. This was a perfect achievement as far as the “attention-getting” goal in the United States was concerned.
Those who were responsible for the acts of terror realized another goal that terrorists pursue, namely, to spread anxiety and fear in a public traumatized by their terror. In the days after the assault, nine in ten Americans worried about additional terrorist events in their country, and a majority worried that they themselves, or somebody close to them, could become victims the next time around. These concerns did not evaporate as time went by. Not only Americans but also people abroad, too, knew quickly about the terrorist attacks on the United States and were affected by what they saw, heard, and read. This phenomenon caused one commentator to conclude, “If there were any remaining doubts about the media’s capacity to almost simultaneously disseminate global news, this poll’s finding should serve to dispel it.”

As media organizations, star anchors, and public officials became the targets of biological terrorism, and postal workers the most numerous victims of “collateral damage” in an unprecedented anthrax offensive by elusive terrorists, the news devoted to terrorism multiplied. Terrorists and terrorism had set the media agenda, the public agenda, and the government agenda. It was a total victory for their goal of getting the attention of the mass media, the public, and of governmental decisionmakers.

Sixteen days after the attacks on New York and Washington, the Christian Science Monitor published an in-depth article that addressed a question that President Bush had posed in his speech before a joint session of Congress, “Why do they [the terrorists] hate us?” Describing a strong resentment toward the United States in the Arab and Islamic world, Peter Ford summarized the grievances articulated by Osama bin Laden and like-minded extremists but also held by many less-radical people in the Middle East and other Muslim regions. This lengthy article was but one of many similar reports and analytical background pieces tracing the roots of anti-American attitudes among Arabs and Muslims and possible causes for a new anti-American terrorism of mass destruction.

While the print press examined the roots of the deeply seated opposition to U.S. foreign policy in the Arab and Islamic world extensively, television and radio dealt with these questions as well — in some instances at considerable length and depth. Thus, in the two and one-half weeks that followed the terrorist attacks, the major television networks and National Public Radio broadcast thirty-three stories that addressed the roots of anti-American terrorism of the sort committed on September 11, 2001, the motives of the perpetrators, and specifically the question that President Bush had asked. In the more than eight months before the attacks on New York and Washington, from January 1, 2001, to “Black Tuesday,” none of the same television or radio programs addressed the causes of anti-American sentiments in the Arab and Islamic world. This turnaround demonstrated the ability of terrorists to force the media’s hand, to set the media’s agenda. Suddenly, in the wake of terrorist violence of unprecedented proportions, the news explored and explained the grievances of those who died for their causes and how widely these grievances were shared even by the vast majority of those Arabs and Muslims who condemned the violence committed in the United States.

The point here is not to criticize the media for publicizing such contextual pieces but rather to point out that this coverage and the accompanying mass-mediated debate were the results of a horrific act of terror. In the process, the perpetrators of violence achieved their goal of recognition: By striking hard at America, the terrorists forced the mass media to explore their grievances in ways that transcended by far the quantity and narrow focus of the pre-crisis coverage.

What about the third goal that many terrorists hope to advance, namely to win or increase their respectability and legitimacy? Here, the perpetrators’ number-one audience was not the terrorized public, but rather the population in their homelands and their regions of operation. A charismatic figure among his supporters and sympathizers to begin

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with, Osama bin Laden was the biggest winner in this respect. The media covered him as “America’s number one public enemy” (according to a promotion for People magazine on CNN, September 29, 2001) and thereby bolstered his popularity, respectability, and legitimacy among millions of Muslims abroad. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington and up to the beginning of the bombing of Afghanistan on October 7, the U.S. television networks covered Osama bin Laden more frequently, leading newspapers and National Public Radio only somewhat less frequently, than President George W. Bush. The same coverage patterns prevailed through the end of 2001 and thus during the military strikes against targets in Afghanistan. A terrible act of terror turned the world’s most notorious terrorist into one of the leading newsmakers — indeed the leading newsmaker.

The fact that the American news media paid more attention to bin Laden than to the U.S. president, or nearly as much, was especially noteworthy considering that George W. Bush made fifty-four public statements during this period as compared with bin Laden, who did not appear in public at all and who provided the media only with a few pre-taped videos. From the terrorists’ point of view, it did not matter that bin Laden got a bad press in the United States and elsewhere. Singled-out, condemned, and warned by leaders such as President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Osama bin Laden was covered as much, or more frequently and lengthily, as the world’s most influential legitimate leaders. This fact in itself was a smashing success from the perspective of bin Laden and his associates.

In sum, then, by attacking symbolic targets in America, killing several thousand Americans and causing tremendous damage to the American and international economy, the architects and perpetrators of this horror achieved their media-centered objectives in all respects.

- First, the public appreciated the flow of information that was provided by television, radio, and print either directly or via media organizations’ Internet sites. In the hours and days of the greatest distress, television and radio especially helped viewers and listeners to feel as if they were involved in the unfolding news. People took some comfort in seeing and hearing the familiar faces and voices of news anchors and reporters as signs of the old normalcy in the midst of an incomprehensible crisis.

- Second, people credited the news media, especially local television, radio, and newspapers in the immediately affected areas in and around New York, Washington, and the crash site in Pennsylvania, for assisting crisis managers to communicate important information to the public. For crisis managers the mass media offered the only effective means to keep the public from panicking and to tell people what to do and what not to do. In this respect, the media served the public interest in the best tradition of disaster coverage.

- Third, Americans experienced a media — from celebrity anchors, hosts, and other stars to the foot-soldiers of the fourth estate — that abandoned cynicism, negativism, and attack journalism in favor of reporting, if not participating in, an outburst of civic spirit, unity, and patriotism. From one minute to another the press and the public seemed to reconnect after years in which media critics and pollsters recognized a growing disconnection.

- Fourth, the news provided public spaces where audience members had the opportunity to converse with experts in various fields and with each other, or to witness question-and-answer exchanges between others. Whether in quickly arranged electronic town-hall meetings or call-in programs, there was no lack of interest on the part of television, radio, and on-line audiences in becoming involved in public discourse. Many news organizations facilitated the sudden thirst for dialogue. While television and radio were natural for these exchanges, newspapers and magazines published exclusively, or mostly, letters-to-the-editor on this topic and reflected a wide range of serious and well-articulated opinions. Seldom, however, was the value of thoughtful moderators and professional gatekeepers more obvious than in the days and weeks after the terror nightmare. The least useful, often bigoted comments were posted on Internet sites and message boards.

**GRADING MEDIA COVERAGE**

In the days following the attack, when most Americans kept their televisions or radios tuned to the news during most or all of their waking hours, the public gave the media high grades for its reporting. Nearly nine in ten rated the performance of the news media as either excellent (56 percent) or good (33 percent). The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, which keeps track of the relationship between the public and the news media, called this high approval rating “unprecedented.” Five aspects in particular seemed to affect these high grades for the media:
Fifth, news consumers were spared the exasperation of watching reporters and camera-crews chasing survivors and relatives of victims, camping on front lawns, shoving microphones in front of people who wanted to be left alone. In the 1980s, when terrorists struck against Americans abroad, the media often pushed their thirst for tears, grief, tragedy, and drama too and even beyond the limits of professional journalism’s ethics in their hunt for pictures and sound-bites. This time, however, many husbands and wives, mothers and fathers, daughters and sons of disaster victims spoke voluntarily to reporters, appeared voluntarily, and in many instances repeatedly, on local and national television to talk about their traumatic losses. Expressing one’s innermost feelings, showing one’s despair, crying controlled or sobbing out of control before cameras and microphones seemed natural in the communication culture of our time and in the age of so-called reality television and talk-shows with a human touch à la Oprah Winfrey or Larry King.

MEDIA’S RESPONSIBILITY

Twelve days after the kamikaze attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, media critic Marvin Kitman, commenting on the perhaps longest continuous breaking news events in the history of television, wrote that television “kept on showing those same pictures of the planes hitting, the buildings crumbling. I’m sure if I turned the TV on right now, the buildings would still be crumbling.” While the initial emergency coverage deserved high marks, some of the “infotainment” habits that had increasingly made their way into television news crept back into the presentations of what screen banners called the “Attack on America” or “America Attacked.” Recalling the rather trivial headlines and cover stories before 9-11, Howard Kurtz suggested early on that “suddenly, dramatically, unalterably the world has changed. And that means journalism will also change, indeed is changing before our eyes.” As it turned out, this was wishful thinking. After the early hours and days there was simply not enough genuine news to fill twenty-four hours per day. As a result, television networks and stations took to replaying the scenes of horror again and again, revisiting the suffering of people over and over, searching for emotions beyond the boundaries of good taste. The shock over the events of 9-11 wore off quickly in the newsrooms, giving way to everyday routine. Some television anchors welcomed their audiences rather cheerfully to the “Attack on America” or “America’s New War” and led into commercial breaks with the promise that they would be right back with “America’s War on Terrorism” or with whatever the sound-bite slogan happened to be that day or week.

But the coverage raised far more serious questions about the proper role of a free press in a crisis. Three areas, in particular, proved problematic.

The first of these issues concerned the videotapes made of bin Laden and his lieutenants that al Qaeda made available to Al Jazeera. On October 7, shortly after President Bush had informed the nation of the first air raids against targets in Afghanistan, all five U.S. television networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, and Fox News) broadcast an unedited feed from Al Jazeera that gave bin Laden and his associates access to the American public. Two days later, the three cable channels (CNN, Fox, and MSNBC) aired in full a statement by bin Laden’s spokesman Suleiman Abu Gheith. Both tapes contained threats against Americans at home and abroad. Bin Laden said, “I swear to God that America will not live in peace before peace reigns in Palestine and before all the army of infidels departs the land of Muhammad, peace be upon him.” (Quoted in John Burns, “A Nation Challenged: The Wanted Man.” New York Times, October 8, 2001, p. A1.) His spokesman warned that “the storms will not calm down, especially the storm of airplanes, until you see defeat in Afghanistan.” He called on Muslims in the United States and Great Britain “not to travel by air-

The Bush administration cautioned that these statements could contain coded messages that might cue bin Laden followers in the United States and elsewhere in the West to unleash more terror. But intelligence experts were unable to point to a particular suspect. While the administration’s argument about these videotapes as vehicles for hidden messages was not credible, these tapes were certainly effective propaganda tools as were the transcripts that newspapers printed in full or as excerpts. The most damaging effect in the American setting was that these broadcasts further frightened an already traumatized public. Prodded by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, who argued that the tapes could incite more violence against Americans abroad, the five television networks agreed to edit future tapes of this sort and eliminate “passages containing flowery rhetoric urging violence against Americans.” This administration argument was just as weak as the suggestion of hidden signs contained in the tapes. After all, Al Jazeera and other television networks aired the material in the Middle East and other regions with Muslim populations.

While the argument that the press in a democracy needs to fully inform citizens, especially in times of crisis and great danger, has most weight here, it is also true that the media all the time make choices as to whom and what to include and exclude, or whom and what to feature more or less prominently in the news. In the case of the al Qaeda tapes, after the first ones were aired excessively by some cable networks, subsequent ones were under-covered. All of these videotapes should have been broadcast fully and printed entirely by newspapers. The public should have learned of bin Laden’s propaganda without being exposed to endless replays.

The second issue concerned the media’s sudden obsession with endlessly reporting and debating the potential for biological, chemical, and nuclear terrorism in the wake of the traditional terror of 9-11. As real and would-be experts filled the air waves, some hosts and anchors were unable to hide their pro-scare bias and their preference for guests who painted doomsday scenarios. And this was before the first anthrax case in Florida made the news on October 4, 2001. It was as if people in the newsrooms and their experts were waiting for the other shoe to drop. Then came the news of a Florida man dying of anthrax and of subsequent cases. In less than a month, the television networks covered or mentioned the anthrax terror in hundreds of segments. The leading newspapers published even more stories on anthrax and on other possible threats from biological and chemical agents. To be sure, the most serious bio-terrorism attacks in the United States deserved lead-story prominence and serious, regular, in-depth coverage, but not an army of talking heads who beat the topic to death many times over. In the process public officials who tried to mask their own confusion, experts who scared the public, and media stars and nonstars who overplayed the anthrax card contributed to a general sentiment of fear and uncertainty.

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Not many in the media listened.

Finally, in taking a softer stand vis-à-vis the President, administration officials, members of Congress, and officials at lower levels of government, the news media made the right choice in the face of a
crisis that presented the country with problems it had never faced before. But suspending the adversarial stance of normal times is one thing; not to report on public officials’ questionable decisions is another. When the House of Representatives stopped its work after anthrax spores had been found in Senator Tom Daschle’s office but not yet in the lower chamber of Congress, the New York Post called members “Wimps” in a huge front-page headline and chided representatives because they had “chicken[ed] out” and “headed for the hills yesterday at the first sign of anthrax in the Capitol” (Deborah Orin and Brian Blomquist, “Anthrax Plays to Empty House.” New York Post, October 18, 2001, p. 5). While the choice of words was not the best, the substance proved on the mark in the following days, when more government offices in Washington from Capitol Hill to the Supreme Court were closed while thousands of fearful postal workers in Washington, New York, and New Jersey were told to continue working because the anthrax traces in their buildings and on their mail-sorting machines did not pose any danger to their health. At the time, two postal workers in Washington had already died of anthrax inhalation, and several others had been diagnosed with less-lethal cases. Yet, by and large the news media showed no appetite to question what looked like a double standard.

In the face of an ongoing terrorism crisis at home and a counterterrorism campaign abroad, the mainstream watchdog press refrained from barking in the direction of public officials. Only when public-opinion polls signaled in late October and early November that the American public was far less satisfied with the Bush administration’s handling of the homeland defense in the face of anthrax bio-terrorism than with its military campaign abroad, some columnists, journalists, and editorial writers returned to asking questions that needed to be answered and voicing criticism that needed to be expressed. This was a signal that the news media began to slowly reclaim their watchdog role with respect to domestic politics and policies.

While nobody yearned for the return of the attack-dog media, the revival of a critical approach was, at last, a hopeful development and a signal that the terrorist assaults on America had failed in one respect: Even political violence of this magnitude did not for long defeat the watchdog function of the news media.

Brigitte L. Nacos has a two-track career in both journalism and political science. As a journalist she has worked for many years as U.S. correspondent for publications in Germany, but she has curtailed her journalistic activity in order to have time to teach and do research. She holds a Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University, where she has taught American government for more than a dozen years. Her particular fields of interest include: the role of the mass media in American politics and government; the linkages among terrorism, the mass media, public opinion, and crisis management; and domestic and international terrorism, anti- and counterterrorism. Her books include Terrorism and the Media: From the Iran Hostage Crisis to the Oklahoma City Bombing (Columbia University Press, 1996) and Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism (forthcoming from Rowman & Littlefield).

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ANNOUNCING...

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The night I met Abdul Haq, he was limping down a cobbled Roman street — his prosthesis had broken two days before. I had thought I was meeting a legendary mujahidin. But this guy was overweight, graying, and looking far older than the forty-three years he claimed.

This was less than a week after the 9/11 attacks and well into long-planned meetings in Rome with the former Afghan king and many mujahidin commanders such as Haq. They wanted to flip the Taliban from within the organization. Two weeks before, U.S. diplomats had laughed at them (one even told me, “The only way any of us will take the former king seriously is if there is a terrorist attack in the states”), and he spoke what he called “street English” — a brand picked up through years of talking to journalists. And Haq had racked up a drama of a life. A distinguished fighter during the Afghan-Soviet War, he lost a foot after stepping on a land mine (the operation took place on the battlefield, without anesthesia). He kept out of the warlord squabbles that split the country in the early 1990s, moving his family to Pakistan. He became a patron of sorts. Once, he heard that the former king’s falconer was living in a refugee camp. He brought the elderly man to a house in Peshawar and bought him a falcon, for what else is a falconer to do? The other residents of the house, who included American journalists, named the hawk Haq. And then the Taliban assassinated his first wife and one of his sons. He took his family to Dubai and plotted his return to Afghanistan.

Haq was a Pashtun. Many people thought, especially since he bridged the East-West gap, that Haq could be a political leader upon the Taliban’s fall. But Haq was not really interested in that. “I want
my family in Afghanistan, and I want to walk down the street without having the people spit in my face,” he said. He was unable to realize any of this. Haq was captured by the Taliban and executed in a horrible way.

I had spoken with him many times, right up until two days before he crossed into Afghanistan. He was pleased because he had been working very hard to put in place local political structures in the south to facilitate a future loya jirga [the newly formed, 1,500-member Afghan national council]. “It doesn’t matter what happens to me because this is ready,” he said. It still is.

Michele Mitchell is the political anchor for CNN Headline News. She appears in the network’s daily segment, “In The Loop,” which takes viewers inside national and international politics. Soon after September 11, Mitchell obtained the last — and one of the longest — sit-down interviews with Abdul Haq before the hero of the Afghan resistance was captured and executed by the Taliban. She was one of the only journalists inside the loya jirga planning meetings in Rome.

How far away from the Capitol building do I have to be?

How far away do I have to be to survive when the plane hits? The questions kept coming inside my head. Two blocks? Three blocks? Was I far enough away at the corner where I stood, trying in vain to call out on my cell phone? I could still see the Dome clearly. I envisioned the plane hitting and how far the fuel and debris would spray.

A few minutes earlier, a Capitol Hill police officer had passed me in a sprint. In fact, we were all sprinting away from the Capitol. As he ran past me, I grabbed his sleeve. “What’s going on?” I asked.

He glanced at my reporter’s notebook. “You didn’t hear this from me,” he said. “There’s a plane heading for the Capitol. It’ll be here in minutes.”

And that was how the most terrifying day of my life began.

We were lucky at the Capitol. We saw no death, no horror. It was nothing like the Twin Towers or the Pentagon. That plane never arrived. To this day, most of us who work on the Hill — journalists and staffers and lawmakers — are convinced that the plane destined for us crashed in a field in Pennsylvania.

But the terror of feeling that this could be my last moment on Earth is something that will never leave me. I don’t think anyone who was in that building on that day will ever forget the feeling. And that, it seems to me, is the secret to how so much work got done in a bipartisan spirit of cooperation in the weeks following September 11.

As my producer and I were scurrying to find a way to broadcast from a nearby church rooftop, the leaders of the House and Senate were taken to a “secure location.”

By all accounts, it was a profoundly moving experience. Remember, these are people who not only don’t see eye-to-eye on many issues, but most of them don’t even talk to one another on a regular basis. Tom Delay, the Republican Majority Whip, had probably never held a real conversation with Democratic Leader Dick Gephardt. But both men later told me that they sat in that bunker with nothing but one television to watch and each other to talk to. And talk they did — for hours.

Those shared experiences, combined with the urgency of the need to unify and keep a solid front in the face of attack, led to a real and noticeable change on Capitol Hill. In the days and weeks following 9/11, lawmakers were no longer Democrats or Republicans. They were simply lawmakers. They were members of the legislative branch of the United States government, backing the president and sending a message to the terrorists that they would not falter.

Things have changed now, of course. I suppose it was inevitable. It’s been more than six months since September 11. It’s been more than six months since the second wave of fear on Capitol Hill — the anthrax attacks. We’ve moved beyond those initial weeks of chaos and stress when the two parties got along with each other and spoke with one voice.

Sure, politics is back and solidly in place on the Hill. But I am convinced that there are some things that won’t go away. I know that deep down even the most hardened politicians still remember that day. I can see it in their eyes.

Kate Snow is a congressional correspondent for CNN based in the network’s Washington, D.C., bureau. During the September 11 attacks, Snow covered the suspected terrorist threats on the Capitol and the legislature’s response. In the following weeks, Snow was a key correspondent reporting on the anthrax attacks on Capitol Hill.
I didn’t become a journalist to be a war correspondent. Yes, I did my stints on the frontlines — in Nicaragua with the Sandinistas fighting the contras, in El Salvador in the 1989 offensive against the FMLN, in Peru in Shining Path-controlled territory, and in Colombia at the height of the narco war in the late 1980s. It was scary and exciting and important work. I will never forget a little Salvadoran girl in a hospital recovering from wounds from shrapnel that had dug holes into her thighs. “If you see my mother back in Los Angeles,” she pleaded with me, “please tell her to come home.”

I went back to the hotel room and cried. And I cried when I got into every plane that took me away from those war zones, knowing that I would probably never see those people again, worried about the kind of lives they would lead — feeling the contradiction of going back to my safe and somewhat predictable life as a New York City-based reporter.

But September 11 changed that. Overnight, I became a war correspondent who got to ground zero on a subway. For me that has been the ultimate contradiction. Every day for the past six months, I kiss my husband and children goodbye, get on the train and prepare myself for work, knowing that at some point during the day I will cry. My assignment since 9-11: covering the families of the close to 3,000 victims of the WTC attacks.

Journalists aren’t supposed to cry. And if we do, we are supposed to do it at home, in our offices behind closed doors, or on airplanes taking us away from dangerous places. But not with our subjects. On 9-11 though, it wasn’t that some New Yorkers were being attacked and others of us could report about that from some safe place. We all felt attacked. And to us journalists, the distinct line of reporter versus subject became blurry. Along with feelings of fear and panic in those first weeks after September 11, the blurriness that we were experiencing in our lives as journalists was uncomfortable.

My professional comfort was not the priority, however. What was important was to tell the untold stories of the victims, who ranged from the undocumented Mexican and Dominican cooks from the Windows on the World restaurant, to the devout Muslim Pakistani banker raising his family in a New Jersey suburb, to the thirty-three-year-old modern American woman who was now a widow but does not quite know how to properly mourn her husband, to the gay partner of a flight attendant who will not be able to claim any help from the federal September 11 aid fund.

As a journalist, I have always thought that one of the best things about my job was learning something new from someone unexpected every day when I set out for my interviews. After 9-11, I have learned what is perhaps the most important life-lesson ever. And I have learned it from the people who have also made me cry.

When life deals a horrible set of circumstances like the assault on September 11, many of us involved with the families have seen them come to a fork in the road of life. Either you die of sadness or fear, or you push one foot in front of the other and force yourself to move forward. They have forced themselves to move forward. And they have given this overnight war correspondent the example.

One foot in front of the other, tentatively perhaps, as I tell the stories of my city’s victims day after day.

Maria Hinojosa is a New York correspondent for CNN. She is the host of National Public Radio’s Latino USA, and the author of two books, Raising Raul — Adventures Raising Myself and My Son (Viking, 1999) and CREWS — Gang Members Talk to Maria Hinojosa (Harcourt Brace, 1995).
Kris Osborn

September 11’s impact on the United States and the world seems to defy the boundaries of human understanding. Without a doubt, its effect will be analyzed for generations while posterity will undoubtedly grapple with its toll in human lives, the psychological and geopolitical effects, and of course, the aftershocks of the global war on terrorism that immediately sprang up after the twin towers toppled.

Comparisons to Pearl Harbor provide insight for many when analyzing this new war. On that fateful day in 1941, thousands of Americans were killed in a single enemy attack; it was an attack that struck the soul of America and inspired a generation of heroes. Most know the stories; many others lived them.

As was the case with World War II, America is once again in the middle of a complex war, with U.S. forces deployed in multiple venues around the world, with strong support at home. Yet with so many similarities to World War II, this new war, Operation Enduring Freedom, remains vastly different. Many say that this new war is unlike anything we’ve witnessed before.

As journalists, my colleagues and I have a duty to communicate events accurately. Since September 11, that sense of duty has become increasingly important. We’ve had to ask ourselves: How is this new war shaping our lives? Other than new words and phrases to add to our vocabulary — al Qaeda, bunker-buster bombs, laser and GPS targeting — and new regions to our collective sense of geography — Kabul, Kandahar, and Tora Bora — just what is the impact of this war?

Descriptions and reports of war often lodge themselves in my mind, frequently blending themselves into a stream of consciousness.

“America is witnessing the unfolding of an unprecedented kind of warfare,” I can tell you.

“Smoke rising from the hilltops in northern and eastern Afghanistan has become a familiar sight from the warzone,” I say in some form or another to television viewers each day.

“. . . including things like unmanned Predator drones streaming real-time video of target locations, F-14 Tomcats patrolling ‘killboxes,’ and U.S. Special Forces advising Northern Alliance troops, helping to pinpoint targets from the ground . . .”

All of these are true statements, but for many, the unspoken is much harder to deal with. And we all know it on some level. Americans know all too well that this war, along with its threats and dangers, is very different. Its impact is daily. Yes, this is a different type of military campaign, seeking to simultaneously apply different kinds of pressure: diplomatic, financial, military, and intelligence efforts, all geared to work in tandem.

The soldiers are different, too — ours and theirs. No longer armies facing off on a battlefield, there are, instead, international terrorist cells waging asymmetrical warfare against institutions and populations. Something we see, hear, and report on every day is the troubling realization that never before have U.S. civilians been such targets in wartime. Experts tell us that civilians are chosen because military targets are fortified, making them harder to hit. Also, striking them might not generate the same degree of panic. As a result, homeland security efforts are working to anticipate varieties of attacks on civilians: nuclear, chemical, and biological threats, to name a few.

These are all different elements.

As a result, this war effort seeks to thwart potential attacks while preparing us for the psychological impact that such assaults are meant to trigger. In this war, preparation on the psychological and intelligence fronts has the multi-faceted goal of preventing attacks while minimizing the sense of public trepidation engendered by the possibility of another terrorist strike.
Then there’s the nuclear aspect. Not since the Cold War had many of us tendered more than a trillionth of a second’s thought to that threat. The few warheads that existed in the world were for government officials and dignitaries to concern themselves with. Now, the CIA and other national agencies have issued new warnings about this possibility. Pentagon officials routinely say they have learned that al Qaeda has aggressively pursued weapons of mass destruction. Intelligence materials from at least sixty different locations are being analyzed at various laboratories. However, Pentagon officials are also quick to counter that at least at the moment, it does not appear that al Qaeda has “weaponized” its nuclear material, meaning that it lacks the ability to actually make and deploy a nuclear weapon.

With our minds swimming with all of this, many ask if we’ll know when victory has come. I am not a soothsayer, and this is not a space to speculate. Apart from more visible occurrences, such as the fall of the Taliban and reported battlefield successes, victories in this war will be marked in the quiet, in the calm. One expert succinctly described to me victory in the war on terrorism as “the dog that never barked!” referring to terrorist actions that are stopped. Victory comes in the absence of terror. When there are no more attacks, we are safe again.

Feeling safe will mark the true victory, however — knowing that the remission has turned into a cure. That will take more time. And therein lies the impact of this very different war.

I will leave you with a personal anecdote, something that speaks to the humanity, the soul perhaps, of what everyone is going through. I recently spoke with twenty-one-year-old U.S. Marine Ian Koch. He was among the first thousand Marines on the ground in Afghanistan, who were stationed at Camp Rhino. After talking about life and death fears, dangers and commitments of serving in the war zone, Ian talked about coming home. It was something he wasn’t sure would ever happen. Upon arriving home in Abington, Mass., and seeing the “Welcome home soldier” banner spread across his front lawn, Ian told his little cousins: “I have something for you.” While they gazed, he handed them Tabasco sauce bottles filled with sand from Afghanistan. Although unable to fully comprehend what their older cousin had endured, the children knew this was a very significant gift. It was a small piece of Ian’s experience on the front lines. It was a gesture that extended beyond words. These emotions of a certain silent understanding characterized his homecoming. At times little was said, just a quick hug, or a knowing glance, recognition and relief that Ian was home again.

Kris Osborn is an anchor with CNN Headline News. Since September 11, he has talked to and interviewed multiple CNN correspondents in various combat zones. He also writes a weekly online column.

All images in this article are courtesy of CNN.
II. GRIEF:
FOR THOSE LEFT IN THE SHADOW

This is a muddle of a pinched maze you’ve found
yourself in, full of unscaleable walls
from that giant thumbprint pressed into the raw
world you move through. And sometimes it drowns
you with its silent shadow when it takes
a life away, when you’re left asking if
this is God’s imprint or some fatal twist
we can’t alter or manipulate.

Some parts of the world are cold and beautiful
at the same time, like those mountain peaks
where you can see the “other side.” But death
is never like that, always a chestful
of ache and already stealing your heartbeat
of memory, your treasure, your perfect rest.

BARRY BALLARD

Barry Ballard’s poetry has most recently appeared in Quarterly West, The Chariton
Review, and New Delta Review. His collections include: Green Tombs to Jupiter
(Snail’s Pace Press Poetry Prize) and Charred Fragment of Light (Creative Ash Press
Poetry Prize).
After several days of waiting in the Jalalabad hotel, we were visited by a bin Laden emissary. The man, who introduced himself as bin Laden’s “media adviser,” was young and wore shoulder-length hair, a headdress, and sunglasses that concealed much of his face. He was not unfriendly, but businesslike, asking if he could take a look at our camera and sound equipment. Following a perfunctory survey of our gear he announced: “You can’t bring any of this for the interview.” To have gotten so far, and to have spent this much time and money, only to learn that the interview would be sabotaged — this was rather bad news.

Things looked up again when the media adviser said that we could shoot the interview on his handheld digital camera. I knew that our professional gear would do a better job, but there was clearly little point in arguing. Bin Laden feared that strangers with electronic equipment might be concealing some type of tracking device that would give away his location. (Ali had mentioned the example of Terry Waite, an Anglican church envoy negotiating for the release of Western hostages in Beirut in the 1980s, who was himself taken captive because he was suspected of carrying such a device.)

Bin Laden’s men left nothing to chance: we were not even to bring our watches. The media adviser’s parting words were: “Bring only the clothes you are wearing.” He told us we would be picked up the next day.

The following afternoon a beaten-up blue Volkswagen van drew up at our hotel. Ali motioned hurriedly for us to get in and then drew curtains over the windows of the van. As the sun dipped, we drove west on the road to Kabul. Inside the van were three well-armed men.

The trip passed mostly in a heavy silence.

After driving through a long tunnel, Ali finally broke the silence, saying almost apologetically: “This is the point in the journey when guests are told if they are hiding a tracking device, tell us now and it will not be a problem.” We took it that any potential
“problem” would likely result in a swift execution. I glanced nervously at my two colleagues. Could I be absolutely sure neither of them had such a device? I assured him we were clean.

It was now nightfall and under an almost full moon we turned onto a little track heading into mountainous terrain. After a few minutes we arrived at a small plateau and were told to get out. Each of us was given a pair of glasses with little cardboard inserts stuffed in the lenses, making it impossible to see. We were then transferred into another vehicle, in which we were later allowed to take off our glasses. We found ourselves inside a jeep with heavily tinted windows. The path wound upward, becoming steeper. In places, the road seemed to be just the rock bed of a mountain stream; elsewhere, improvements had been made to the track. My colleagues and I exchanged almost no words during this surreal trip. None of us had any idea how it would end.

Suddenly a man leaped out of the darkness, pointing an RPG, or rocket propelled grenade, at our vehicle. He shouted at us to halt and then exchanged some quick words with the driver before letting us pass on. This happened again a few minutes later. Finally, a group of about half a dozen men appeared and signaled us to get out of the vehicle. They were armed with Russian PK submachine guns and RPGs.

“Don’t be afraid,” said their leader, a burly Saudi, who politely asked us to get out of the car. “We are going to search you now,” he said in barely accented English. They patted us down in a professional manner and ran a beeping instrument with a red flashing light over us. I assumed it was a scan for any tracking device we might have secreted.

We drove into a small rock-strewn valley at about five thousand feet. March in the Afghan mountains is cold and I was glad I had brought a down jacket for the trip. We were led to a rough mud hut lined with blankets; here we were to meet bin Laden. Nearby were other huts, grouped around a stream. The settlement was probably used from time to time for the trip. We were led to a rough mud hut lined with blankets; here we were to meet bin Laden.

Without raising his voice, bin Laden appeared with hisourage — a translator and several bodyguards. He is a tall man, well over six feet, his face dominated by an aquiline nose. Dressed in a turban, white robes, and a green camouflage jacket, he walked with a cane and seemed tired, less like a swaggering revolutionary than a Muslim ascetic. Those around him treated him with the utmost deference, referring to him with the honorific “sheikh,” an homage he seemed to take as his due. We were told we had about an hour with him before he would have to go. As he sat down, he propped up next to him the Kalashnikov rifle that is never far from his side. His followers said he had taken it from a Russian he had killed.

Jouvenal fiddled with the lights and camera and then said the welcome words “We have speed,” which is cameramanese for “We’re ready.”

Peter Arnett and I had worked up a long list of questions, many more than could be answered in the hour allotted to us. We had been asked to submit them in advance, and bin Laden’s people had excited any questions about his personal life, his family, or his finances. We were not going to find out, Barbara Walters-style, what kind of tree bin Laden thought he was. But he was going to answer our questions about his political views and why he advocated violence against Americans.

Without raising his voice, bin Laden began to rail in Arabic against the injustices visited upon Muslims by the United States and his native Saudi Arabia: “Our main problem is the U.S. government. . . . By being loyal to the U.S. regime, the Saudi regime has committed an act against Islam,” he said. Bin Laden made no secret of the fact that he was interested in fomenting a revolution in Saudi Arabia, and that his new regime would rule in accordance with the seventh-century precepts of the Prophet Muhammad. “We are confident . . . that Muslims will be victorious in the Arabian peninsula and that God’s religion, praise and glory be to Him, will prevail in this peninsula. It is a great . . . hope that the revelation unto Muhammad will be used for ruling.”

Bin Laden coughed softly throughout the interview and nursed a cup of tea. No doubt he was suffering from a cold brought on by the drafty Afghan mountains. But by now I was ravenous, so I tucked in with gusto.

I calculated that it was sometime before midnight when bin Laden appeared with his entourage — a translator and several bodyguards. He is a tall man, well over six feet, his face dominated by an aquiline nose. Dressed in a turban, white robes, and a green camouflage jacket, he walked with a cane and seemed tired, less like a swaggering revolutionary than a Muslim ascetic. Those around him treated him with the utmost deference, referring to him with the honorific “sheikh,” an homage he seemed to take as his due. We were told we had about an hour with him before he would have to go. As he sat down, he propped up next to him the Kalashnikov rifle that is never far from his side. His followers said he had taken it from a Russian he had killed.

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Inside the hut, a flickering kerosene lamp illuminated the faces of bin Laden’s followers. Some were Arabs; others had darker, African complexions. They served us a dinner of heaping platters of rice, nan bread, and some unidentifiable meat. Was it goat? Chicken? Hard to tell in the dim light. I have generally made it a rule of the road never to eat anything I am not too sure of, ever since an eventful encounter with some curried brains in Peshawar. But by now I was ravenous, so I tucked in with gusto.

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Bin Laden coughed softly throughout the interview and nursed a cup of tea. No doubt he was suffering from a cold brought on by the drafty Afghan mountains. He continued on in his soft-spoken but focused manner, an ambiguous, thin smile sometimes playing on his lips: “We declared jihad against the U.S. government because the U.S. government . . . has committed acts that are extremely unjust, hideous, and criminal whether directly or through its support of the Israeli occupation of [Palestine]. And
we believe the U.S. is directly responsible for those who were killed in Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq. This U.S. government abandoned humanitarian feelings by these hideous crimes. It transgressed all bounds and behaved in a way not witnessed before by any power or any imperialist power in the world. Due to its subordination to the Jews, the arrogance and haughtiness of the U.S. regime has reached to the extent that they occupied [Arabia]. For this and other acts of aggression and injustice, we have declared jihad against the U.S., because in our religion it is our duty to make jihad so that God's word is the one exalted to the heights and so that we drive the Americans away from all Muslim countries.”

Throughout bin Laden’s diatribe perhaps a dozen of his followers listened in rapt attention as he went on to clarify that the call for jihad was directed against U.S. armed forces stationed in the Saudi Kingdom.

“We have focused our declaration on striking at the soldiers in the country of the Two Holy Places.” This was bin Laden’s name for Saudi Arabia, a term he avoids using, as he loathes the Saudi royal family. He continued: “The country of the Two Holy Places has in our religion a peculiarity of its own over the other Muslim countries. In our religion, it is not permissible for any non-Muslim to stay in our country. Therefore, even though American civilians are not targeted in our plan, they must leave. We do not guarantee their safety.”

This was the first time that bin Laden had told members of the Western press that American civilians might be casualties in his holy war. A year later he would tell ABC News that he made no distinction between American military and civilian targets, despite the fact that the Koran itself is explicit about the protections offered to civilians.

Bin Laden envisaged his own counterpoint to the march of globalization — the restoration of the Khalifa, or caliphate, which would begin from Afghanistan. Not since the final demise of the Ottoman Empire after the end of World War I had there been a Muslim entity that more or less united the umma, the community of Muslim believers, under the green flag of Islam. In this view, the treaties that followed World War I had carved up the Ottoman Empire, “the Sick Man of Europe,” into ersatz entities like Iraq and Syria. Bin Laden aimed to create the conditions for the rebirth of the Khalifa, where the umma would live under the rule of the Prophet Muhammad in a continuous swath of green from Tunisia to Indonesia, much as the red of the British empire colored maps from Egypt to Burma before World War II. As a practical matter, the restoration of the Khalifa had about as much chance as the Holy Roman Empire suddenly reappearing in Europe, but as a rhetorical device the call for its return exercised a powerful grip on bin Laden and his followers.
During the interview bin Laden’s translator, who spoke precise English, gave us rough translations of what bin Laden was saying. Occasionally, though, bin Laden would answer questions before they had been translated. So he clearly understood some English. “The U.S. today has set a double standard, calling whoever goes against its injustice a terrorist,” he said at one point. “It wants to occupy our countries, steal our resources, impose on us agents to rule us, and wants us to agree to all these. If we refuse to do so, it will say, ‘You are terrorists.’ With a simple look at the U.S. behaviors, we find that it judges the behavior of the poor Palestinian children whose country was occupied: if they throw stones against the Israeli occupation, it says they are terrorists, whereas when the Israeli pilots bombed the United Nations building in Qana, Lebanon, while it was full of children and women, the U.S. stopped any plan to condemn Israel.” (This was a reference to April 18, 1996, when Israeli forces seeking to attack Hezbollah guerrillas shelled a U.N. building in Qana, Lebanon, killing 102 Lebanese civilians. Israel characterized the attack on the U.N. building as an accident, a claim the U.N. later dismissed.)

Bin Laden angrily continued. “At the same time that they condemn any Muslim who calls for his rights, they receive the top official of the Irish Republican Army [Gerry Adams] at the White House as a political leader. Wherever we look, we find the U.S. as the leader of terrorism and crime in the world. The U.S. does not consider it a terrorist act to throw atomic bombs at nations thousands of miles away, when those bombs would hit more than just military targets. Those bombs rather were thrown at entire nations, including women, children, and elderly people, and up to this day the traces of those bombs remain in Japan.”

Bin Laden then surprised us by claiming that Arabs affiliated with his group were involved in killing American troops in Somalia in 1993, a claim he had earlier made to an Arabic newspaper. We all remembered the grisly television images of the mutilated body of a U.S. serviceman being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. What was not known at the time was the possible involvement of bin Laden’s organization in training the Somalis who carried out the operation.

Bin Laden told us: “Resistance started against the American invasion, because Muslims did not believe the U.S. allegations that they came to save the Somalis. With Allah’s grace, Muslims in Somalia cooperated with some Arab holy warriors who were in Afghanistan. Together they killed large numbers of American occupation troops.” For bin Laden, Somalia was clearly an intoxicating victory. He exulted in the fact that the United States withdrew its troops from the country, pointing to the withdrawal as an example of the “weakness, frailty and cowardice of the U.S. troops.”

Asked what message he would send President Clinton, bin Laden answered: “Mentioning the name of Clinton or that of the American government provokes disgust and revulsion. This is because the name of the American government and the name of Clinton and Bush directly reflect in our minds . . . the picture of the children who died in Iraq.” He was referring to the fact that, by May 1996, an estimated 500,000 Iraqi children had died as a result of U.N. sanctions imposed on Iraq in 1990, for its continued violations of U.N. resolutions.

He continued: “The hearts of Muslims are filled with hatred towards the United States of America and the American president. The president has a heart that knows no words. A heart that kills hundreds of children definitely knows no words. Our people in the Arabian Peninsula will send him messages with no words because he does not know any words. If there is a message that I may send through you, then it is a message I address to the mothers of the American troops who came here with their military uniforms walking proudly up and down our land . . . . I say that this represents a blatant provocation to over a billion Muslims. To these mothers I say if they are concerned for their sons, then let them object to the American government’s policy.”

The interview came to an end, but bin Laden lingered for a few minutes, courteously serving us cups of tea. The talk turned to Iraq and Saddam Hussein, whom Arnett had interviewed during the Gulf War. Bin Laden said that the Iraqi dictator wanted the oil of Kuwait for his own aggrandizement and was not a true Muslim leader.

After posing for a couple of photos, bin Laden left as quickly as he had arrived. He had spent a little over an hour with us. But the “media adviser” was reluctant to give up the interview tapes. First, he wanted to erase some shots of bin Laden he considered unflattering. With several of bin Laden’s guards still present, there was no way to stop him. I watched as he proceeded to erase the offending images by taping over the interview tape inside the camera. Not content with this little display, he then started an argument with Ali about giving us the tapes at all. A tugging match ensued. Finally, Ali prevailed, giving me both interview tapes, which were hardly larger than a pair of matchbooks. I put them in the most secure place I could think of inside my money belt, which I wore under my trousers.

“Will you use the bit of the interview where bin Laden attacks Clinton?” Ali asked. We were standing outside the mud hut underneath a vast sky. There
is no light pollution or smog in Afghanistan, so the heavens can be seen in their natural state. It was a beautiful night, clear and cold and utterly, utterly silent. “Of course,” I told him. Ali seemed surprised. He was used to firm government control of the media.

During the next weeks we wrote and edited the script for our profile, which was broadcast on May 12, 1997, in the United States and over a hundred other countries. In Saudi Arabia, authorities confiscated copies of newspapers that ran items about our story, while in the U.S. the Associated Press wire service ran a piece that was picked up by a number of American papers. Otherwise, the story had little impact.

But a line kept resonating in my mind, the final words in our broadcast. When asked about his future plans bin Laden had replied: “You’ll see them and hear about them in the media, God willing.”

**From The Epilogue**

As I was completing this book in August 2001, at the beginning of a new century, the United States seemed secure. If bin Laden and his network posed one of the gravest threats to that security, then Americans could rest easy at night: statistically, they had a better chance of being killed by a snake than by a terrorist. The Cold War and its threat of nuclear annihilation had vanished like a barely remembered dream, and the pervasiveness of American cultural and military power made the United States much like the Roman Empire during its golden age, with no Goths or Vandals in sight.

On September 11, that complacency was exploded. The vandals were among us now, responsible for the deaths of some five thousand Americans. The airwaves quickly filled with blathering bloviators, who called this an attack on “the American way of life,” on the very idea of the United States and its culture. While such statements may provide psychological satisfaction to those who make them, they shed more heat than light on the motivations of bin Laden and his followers.

If you have read this far in *Holy War, Inc.*, then presumably the question you are hoping will be answered is: Why is bin Laden doing what he does? To attempt an answer, we have to refrain from caricature and instead attend to bin Laden’s own statements about why he is at war with the United States. Bin Laden is not some “AY-rab” who woke up one morning in a bad mood, his turban all in a twist, only to decide America was THE ENEMY. He has reasons for hating the United States, and if we understand those reasons, we will have a glimmer of insight into what provoked the terrible events of September 11.

In all the tens of thousands of words that bin Laden has uttered on the public record there are some significant omissions: he does not rail against the pernicious effects of Hollywood movies, or against Madonna’s midriff, or against the pornography protected by the U.S. Constitution. Nor does he inveigh against the drug and alcohol culture of the West, or its tolerance for homosexuals. He leaves that kind of material to the Christian fundamentalist Jerry Falwell, who opined that the September 11 attacks were God’s vengeance on Americans for condoning feminism and homosexuality.

If we may judge his silence, bin Laden cares little about such cultural issues. What he condemns the United States for is simple: its policies in the Middle East. Those are, to recap briefly: the continued U.S. military presence in Arabia; U.S. support for Israel; its continued bombing of Iraq; and its support for regimes such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia that bin Laden regards as apostates from Islam.

Bin Laden is at war with the United States, but his is a political war, justified by his own understanding of Islam, directed at the symbols and institutions of American political power. The hijackers who came to America did not attack the headquarters of a major brewery or AOL-Time Warner or Coca-Cola, nor did they attack Las Vegas or Manhattan’s West Village or even the Supreme Court. They attacked the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, preeminent symbols of the United States’ military and economic might. And that fits the pattern of previous al-Qaeda attacks on U.S. embassies, military installations, and warships.

That being said, are the attacks the opening barrage in what Harvard professor Samuel Huntington famously predicted would be a “clash of civilizations”? “Cultural communities are replacing Cold War blocs,” he wrote, “and the fault lines between civilizations are becoming the central lines of conflict in global politics.” In Huntington’s view, the tectonic plates of Islam would grind up against the plates of Christianity and Hinduism, while within Christendom the Orthodox would war with the Catholics. Such clashes, he predicted, would be the future ruptures of history.

Huntington singled out Islam itself as the Dark Force in tomorrow’s world. Consider the following: “The Muslim propensity toward violent conflict is also suggested by the degree to which Muslim societies are militarized.” And this: “Some Westerners, including President Bill Clinton, have argued that the West does not have problems with Islam but only with violent Islam extremists. Fourteen hundred
years of history demonstrate otherwise.” Huntington has also written, “Islam has bloody borders” — a charge I am sure the Bosnian Muslims would second. Huntington correctly points to an “Islamic resurgence” in the twentieth century, but he mistakenly conflates this resurgence with violence. In this he resembles those American journalists, imprisoned in their secular-liberal prism, who blame the Christian fundamentalist revival in the United States for the assassinations of abortion clinic doctors; the Christian revival is a movement of millions, but the violence at abortion clinics is the work of a handful of zealots.

Superficially, bin Laden seems to fit into the “clash of civilizations” thesis. After all, he revels in attacks on American targets. But a closer look shows that his rage is as much directed against one of the most conservative Muslim states in the world — Saudi Arabia — as against the United States. And for all his denunciations of the Jews, al-Qaeda has so far never attacked an Israeli or Jewish target.

In addition, treating “Islam” as a monolith defies common sense. There are as many Islams as there are Christianities. They range from the Muslim engineering students at M.I.T. who have set up their own prayer rooms; to the clerics in Yemen who are participating in elections; to the Iranian women who are creating an emerging Islamic feminism; to the Tablighi Jamaar, a nonviolent Muslim missionary movement of millions barely known in the West; to the Taliban religious warriors in Afghanistan who have destroyed the country’s ancient Buddhist statues in the name of Allah.

Even in the former Yugoslavia, Huntington’s Exhibit A, where two hundred thousand died in the 1990s wars among Orthodox Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, and Catholic Croats, his analysis works only to a point. As has been well documented, it took a Milosevic to ignite the Yugoslav wars, just as it took a Hitler to unleash the Final Solution. Yes, once these events were in motion, “ordinary” Germans and “ordinary” Serbs (and Croats and Muslims) took enthusiastically to the task of killing their neighbors. But “age-old hatreds” are not sufficient explanations for warfare and genocide. Political changes are key. Germany under Bismarck was not a bad place to be Jewish, just as Yugoslavia under Tito was not a bad place to be Muslim.

The clash of civilizations, however, is a seductive theory to explain the post-Cold War world. The test of such a theory is its applicability to a wide number of situations, and certainly Huntington can point to a wealth of examples: a bloody war in Sudan between its Islamist regime and animist and Christian rebels; continued wars between the Russians and Chechens; the Muslim insurgency in the Philippines; Arab versus Jew in Israel; and now, perhaps, the events of September 11.

But a myriad of conflicts around the globe have run inconveniently counter to the world according to Huntington. The bloodiest genocide of the nineties was not between civilizations but tribal groups: the Hutus and the Tutsis in Central Africa. That war left eight hundred thousand dead. In Somalia, the West’s humanitarian intervention in 1992 was a sideshow to a decade of brutal clan warfare in that overwhelmingly Muslim nation. The ongoing civil war in Colombia, which has displaced millions and killed tens of thousands, has devolved from a battle between leftists and rightists into a brutal competition for control of the cocaine trade.

Huntington used the 1980s war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan as a prime example for his thesis, describing it as a “a civilization war because Muslims everywhere saw it as such and rallied against

A more accurate predictor of post-Cold War rivalries, then, is good old nationalism, as could be seen in Kosovo. In 1999, the Kosovars, who are Muslim more in name than practice, specifically rejected the “help” of outside Islamists, not wanting to complicate their struggle for independence. Kurds in Iraq and Turkey have struggled for decades to achieve greater independence from their fellow Muslim Turks and Iraqis.
Even examples that seem, at first blush, to confirm The Clash of Civilizations get more complicated when one takes a deeper look. In Kashmir it seems that Muslims, with the aid of Pakistan, are fighting to free themselves from the yoke of Hindu India; but on closer inspection most Kashmiris are engaged in a nationalist struggle for independence and are opposed both to Indian rule and to the militant Islamists from Pakistan and elsewhere who have come to their aid.

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A further predictor of conflict is what Michael Ignatieff, borrowing from Freud, calls the “narcissism of minor differences”— wars fought between culturally similar neighbors, like so many conflicts in Africa today.

Another predictor is power politics as usual — for instance, Saddam Hussein’s land grab to seize Kuwait from his brother Arabs in 1990, and the subsequent alliance of Western states and almost all of the Muslim states to dislodge him. Hussein’s attempt to garb himself in the raiment of Islam in order to rally the Muslim world behind him during the ensuing Gulf War would have been pathetic if it had not been so breathtakingly cynical. Muslims were well aware that Hussein was ruthlessly and ecumenically secular, exterminating Muslim opponents whether they were militant Islamists, Kurds, Shias, or the Marsh Arabs of southern Iraq.

The Gulf War was unpopular in the Arab “street,” yes, but Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman all sent troops for Operation Desert Storm. Indeed, Saudi and Egyptian ulama (clergy) issued statements calling the war against Iraq a holy war. Leaders of Muslim nations did not want Iraq to become the strong man of the Middle East, whatever rhetoric they may have employed to disguise the truth that they preferred the United States in that role.

President George W. Bush is now the commander-in-chief of a very different war than the one his father fought against Iraq. Yet many of those same Muslim nations — as well as countries like Jordan and Yemen which were sympathetic to Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War — are aiding the American-led coalition. Most Middle Eastern governments are implacably opposed to al-Qaeda and its affiliates; they are well aware that they, too, are targets of bin Laden’s campaign of violence. And their antipathy to the radical jihadist organizations that seek to overthrow them appears to be shared by their people; as support for extremist organizations declines, moderate Islamist groups that are willing to work within the existing political framework have become increasingly popular.

The journalist Genevieve Abdo argues that the roots of the moderate Islamist movement can be found in groups such as Egypt’s professional unions and that the movement has already made strides towards securing power. Abdo’s thesis is amplified by another journalist, Anthony Shadid, who shows that the moderate Islamist movement has become progressively more important not only in Egypt but also in Jordan and Iran. (That said, the reverse is taking place in Israel and the Palestinian Authority, where the collapse of the peace process has empowered hard-liners on both sides of the conflict.)

Yemen is also seeing the development of a democratic Islamist movement. The Islamist Islah party, which wins around 20 percent of the seats in parliament, includes elements of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, which a decade ago would not have participated in elections. Now Islah works within Yemen’s tentative experiment in multiparty democracy as a responsible political actor.

The development of Islamist movements working within a democratic framework should not be surprising. There is nothing inherently “antidemocratic” in Islam, and there are Muslim concepts, such as shura — “consultation with the people” — that fit rather neatly into a democratic framework. What are elections, if not consultations with the people? Just as Franco’s fascism, seventeenth-century Europe’s divine right of kings, and America’s 1960s civil rights movement all emerged from Christian societies, any number of political models is possible in an Islamic environment. The proof lies in Indonesia: With more than two hundred million inhabitants, it is one of the world’s largest democracies and the world’s largest Muslim country. Which is not to overlook the fact that too many countries in the Muslim world today remain in the grip of dictators and authoritarian monarchs.

If the advocates of political Islam have largely failed to create viable Islamist states in countries such as Sudan and Afghanistan, and if countries in the Middle East are seeing the emergence of less confrontational Islamist groups and parties, what is the significance of Holy War, Inc., the most radical Islamist strain?

To help answer that question, let us consider the history of an analogous group: the Assassins, a rad-
nal Muslim sect of the eleventh and twelfth centuries that may have been the first group in history to use terrorism systematically as a means of destroying its enemies. The Assassins directed their campaign of terror from remote mountain fortresses in the region that is now part of Syria and Iran. Assassins were dispatched to bump off enemies of the group, principally leaders of the reigning Sunni political order and also a smaller number of Christians. Myths grew up around the Assassins, particularly in the West, where it was believed that the Assassins smoked hashish before they went off on their murderous missions. (Eight centuries later, in a peculiar echo of the Assassins, al-Qaeda’s Mohamed Atta would go on a drinking binge days before guiding American Airlines flight 11 into the North Tower of the World Trade Center.) Medieval Western sources also thought that the Assassins were led by a mysterious leader, the Old Man of the Mountains, who had created a cult-like group of murderers.

There are obvious parallels between the Assassins and al-Qaeda. The first is al-Qaeda’s choice of a base, mountainous and remote Afghanistan, far from the reach of the powers it is attacking. The second is the use of terrorism to achieve its aims. Bin Laden and company have focused less on acts of assassination — although they did try to kill Hosni Mubarak in 1995 — than on acts of mass destruction, but it is terrorism all the same. Although the Assassins were a splinter group of the Shia minority in the Muslim world, and bin Laden preaches a neo-fundamentalist Sunni Islam, in practice both groups are opposed to the Sunni establishment and the West. And, like the Old Man of the Mountains, bin Laden has achieved an almost mythic status.

Will capturing or killing bin Laden spell the end of al-Qaeda? There are others who would replace him. Standing in the wings are the Eminence grise of the group, Ayman al-Zawahiri, as well as his colleague Abu Hafs, al-Qaeda’s Egyptian military commander. The latter is now the father-in-law of bin Laden’s son, Mohammed, who himself might one day lead al-Qaeda. And behind them are the many thousands of members and affiliates of al-Qaeda, not only in Afghanistan but in sixty countries around the world: a Hydra-headed monster.

That said, al-Qaeda would be dealt a severe blow if bin Laden were ushered from this world. Others down the chain of command might hate the United States as much or more, but it was bin Laden’s charisma and organizational skills that turned this transnational terrorist concern into a big business. A senior U.S. counterterrorism official told me something after the 1998 African embassy bombings that remains true today: “If he [bin Laden] were to depart the scene tomorrow, there would be serious fractures in al-Qaeda a year or two later. . . . But I hate to focus on bin Laden, there are a lot of people out there. He is a symbol for a wider problem. There is no finish line.” It remains to be seen whether the ideas espoused by al-Qaeda and bin Laden will end up in what President George W. Bush has called “history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies.”

If al-Qaeda is to be buried in that unmarked grave, the most effective plan beyond eliminating the leadership of the group is to shut down permanently the Afghan training camps where the foot soldiers of Holy War, Inc. learn their deadly skills. Without the training camps, al-Qaeda’s recruits cannot easily learn how to construct devastating bombs or create disciplined cells capable of carrying out complex operations such as the September 11 attacks. The training camps turn raw recruits with a general and inchoate antipathy to the West into skilled bomb makers. A perfect example of their handiwork is Ahmed Ressam, whose arrest at the Canadian border in December 1999 probably saved the lives of hundreds of travelers and workers at Los Angeles International Airport.

As we have seen, the training camps are easily rebuilt after they have been bombed, but constant aerial reconnaissance of likely camp locations followed by air strikes will eventually force them out of business, as will a change of regime in Afghanistan. Without the patronage of the Taliban, the groups that use the country for training, whether al-Qaeda or other terrorist organizations such as Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group or Kashmir’s Harakat ul-Mujahideen, cannot operate.
I believe two moral judgments can be made about the war in Afghanistan:
The September 11 attack constitutes a crime against humanity and cannot be justified, and the bombing of Afghanistan is also a crime, which cannot be justified.

And yet, voices across the political spectrum, including many on the left, have described this as a “just war.” One longtime advocate of peace, Richard Falk, wrote in *The Nation* that this is “the first truly just war since World War II.” Robert Kuttner, another consistent supporter of social justice, declared in *The American Prospect* that only people on the extreme left could believe this is not a just war.

I have puzzled over this. How can a war be truly just when it involves the daily killing of civilians, when it causes hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children to leave their homes to escape the bombs, when it may not find those who planned the September 11 attacks, and when it will multiply the ranks of people who are angry enough at this country to become terrorists themselves?

This war amounts to a gross violation of human rights, and it will produce the exact opposite of what is wanted: It will not end terrorism; it will proliferate terrorism.

I believe that the progressive supporters of the war have confused a “just cause” with a “just war.” There are unjust causes, such as the attempt of the United States to establish its power in Vietnam, or to dominate Panama or Grenada, or to subvert the government of Nicaragua. And a cause may be just—getting North Korea to withdraw from South Korea, getting Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait, or ending terrorism — but it does not follow that going to war on behalf of that cause, with the inevitable mayhem that follows, is just.

Only a few weeks into the bombing, reports began to come out of civilians being killed, hospitals being bombed, people being deprived of clean water and power, children wounded. The result was to frighten hundreds of thousands of Afghans into abandoning their homes and taking to the dangerous, mine-strewn roads. The “war against terrorism” has become a war against innocent men, women, and children, who were in no way responsible for the terrorist attack on New York.

And yet there are those who say this is a “just war.”

Terrorism and war have something in common. They both involve the killing of innocent people to achieve what the killers believe is a good end. I can see an immediate objection to this equation: They (the terrorists) deliberately kill innocent people; we (the war makers) aim at “military targets,” and civilians are killed by accident, as “collateral damage.”

Is it really an accident when civilians die under our bombs? Even if you grant that the intention is not to kill civilians, if they nevertheless become victims, again and again and again, can that be called
an accident? If the deaths of civilians are inevitable in bombing, it may not be deliberate, but it is not an accident, and the bombers cannot be considered innocent. They are committing murder as surely as are the terrorists.

The absurdity of claiming innocence in such cases becomes apparent when the death tolls from “collateral damage” reach figures far greater than the lists of the dead from even the most awful act of terrorism. Thus, the “collateral damage” in the Gulf War caused more people to die — hundreds of thousands, if you include the victims of our sanctions policy — than the very deliberate terrorist attack of September 11. The total of those who have died in Israel from Palestinian terrorist bombs is somewhere under 1,000. The number of dead from “collateral damage” in the bombing of Beirut during Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was roughly 6,000.

We must not match the death lists — it is an ugly exercise — as if one atrocity is worse than another. No killing of innocents, whether deliberate or “accidental,” can be justified. My argument is that when children die at the hands of terrorists, or — whether intended or not — as a result of bombs dropped from airplanes, terrorism and war become equally unpardonable.

Let’s talk about “military targets.” The phrase is so loose that President Truman, after the nuclear bomb obliterated the population of Hiroshima, could say: “The world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military base. That was because we wished in this first attack to avoid, insofar as possible, the killing of civilians.”

What we are hearing now from our political leaders is, “We are targeting military objectives. We are trying to avoid killing civilians. But that will happen, and we regret it.” Shall the American people take moral comfort from the thought that we are bombing only “military targets”?

The reality is that the term “military” covers all sorts of targets that include civilian populations. When our bombers deliberately destroy, as they did in the war against Iraq, the electrical infrastructure, thus making water purification and sewage treatment plants inoperable and leading to epidemic waterborne diseases, the deaths of children and other civilians cannot be called accidental.

Recall that in the midst of the Gulf War, the U.S. military bombed an air raid shelter, killing 400 to 500 men, women, and children who were huddled to escape bombs. The claim was that it was a military target, housing a communications center, but reporters going through the ruins immediately afterward said there was no sign of anything like that.

I suggest that the history of bombing — and no one has bombed more than this nation — is a history of endless atrocities, all calmly explained by deceptive and deadly language like “accident,” “military targets,” and “collateral damage.”

Indeed, in both World War II and in Vietnam, the historical record shows that there was a deliberate decision to target civilians in order to destroy the morale of the enemy — hence the firebombing of Dresden, Hamburg, Tokyo, the B-52s over Hanoi, the jet bombers over peaceful villages in the Vietnam countryside. When some argue that we can engage in “limited military action” without “an excessive use of force,” they are ignoring the history of bombing. The momentum of war rides roughshod over limits.

The moral equation in Afghanistan is clear. Civilian casualties are certain. The outcome is uncertain. No one knows whether it will lead to a democratic Afghanistan (very unlikely) or an end to terrorism (almost certainly not).

And in the meantime, we are terrorizing the population (not the terrorists; they are not easily terrorized). Hundreds of thousands packed their belongings and their children onto carts and left their homes to make dangerous journeys to places they thought might be more safe.

Not one human life should have been expended in this reckless violence called a “war against terrorism.”
We might examine the idea of pacifism in the light of what is going on right now. I have never used the word “pacifist” to describe myself, because it suggests something absolute, and I am suspicious of absolutes. I want to leave openings for unpredictable possibilities. There might be situations (and even such strong pacifists as Gandhi and Martin Luther King believed this) when a small, focused act of violence against a monstrous, immediate evil would be justified.

In war, however, the proportion of means to ends is very, very different. War, by its nature, is unfocused, indiscriminate, and especially in our time when the technology is so murderous, inevitably involves the deaths of large numbers of people and the suffering of even more. Even in the “small wars” (Iran vs. Iraq, the Nigerian war, the Afghan war), a million people die. Even in a “tiny” war like the one we waged in Panama, a thousand or more die.

Scott Simon of NPR wrote a commentary in The Wall Street Journal on October 11, 2001, entitled, “Even Pacifists Must Support This War.” He tried to use the pacifist acceptance of self-defense, which approves a focused resistance to an immediate attacker, to justify this war, which he claims is “self-defense.” But the term “self-defense” does not apply when you drop bombs all over a country and kill lots of people other than your attacker. And it doesn’t apply when there is no likelihood that it will achieve its desired end.

Pacifism, which I define as a rejection of war, rests on a very powerful logic. In war, the means — indiscriminate killing — are immediate and certain; the ends, however desirable, are distant and uncertain.

Pacifism does not mean “appeasement.” That word is often hurled at those who condemn the present war on Afghanistan, and it is accompanied by references to Churchill, Chamberlain, Munich. World War II analogies are conveniently summoned forth when there is a need to justify a war, however irrelevant to a particular situation. At the suggestion that we withdraw from Vietnam, or not make war on Iraq, the word “appeasement” was bandied about. The glow of the “good war” has repeatedly been used to obscure the nature of all the bad wars we have fought since 1945.

Let’s examine that analogy. Czechoslovakia was handed to the voracious Hitler to “appease” him. Germany was an aggressive nation expanding its power, and to help it in its expansion was not wise. But today we do not face an expansionist power that demands to be appeased. We ourselves are the expansionist power — troops in Saudi Arabia, bombings of Iraq, military bases all over the world, naval vessels on every sea — and that, along with Israel’s expansion into the West Bank and Gaza Strip, has aroused anger.

It was wrong to give up Czechoslovakia to appease Hitler. It is not wrong to withdraw our military from the Middle East, or for Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories, because there is no right to be there. That is not appeasement. That is justice.

Opposing the bombing of Afghanistan does not constitute “giving into terrorism” or “appeasement.” It asks that other means be found than war to solve the problems that confront us. King and Gandhi both believed in action — nonviolent direct action, which is more powerful and certainly more morally defensible than war.

To reject war is not to “turn the other cheek,” as pacifism has been caricatured. It is, in the present instance, to act in ways that do not imitate the terrorists.

The United States could have treated the September 11 attack as a horrific criminal act that calls for apprehending the culprits, using every device of intelligence and investigation possible. It could have gone to the United Nations to enlist the aid of other countries in the pursuit and apprehension of the terrorists.

There was also the avenue of negotiations. (And let’s not hear: “What? Negotiate with those monsters?” The United States negotiated with — indeed, brought into power and kept in power — some of
the most monstrous governments in the world.) Before Bush ordered in the bombers, the Taliban offered to put bin Laden on trial. This was ignored. After ten days of air attacks, when the Taliban called for a halt to the bombing and said they would be willing to talk about handing bin Laden to a third country for trial, the headline the next day in *The New York Times* read: “President Rejects Offer by Taliban for Negotiations,” and Bush was quoted as saying: “When I said no negotiations, I meant no negotiations.”

That is the behavior of someone hellbent on war. There were similar rejections of negotiating possibilities at the start of the Korean War, the war in Vietnam, the Gulf War, and the bombing of Yugoslavia. The result was an immense loss of life and incalculable human suffering.

International police work and negotiations were — still are — alternatives to war. But let’s not deceive ourselves; even if we succeeded in apprehending bin Laden or, as is unlikely, destroying the entire al Qaeda network, that would not end the threat of terrorism, which has potential recruits far beyond al Qaeda.

To get at the roots of terrorism is complicated. Dropping bombs is simple. It is an old response to what everyone acknowledges is a very new situation. At the core of unspeakable and unjustifiable acts of terrorism are justified grievances felt by millions of people who would not themselves engage in terrorism but from whose ranks terrorists spring.

Those grievances are of two kinds: the existence of profound misery — hunger, illness — in much of the world, contrasted to the wealth and luxury of the West, especially the United States; and the presence of American military power everywhere in the world, propping up oppressive regimes and repeatedly intervening with force to maintain U.S. hegemony.

This suggests actions that not only deal with the long-term problem of terrorism but are in themselves just.

Instead of using two planes a day to drop food on Afghanistan and 100 planes to drop bombs (which have been making it difficult for the trucks of the international agencies to bring in food), we should have used 102 planes to bring food.

Take the money allocated for our huge military machine and use it to combat starvation and disease around the world. One-third of our military budget would annually provide clean water and sanitation facilities for the billion people in the world who have none.

Withdraw troops from Saudi Arabia, because their presence near the holy shrines of Mecca and Medina angers not just bin Laden (we need not care about angering him) but huge numbers of Arabs who are not terrorists.

Stop the cruel sanctions on Iraq, which are killing more than a thousand children every week without doing anything to weaken Saddam Hussein's tyrannical hold over the country.

Insist that Israel withdraw from the occupied territories, something that many Israelis also think is right, and which will make Israel more secure than it is now.

In short, let us pull back from being a military superpower, and become a humanitarian superpower.

Let us be a more modest nation. We will then be more secure. The modest nations of the world don't face the threat of terrorism.

Such a fundamental change in foreign policy is hardly to be expected. It would threaten too many interests: the power of political leaders, the ambitions of the military, the corporations that profit from the nation’s enormous military commitments.

Change will come, as at other times in our history, only when American citizens — becoming better informed, having second thoughts after the first instinctive support for official policy — demand it. That change in citizen opinion, especially if it coincides with a pragmatic decision by the government that its violence isn't working, could bring about a retreat from the military solution.

It might also be a first step in the rethinking of our nation’s role in the world. Such a rethinking contains the promise, for Americans, of genuine security, and for people elsewhere, the beginning of hope.

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This article was adapted from one that appeared in the November 2001 issue of *The Progressive*. By permission of the author.
Within a week of the attack, I added my voice to the clamor of voices debating the events of 11 September 2001. I made two sets of comments then, and they are essentially unchanged now. Many of my thoughts and predictions turned out to be right on the mark. The first set of comments pertained to the economic impact of the terror attack; the second, more unusual, referred to what economists call the “economics of terrorism.”

THE REAL ECONOMIC IMPACT

With regard to the first topic, I made two points. First, while the gruesome reality is that thousands died, that two big buildings collapsed, and that many other buildings and the infrastructure were badly affected, the reality also is that relative to the nation as a whole, the death and damage has been minor. The nation consists, after all, of more than 280 million people and of their daily production. Important as they are, Manhattan and the Pentagon building are small in relation to the United States as a whole. The country’s overall capacity to be productive is unaffected. Taking a long-run perspective, the estimate of $10, $20, or even $50 billion worth of direct damage is not much when compared with our $10 trillion economy. To many, this will sound heartless, even cynical. Perhaps. But this sort of calculation is just as real as are the death and destruction that we have witnessed.

Continuing with this “hard-nosed” attitude, I said, note that the country’s financial functions are essentially unaffected by the attack. The financial markets work as before, and your money is still in the bank. The computerized financial records that are kept in the World Trade Center are backed up nightly and are nearly fully available as well. The Federal Reserve Bank made clear that there is no monetary crisis; it also injected extra liquidity into the economy and, in conjunction with Central Banks elsewhere in the world, lowered interest rates yet again. As an independent observer and economist, I fully concur that there is no economic or financial crisis.

Half a year on, this set of comments turned out to be correct. The economic recession, if indeed there was any at all (that is still debated), was dated to have begun in March 2001. My own opinion is that it was caused by the uncertainty surrounding the U.S. presidential election in November 2000. The terror attack certainly added to the further slowing of economic activity, especially in business travel and tourism, but was primarily a function of Americans shooting themselves in the economic foot — fear induces one to consume less, and thereby to rob your neighbor of his or her job. The forceful federal response improved the people’s confidence, so that economic activity resumed at normal levels (that is, economic growth resumed).

The “impact” part of the attack is trivial from an economist’s point of view (sad, to be sure, though it involves such dicey moral and technical issues as
how to value the loss of lives, but it’s nonetheless trivial). The much more interesting part concerns the economics of terrorism, in other words, the understanding of the terrorist mind. What makes it tick, and what can be done? Let’s start with a definition, supplied by my esteemed colleagues Todd Sandler of the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, and Keith Hartley of the University of York, United Kingdom: “Terrorism is the premeditated use, or threat of use, of extra-normal violence or brutality to gain a political objective through intimidation or fear” (Sandler and Hartley, 1995, p. 308).

This definition contains four elements: (a) the inducement of intimidation or fear; (b) the use, or threat of use, of extra-normal violence; (c) the premeditated character of such violence; and (d) the political objective. This definition applies to nuclear-weapons posturing as it applies to the narco-rebels in the Colombian jungle as it also fits 11 September 2001. The last element — the political objective — is of particular interest because it requires that terrorists must reveal their identity and that they must communicate their demands.

Before proceeding, let us understand a couple of general items. First, we need to distinguish between domestic and transnational terrorism. The attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., and the December 2001 attack on the Indian parliament are examples of transnational terror. The attacks by Basque terrorists in Spain or the aforementioned jungle in the Colombian hinterland involve acts of domestic terror, as did the Sarin nerve-gas attack in Tokyo and the Oklahoma City bombing a few years back. Second, let us recognize that terror comes in a variety of flavors. The four major categories are: first, bombings (embassies, letter bombs, car bombs, and so on); second, hostage-taking (hijackings or kidnappings at sea, in the air, or on the ground, say at embassies or at Philippine scuba-diving resorts); third, assassinations; and fourth, threats and hoaxes. These tend to move in cycles for reasons to be discussed. Bombs are the most frequently undertaken terror action, again for reasons to be discussed shortly. Terror activities come in cycles, with around 150 transnational incidents per three-month period since 1968.

The “impact” part of the attack is trivial from an economist’s point of view (sad, to be sure, and it involves such dicey moral and technical issues as how to value the loss of lives, but nonetheless trivial). The much more interesting part concerns the economics of terrorism, in other words, the understanding of the terrorist mind. What makes it tick, and what can be done?

Drawing on this literature, let me make a few salient points on how we believe the terrorist mind works and what effect government action has on terrorist perceptions and opportunities. First, economists are interested in behavior. We treat all subjects, even terrorists, as behaving rationally. This does not mean that we condone their actions. Rather, it means that we assume (and then test empirically) that once terrorists have decided on their objective, they go about their beastly business in a rational manner, given the resources at their disposal. These include their own financial resources, shelter, and logistic and other support (such as expertise, training, intelligence information) offered by other groups and other governments. Resources can be augmented by training, by profits derived from legitimate businesses, by conversion of new recruits to the cause, and by other means. The reports of al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, and training camps of other groups elsewhere, make perfect sense to an economist. We would see this as an investment that pays off in terms of future terrorist productivity, that is, increased effectiveness per incident. It is a matter of maximum bang for your buck, to put it provocatively.

Second, even terrorists have the option of choosing among legal action, illegal action, or an arbitrary combination between the two (the IRA in Northern Ireland would be an example). Repressive govern-
ments, by foreclosing legal avenues of voicing dissent, are therefore directly responsible for limiting dissenters’ feasible set of options that push them into illegal, that is, terrorist, activity. If the cost of legal dissent is raised by government (by limiting or forbidding it), then the relative cost of illegal dissent has in effect been lowered, and we would expect to observe a larger quantity of terror behavior (as theory predicts, a price change induces behavioral changes). Repressive Arab regimes — of which there are many — bear direct responsibility for 11 September, protestations notwithstanding.

Third, if one raises the cost of one type of illegal behavior, theory predicts that terrorists will substitute and pursue other types of terror. That indeed is what happened. The installation of airport metal detectors beginning in 1973 increased the cost of hijackings and induced terrorists to switch to other targets, namely increased attacks on embassies. When embassies were secured as from 1976 onward, terrorists shifted to attacking diplomatic personnel away from secured embassy grounds. As U.S. interests abroad were secured, terrorists now shifted to the U.S. mainland itself.

Fourth, as mentioned, bombings are by far the preferred method of terror. The reason, once more, has to do with the cost of the action. Hostage-taking is logistically more complex and operationally more risky than is bombing. Bombing is not only cheap for the terrorist but more costly for government to detect (far fewer communications available for interception for instance, making it harder to track down potential bombers). Once more, as theory predicts, a lower cost will attract more activity.

Fifth, the availability of large numbers of terrorist recruits makes them more expendable and will permit more suicide missions, especially if the recruits can be offered immaterial rewards (“heaven”). Whereas European terrorists in the 1960s and 1970s rarely committed suicide missions so that they could preserve their personnel base, Islamic fundamentalists, in contrast, have been able to draw on a much larger terrorist labor pool. Also note that the next generation of terrorists has already been “farmed” on the nutrient of past discontent and repression of freedom of speech. Current ideological intervention is unlikely to affect the current crop of those in their late teens and early twenties. Terror will be with us for at least another generation, and probably more than that.

Sixth, terrorism moves in cycles. The length of the cycle corresponds to the logistical complexity of the incident. Threats and hoaxes display the shortest cycles; after all, they cost nothing. Bombings run on somewhat longer cycles but much shorter than do hostage-taking events. The cycles occur because after each severe event, governments take “decisive” action, making terrorism costlier for terrorists. After government attention wanes, the cycle swings upward again. Terrorists not only substitute one mode of attack for another, they also substitute over time by shifting currently planned attacks into the future (intertemporal substitution).

Seventh, there is more recent evidence that terrorism is limited by media attention and outlets. Recall that the objective is political in nature. Some demand must be made and communicated via the use, or threat of use, of force against those not directly involved in the decisionmaking process. That is, popular pressure must be incited against the target government. But popular pressure works only via media channels, and there is some evidence of media clogging or “crowding.” Absent a free press, terrorist dissent in China or Myanmar (Burma) does not work well. Terror is a “western” phenomenon.

Eighth, in dealing with terrorists, governments possess but three options: (a) capitulate, (b) never capitulate, and (c) negotiate. Option (a) is unavailable to most governments which, to safeguard democratic principles, cannot give in to the demands of the unelected. Also, theory predicts that capitulation encourages ever-bolder follow-on acts of terror.
India capitulated to a group of hijackers who then, it turns out, attacked the Indian Parliament last December. In 1999, Colombian president Andrés Pastrana granted FARC rebels control of territory equivalent to the size of Switzerland, in exchange for peace negotiations, only to have the FARC become even more audacious. It follows that government must oppose terrorists, but the response must be carefully calibrated between negotiating but not capitulating. Regrettably, we have data only on terrorist events, not on the details of negotiation, and we therefore cannot test any theories we might devise.

Ninth, countries can protect themselves from terrorism by offering terrorists safe-haven in exchange for not themselves being attacked. As it turns out, France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom do not appear to have been particularly vigilant with regard to “Islamic” fundamentalist terrorism directed, for the most part, at the United States. Theory says that, so long as transnational terrorism is directed against any one nation, the other nations have little incentive to help bear the cost of that nation’s antiterrorist operations and requests for antiterror cooperation. This helps explain why a number of European nations have only in the past few months “discovered” so very many terrorist cells directed against the United States. The hypothesis here is that this happened because the United States quickly issued substantial and rather more credible threats against its European allies that made it “cheaper” for the Europeans to cooperate with the United States than not to cooperate — at least for the time being. After all, the United States is a substantial power and can make things uncomfortable for Europe.

In sum, terrorism is not a “crime of passion.” Contrary to public opinion, terrorists do not take lives indiscriminately. Instead, terrorists are rational: they take lives deliberately, or else they use the threat of taking lives as a tool of negotiation to achieve their objectives at the least cost.

**POLICY OPTIONS AGAINST TERRORISM**

Finally, what are the policy options and prospects? Again with apologies to my aforementioned colleagues, let me highlight a few points:

- First, government must beware of terrorist rationality, fortify likely substitute targets, and direct future terrorist attacks toward substitute targets that are increasingly less costly to the target society.
- Second, government must also beware of intertemporal substitution and maintain fortification for considerable lengths of time and not relax its vigilance too early (this implies extended costs).
- Third, government must further beware of spatial substitution (from attacks on the United States to attacks on U.S. citizens abroad or vice versa, which was why the 11 September 2001 attack came as a surprise).
- Fourth, governments must beware of target-country substitution, meaning that if the United States protects itself, more attacks might take place on or from other countries (for example, the attempted Paris-Miami flight bombing). This possibility raises a collective action problem where the set of target countries will want to free-ride on each others’ antiterror efforts and expenditures.
- Fifth, government must minimize terrorist resources, both directly in terms of their finances, personnel, and bases of operation, and indirectly by genuinely addressing whatever true and honest kernel of grievances may underlie the acts of terror; in other words, government must ultimately starve terrorists of their recruitment base.
- Sixth, piecemeal antiterror policy is ineffective because it allows too many loopholes through which terrorist activity will slip. Antiterror action must be collective and comprehensive. The achievement of either, or both, of these is questionable. Already President Bush is straining to repeatedly remind Europeans in particular to keep doing their part, and the idea that the U.S. government will ever do anything comprehensive strains credulity also.

Jurgen Brauer’s most recent book (with J. Paul Dunne) is due out in April 2002, *Arming the South: The Economics of Military Expenditure, Arms Production, and Arms Trade in Developing Countries* (Palgrave). He is vice-chair of Economists Allied for Arms Reduction (www.ecaar.org) and is professor of economics at Augusta State University in Augusta, Georgia, where he can be reached at www.aug.edu/~sbajmb. He is also president of the Augusta State University chapter of The Honor Society of Phi Kappa Phi.

**For Further Reading:**


The September 11 attack on the United States awakened in all Americans the reality of modern life and our vulnerability to danger and trauma. The purpose of this article is to describe the efforts of the Green Cross Projects (GCP) in responding to the attack by helping those immediately affected in New York City. The GCP was established in 1995 in response to the Oklahoma City bombing to provide disaster mental-health training, education, and services to those in need. The GCP emerged over the ensuing years as a membership-based, humanitarian-assistance program providing traumatology services to individuals, groups, and communities recovering from disasters and other traumatic events (Figley, 1997).

Within hours of the attack, the GCP was mobilized to provide mental-health services to survivors in New York City’s lower Manhattan. For the next month, GCP volunteers worked with several thousand people to help them overcome their immediate disorientation and help prevent the expected posttraumatic stress reactions that might develop into potentially disabling mental disorders. This article tells the story of the efforts of the GCP and provides a primer for others who have helped or wish to help those victimized by terrorism.

GCP OVERVIEW

The mission of the GCP is to provide immediate trauma intervention to any area of our world when a crisis occurs. Most often GCP members provide humanitarian service in their local communities through either an individual effort or a mobilization. However, GCP is unique in its ability to activate large numbers of trained traumatologists to respond to major disasters, such as the one that struck lower Manhattan, New York City, on September 11.

HISTORY

Any organization providing assistance must be very clear about what the affected community needs and wants. Immediately following the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, Charles Figley met with public and private officials to determine what would be most needed by those responsible for helping the bombing victims, their families, the rescue workers, and others affected. It was determined that training was the most acute need. Within a few months more than a thousand professionals received at least one workshop of training, and fifty-eight completed the entire five-course program of training and received a certificate as a Registered Traumatologist (Figley, 1998).

Those Registered Traumatologists became the founding members of the GCP and were ready to apply the lessons that they had learned both in the classroom and in their own state in helping people recover from a terrorist attack. As it turned out, Oklahoma sent one of the largest contingents of GCP traumatologists to New York, second only to Florida.

The program of training that they had completed was adopted by Florida State University’s Traumatology Institute as the Certified Traumatologist certificate program (Figley, 1998). Over the years the Institute
established three other certifications: Master Traumatologist, Field Traumatologist, and Compassion-Fatigue Specialist. With certification comes automatic membership in the GCP. Members practice traumatology guided by the Academy of Traumatology standards of practice and ethical guidelines (Figley, 1999). The GCP web site (http://www.greencross.20m.com/) informs members throughout the world. During the New York City mobilization, for example, on the website were updates on what was happening, copies of various messages to members, press releases, news accounts, and other helpful information for those who had been activated as well as others who were interested.

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**GCP MOBILIZATION GOAL**

The goal of every GCP deployment is to transform “victims” into “survivors.” Immediately after a traumatic event, victims attempt to address five fundamental questions (Figley, 1985):

1. **What happened to me?** This question can be applied to one’s family, company, neighborhood, city, or country. This is the most fundamental question in the processing of trauma memories and is associated with experiencing shock, disbelief, disorientation, and confusion. The GCP service providers help the clients to recognize what has happened to them. Most often this recognition is achieved by encouraging them to talk about their experiences or express them in some other way such as through expressive therapies (for example, poetry and drawings).

2. **Why did it happen to me (us)?** This question is at the heart of one’s sense of responsibility for either the cause or the consequence of the event, or both. Similarly, GCP service providers create an opportunity for the traumatized to reevaluate their actions, often associated with guilt. This was certainly the case with those who had worked in or near Ground Zero.

3. **Why did I (we) do what I (we) did during and right after this disaster?** This second-guessing and self-analysis is central to acquiring some degree of mastery over the memories and events that were or still are traumatic. GCP service providers gently encourage survivors to address such difficult and often troubling thoughts associated with self-evaluation. Often hearing other survivors talk about their misgivings enables them to reassure those others while, at the same time, reassuring themselves.

4. **Why have I (we) acted as I (we) have since the disaster?** This is an effort to self-assess, to determine whether what is being experienced is cause for alarm and requires the help of others. It also suggests the need for mastery of what may be described as being obsessed with the traumatic event. GCP service providers offer a wide variety and a large number of public-education sessions that discuss the immediate and long-term psychosocial consequences and opportunities following dangerous and horrible events. These sessions address not only how to handle events as a survivor, but also how to help friends and family to evaluate what are normal reactions and to cope with those that require more attention and perhaps professional assistance.

5. **Will I (we) be able to cope if this disaster happens again?** This is the most fundamental of questions. It is an indication of whether or how much the survivor has learned from the trauma and its wake. The answer to this and the other questions forms the survivor’s “healing theory” (Figley, 1985; 1989) and enables the survivor to move on in his or her life and let go of the emotional reactions associated with the memories. This last question is the most challenging for GCP service providers because only time and lots of discussion and processing enable survivors to develop their own healing theory.

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**STANDARD MOBILIZATION SERVICES PROVIDED**

The GCP responds to requests from individuals, organizations, and other entities after a traumatic event. A request can include any or all of the following:

1. **Crisis Assistance and Counseling** (helping those in shock get back on their feet and access their natural coping methods and resources).

2. **Assessment and Referral Services** (identifying who is recovering properly from the traumatic event, who is not, why they are not recovering, and what additional or other services are needed when and by whom).

3. **Orientation and Consultation to Management** (educating management about the immediate, week-to-week, and long-term consequences of traumatic events for individuals, work groups, families, and larger systems).

4. **Training, Education, and Certification** (preparing management, human resources, employee-assistance professionals, and service providers with sufficient guidance and competence to first do no harm to the traumatized and help them recover).

5. **Family Resource Management** (designing and implementing programs for strengthening and promoting family wellness in the wake of traumatic events, with special attention to young children).

6. **Long-Term Trauma Counseling** (helping those
unable to recover quickly from the trauma by providing individual and group trauma and grief counseling).

These services are provided over varying periods of time and are performed initially by members of a deployment team. They are transported into the affected area within hours after the request is made. They stay for three to six weeks or until local GCP members can relieve them.

The GCP works with the host or client to clarify the mission of the deployment and specify measurable and attainable goals. Typically, the services provided are phased in as appropriate and include crisis stabilization, stress management, assessment and referral, grief and loss consultation and counseling, and training.

THE ATTACK

At 8:46 A.M. on September 11 in the first year of the millennium, America’s sense of security was changed forever. American Airlines Flight 11, a Boeing 767 carrying ninety-two people, crashed into the World Trade Center’s North Tower. Eighteen minutes later United Airlines Flight 175, also a Boeing 767, with sixty-five people aboard crashed into the World Trade Center at the South Tower. Two other tragedies were about to happen involving two other locations and two other planes. Everyone in lower Manhattan was focused on the horror of the Trade Center towers.

Fifteen blocks away more than 800 people watched in horror from the Service Employee International Union Local 32B-J building on Avenue of the Americas at Grand Street. Most witnessed people jumping from the Towers to their death, the stream of rescue workers responding to the disaster, the stream of New Yorkers fleeing from the explosions, and then the Towers collapsing. More than 1500 members of 32B-J worked in the World Trade Towers. Another 7500 members were working in Manhattan below 14th Street, blocks from Ground Zero. Not only was 32B-J suffering its worst single day of loss of life, but also its professional staff, managers, and general staff were in emotional shock. They required massive assistance.

As the networks broadcast the news of the attack, Kathleen Figley placed the GCP on standby and identified two teams of six members who were prepared to go immediately to New York. It was just a matter of time until a request for services would be made.

THE INVITATION

Through professional colleagues the management of Local 32BJ learned of the GCP and requested immediate assistance. In the September 14 invitation letter to the Founder (Charles Figley) and current President (Kathleen Figley), Mary Ellen Boyd, the Chief Executive Officer of the Union’s Health Fund, explained, “We have a small Employee Assistance staff and a group of volunteer therapists to help us deal with the situation but we are totally without expertise.”

Her letter went on to say, “Your assistance would be invaluable. Our employees and members are suffering with many different symptoms and their families are reporting difficulties as well. To add to our complications, will be the economic realities our members will be facing.” Ms. Boyd herself would be forced out of her residence because she lived in the blast area near the World Trade Center.

GCP SEPTEMBER 11 MOBILIZATION

Mobilization is declared by the president of the GCP based on (a) a specific invitation from a host organization, (b) a specific and attainable mission as identified through interaction with the host, (c) availability of sufficient resources and members, and (d) identification of key individuals to serve in the key disaster-service roles. The president of the GCP is responsible for recognizing that a disaster of sufficient magnitude may require the services of the GCP and for placing the organization on standby status. GCP operates under the Incident Command System to ensure role clarity, avoid duplication of effort, and integrate into any disaster operation structure.

Incident Command System

Consistent with crisis-management protocol (the Incident Command System), GCP members filled the roles of Incident Commander (initially Kathleen Figley), Operations Manager, Public Relations Specialist (Charles Figley), and team leaders who each supervised five traumatologists.

The Incident Commander (IC) is responsible for GCP deployment, following a standard protocol for the operation using chain of command as well as acting as the point of contact with the host organization. The Operations Manager (OM) is responsible for the day-to-day service provision, including supervising the team leaders, monitoring the quality of services delivered, and ensuring that all appropriate documentation of services is delivered. The Public Relations Specialist is responsible for representing the GCP mobilization to all entities outside the operation, including the news media, other organizations involved in the operation, and the general public.

Additional roles include Logistics Officer and Finance/Administration Officer, who ensure that all
logistics and planning are complete, all transportation needs are coordinated, and all necessary supplies are procured.

These roles are consistent with the incident command structure used by most response-oriented organizations. Unlike other organizations, however, the GCP in its operations manual requires that all teams include a compassion-fatigue specialist responsible for daily team defusing, the general morale of the team, and follow-up after the traumatologists return home.

After the September 14 letter was received by the GCP, Kathleen Figley declared the mobilization, established the New York GCP, and dispatched the advance party of GCP workers to arrive September 16. The Incident Commander (Kathleen Figley) and Public Relations Specialist (Charles Figley) met with the Host (32B-J) mid-afternoon September 16, and together GCP and Local 32B-J established their plan of operations. An orientation to the operation was provided by the Incident Commander to all GCP team members on the evening of September 16, and services began the next day.

**Staffing**

GCP deployed a total of thirty-six traumatologist volunteers from September 16 through October 17, 2001, in teams numbering from eleven to fourteen. To maintain continuity of services, some team members were on site from one week to the next.

**INITIAL MOBILIZATION MISSION**

Before initiating services for the Host, it was agreed that the mission of the GCP New York at 32B-J was to help the management, staff, employees, and membership mitigate the impact of traumatic response induced by the September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade Center. This resulted in the following objectives.

**Primary Objective**

- Objective 1: Provide immediate critical-incident stress management and crisis-oriented services using scheduled group defusing/educational sessions with fund and union staff; scheduled individual defusing/educational sessions with fund, union staff, and members; unscheduled individual and/or group sessions with fund, union staff, and members; and crisis interventions as needed.

  GCP volunteers facilitated seventy-six group defusing/educational sessions from September 17 through October 14, 2001, with the fund and union staff, and 2,159 individual defusing/crisis interventions. Individuals with more than critical needs were referred to the Employee Assistance Program so that their needs could be met. There were approximately thirty referrals to the EAP by GCP personnel.

  GCP volunteers’ primary function on a deployment is to assess, stabilize, and refer as needed. During the assessment and stabilization process at 32B-J, more specific needs were discovered. The family members who had lost loved ones in the attack on the World Trade Center Towers faced a very difficult situation. Most of them would not have the body of their loved one for formal final services. This absence usually results in an ambiguous-loss process. Dr. Pauline Boss from the University of Minnesota, an expert in helping family members process ambiguous loss, brought two teams of ambiguous-loss experts from her program to New York City to work with affected 32B-J families.

  The first team of four ambiguous-loss specialists and Dr. Boss were on site from September 26 through 29, 2001. During their first deployment, the University of Minnesota team was able to contact and assist four family members who had lost loved ones and help them begin processing their ambiguous grief.

  During the University of Minnesota’s second deployment, from October 10 through 14, 2001, Dr. Boss and a team of four held a training program on ambiguous loss with twenty-three local mental-health professionals. This training was put to use on Saturday October 14, 2001, when eight families were brought together at 32B-J to begin developing their support system.

**Other Objectives**

- Objective 2: Provide a five-hour course in basic care for the traumatized to 100 licensed mental-health providers who will form the basis for a referral networking system working with the Employee Assistance Program at 32B-J. Provide additional courses on traumatology as needed and requested.

- Objective 3: Provide a course on compassion fatigue that will increase self-care for those mental-health professionals and others who have provided services to the victims. The compassion-fatigue course is designed to keep the mental-health professionals healthy so that they can continue to provide services.

  GCP trainers provided four sixteen-hour trainings for certification as a Registered Traumatologist to sixty-nine mental-health professionals. Training included basic care for the traumatized, as well as self-care for the mental-health professionals while

*continued on page 48*
WEIGHTING TIME

Peter Huggins’s second book of poems, *Blue Angels*, clearly demonstrates this poet’s ability to bring to the foreground those mysterious forces one senses emanating from the ordinary world. Though long the province of poets and priests, the desire of this book seems to be to locate, name, and, sometimes, even praise the unseen world of spirit, ghost, and dream. This is no small task for a contemporary poet. For his poems are written in a time when the mystical in our culture often appears to us as a cross between *The Poseidon Adventure — The Movie* and *Survivor Island*. Hercules is a cartoon character. Ghosts have Ph.D’s in psychology. Dreams are the stuff of E.T.’s anxiety of influence. It seems that we want our spirits friendly and/or tamable; our ghosts, witty and urbane; our dreams, manageable.

But Huggins’s poems do not shrink from the difficult world where questions breed doubts, doubts raise up fear, and fear, finally, stands before us on both hind legs and roars: you will consider other possibilities.

For example, in the wonderfully titled piece, “For the Man Who Struck a Small Boy One Wednesday Afternoon in Auburn,” the poet urges the reader to consider one’s life carefully, to not live [a] life of memory and regret. Yet the poet does acknowledge the almost Job-like affliction that comes when one does live deliberately. In the poem “Choctaw Point” the line, which also seems to be the underlying lament throughout the entire book, asserts: I wish I didn’t need to master myself. We find, in the poem “On a Print of Piranesi” the poet opening with the lines I wish I could seeIn black and white . . . , and this wish for simple clarity is stated with a plaintive desire that borders on the line between prayer and despair. Then, in the poem “Taking my Cuts,” the poet seems to speak to the reader who is honest about facing the impossible hardships of simply being human. The reader can not help but feeling that the following lines were written for the especially brave, the very special person who faces himself/herself dead-on: I’m convinced I’m/A candidate for sainthood.

Throughout this book there are ghosts of other poets, of other people. It’s as if the pages themselves were walls through which both poet and reader could walk, stopping just a bit to listen in, to ponder the situation before moving on. For example, Huggins’s poem “Dusting” echoes Rita Dove’s often anthologized work of the same name. Dove’s poem, like Huggins’s, deals with memory and regret. In one poem, even Perry Mason makes a brief appearance.

There are some remarkable moments in this book. Clearly its poems have a mature sense of themselves though they offer the reader no quick or easy resolution to questions posed in the poems or to the poetics of life’s most opaque questions. The poems do not shrink — as the poet writes — under the force of *The Blue Weight of Time* — memory, desire, or regret — as seen in Huggins’s “The Salvage Diver.” They speak with compassion, wit, and authority. Above all else, the poems are not afraid to look the reader in the eye and dare him or her to hope — wisely.

When Patrick shines a light
Into the mouth of my car,
I know the angel
Is in there and he’s laughing
His fool head off
As he turns the engine over.

— “Finding an Angel”
Peter Huggins

Lois Roma-Deeley, a poet and professor of creative writing at Paradise Valley Community College, is also a poetry editor of the *Phi Kappa Phi Forum*.
Letters to the Editor

VIOLENCE

A
fter reading your “Violence” issue [Fall 2000, Vol. 80, No. 4] I was impressed with the thought that there is such a huge rift between the eastern/urban and the western/rural mindset as to be almost insurmountable. To read these articles would lead a person to believe that all guns are evil, and we must do all we can to banish them forever. What a contrast to the area where I live, and teach, where many own guns, both pistols and rifles, and enjoy them as recreation. Hitting a tin can at 25 meters with my .45 can be just as fulfilling as hitting a golf ball 280 meters with my Taylormade. I have done both. Believing that by taking away all firearms we would eliminate some of the mayhem of our society is faulty thinking. Followed to its conclusion we might as well include automobiles; they certainly kill enough people each year. Next we would see the airlines banning pencils and pens because they too can be used as a weapon. Either is far more lethal than the banned plastic knives. In all this we are straining at gnats and swallowing camels.

R. Davis
Idaho

CRIME & PUNISHMENT

Y
our approval of the issue on “Crime and Punishment” is an indicator of the gap between our Society motto and the resultant editorial implementation of faith-based, one-sided rhetoric in our magazine.

I suspect my membership is in arrears and so it will remain. Stop sending your version of “...Arbeit macht frei...” to me.

Although I am on the same page as most of the writers in this issue, I am first of all dedicated to learning factual information, which enables a thoughtful decision and intelligent discourse and debate. Your publication, on the contrary, is just another faith-based journal of like-minded folks who swerve into resultant decisions based mainly on the vector-of-emotion axis. What you allowed into print I can find in any New York Times piece passed off to the public with little to no fact for the reader to assimilate. I do not support zealotry even when I agree with the issue.

Too bad for me, too bad for you with myopic vision, and too bad for a nation starved for information rather than a secular version of the Baltimore Catechism or Mein Kampf or The Communist Manifesto.

May we all wake up some day to realize that diversity (Brown-Boot lockstep behavior, as practiced) at the expense of cogency was a driving force bringing down other civilizations which, although strong in bigotry also were educationally challenged thus ruining country-specific advantages in a competitive global landscape. I think their problem also was more than correlative.

Anthony C. Deivert
Oak Park, Virginia

C
concerning the Spring 2002 issue on “Crime and Punishment,” it would have been interesting to have a discussion of the laws regarding crime and punishment contained in the Biblical Mosaic Law. I have never seen it discussed in any forum or commentary, but in the Mosaic Law there is no mention of any jails or prisons. The only confinement was in the form of protective custody in the Cities of Refuge. Justice appears to have been swift and final. This is significant, given the recidivism rate and the evidence that many come out of jail worse than when they went in. Also, the responsibility of enforcing the law was on the entire community, not just the law-enforcement officers.

For most minor crimes there was the requirement of restitution. When the crime was theft, the minimum requirement for restitution was to pay back double whatever was taken. As those in the debtors’ pris-

ons of past centuries would testify, it is hard to pay off debts when you cannot work. There was also harsh punishment for being a false witness. The person lying or bringing false charges was required to “pay” whatever the person falsely accused would have paid in restitution.

For capital crimes, the punishment was also swift and public. There was no sterile process behind closed doors. The entire community was required to participate in the stoning. It is interesting to look at the reason given for the death penalty. It is repeatedly stated that the reason was to “purge the evil from the land.” It was not for deterrence or punishment; it was to remove the evil influence from corrupting the society. It appears that there were some actions and activities which were so detrimental to the whole fabric of society that the only solution was to remove them from society. The stoning was done publicly and by all to affirm that such activities had to be removed to preserve the society.

On the other hand, the Mosaic Law provided a sense of community and hope. It was required of the entire community to take care of the widow and the orphan so that they would not have to resort to theft to live. The reapers were required to leave the gleanings in the field for the poor to collect for food. This practice was illustrated in the book of Ruth. However, all who could were expected to work. We need to put in place programs which build a sense of community and which give hope to all segments of society. This would probably require a complete overhaul of our criminal-justice, education, and welfare systems.

Duane Steiner, Ph.D.
Ridgecrest, California

I
just finished the Winter 2002 issue of the Phi Kappa Phi Forum and want to congratulate you on another great issue. I particularly enjoyed the diverse and thought-provoking opinions presented on the feature topic, “Crime and Punishment.”

Lois O’Connor
Houston, Texas
AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY: JUST ANOTHER FORM OF VIOLENCE

Mr. Bessler's claptrap of warmed-over ideological propaganda is a disgrace to the Forum. His intellectual deception belies his professed concern for the examples we set for our children. Paul Rubin’s approach to this topic provides the opportunity for rational discourse. Mr. Bessler’s logic is only the arrogance of his feelings.

Mr. Bessler’s call for tougher gun-control laws is typical of the absurdity of his approach. Where tougher gun laws have been introduced, violent crimes against individuals have risen. Conversely, when gun-access laws have eased, violent crimes against individuals have decreased. Please look at the current violent-crime statistics in the United Kingdom (sharply increasing after a total ban on hand guns was enacted) and the State of Florida (where violent crime against individuals, notably carjacking, has sharply decreased since gun-ownership restrictions were eased).

For the Forum to carry the weight of intellectual leadership, it must insist on a foundation of intellectual honesty by its contributors. This topic and your readers deserve better.

Paul W. Martin, Jr.
Knoxville, Tennessee

LAGNIAPPE

Elaine S. Potoker’s “Lagniappe” remarks in the Winter 2002 issue were very good [“Click and Enter: A Dialectic over the Future of the Teaching/Learning Dynamic in an Era of Search Engines,” pp. 33-34]. As a librarian, I agree completely with her. The quibble I have with her article is that she ignores the role of librarians in remedying the situation. In fact, she throws in an unnecessary and somewhat hostile remark about keeping “libraries intellectually responsible.” Every librarian I know wants libraries to be intellectual centers and knows that one must keep a balance between books and electronic resources. We are constantly preaching and teaching the very ideas she is espousing, including critical thinking. Librarians are allies in her goals and in fact are eager to help instructors teach students the concepts that she espouses.

Chuck Dintrone
San Diego State University Library

(continued from page 45)

working with the traumatized. Of those mental-health professionals, forty-five are part of 32B-J’s Employee Assistance Program. The other twenty-four have indicated that they will volunteer their services to 32B-J as needed.

During the thirty-day mobilization to reach the above objectives it became clear that there would be far more traumatized Host members and employees requesting trauma services. There was ongoing interest and effort in establishing a GCP chapter at the time that this article was written.

Outcome

As an indication of the success of the New York Mobilization, the authors quote from a letter received from the president of the Host organization, Michael P. Fishman, October 25, 2001. The letter states in part:

From the day you hit the ground, GCP brought an immeasurable degree of safety and calmness as we dealt with what was for many the most horrible and tragic event of their lives. Time after time, people would tell me how they were struggling to get by and because of some connection with one of the GCP volunteers, they were able to continue to assist our members and carry on in their own lives.

It was hard to imagine, in the beginning, that five weeks later we would begin to have some distance from this terrible event and be able to resume some semblance of a normal, although changed, life. For this, we owe many thanks.

Charles R. Figley, Ph.D. is director of the Florida State University Traumatology Institute, and Editor of Traumatology: The International Journal (www.fsu.edu/~trauma). He and his clinical research team have provided information, education, consultation, and treatment for numerous individuals and communities who suffer the effects of trauma. His recent books include Treating Compassion Fatigue (2002, Brunner/Rutledge) and Brief Treatments for the Traumatized: A Project of the Green Cross Foundation (2002, Greenwood Books).

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Kathleen Regan Figley is the Vice President and CEO of Green Cross Foundation, Inc., a non-profit corporation specializing in traumatology-related humanitarian efforts, standards of practice in research, and consultation and education. She is certified as a Master Traumatologist and was recognized in 1998 as Green Cross Projects’ Traumatologist of the Year. e-mail: GCFRegan@aol.com

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